The Foreign Service Journal, January 2007

I would like to respond to Kevin Stringer’s article, “The Pacific Microstates and U.S. Security” (November 2006 FSJ ). Mr. Stringer makes a compelling case for U.S. engagement in the Pacific, and is cor- rect in pointing out the many obsta- cles the region faces. Unfortunately, Mr. Stringer overlooks the fact that the U.S. government is already taking many of the actions he prescribes. While some retrenchment did occur in the 1990s, the U.S. govern- ment never disengaged from the region. In fact, the U.S. has recently expanded its presence: in 2006 the State Department approved the es- tablishment of new regional environ- mental and public diplomacy hubs in Suva, with a mandate to expand our programs and enhance our efforts in those two key areas in the Pacific. The nontraditional security con- cerns highlighted in the article are real, and the U.S. is acting on them. The State Department, along with other U.S. government entities such as the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Pacific Command, is working to strengthen maritime security architecture in the region. The practical result of such cooperation will be a Pacific in which the ability of terrorists, organized crime syndicates and other mala fide operators to act is drastically curtailed. We also work closely with Australia and New Zealand in addressing these threats. Despite Mr. Stringer’s contention that “Beijing’s expanding influence in Oceania has gone almost unremarked in Washington,” the U.S. is not only aware of China’s diplomatic and com- mercial forays in the region, but has engaged with China and Taiwan on a variety of fronts to encourage them to temper their actions, and with the island states to sensitize them to the risks of unbridled “checkbook diplo- macy.” Despite these efforts, the real- ity is that China/Taiwan competition will affect the region for the foresee- able future. The U.S. therefore has been and will be committed to press- ing donors to use foreign assistance in a manner that enhances transparency and promotes good governance. In the article’s final section, Mr. Stringer suggests the U.S. can fill the “strategic vacuum” in Oceania by “renewing U.S. diplomatic engage- ment in the region through physical presence, personal diplomacy and aid.” We agree. To that end, high- level officials from the departments of State, Interior, Defense and other agencies travel frequently to the region to consult with key officials. In the last few months, Pacific Island leaders have been able to meet with high-level State Department officials, both on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly in New York and in Nadi, Fiji, at the Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Dialogue. These meetings happen on a yearly basis and are characterized by frank, mutually beneficial, high-level dialogue. The U.S. government sees Van- uatu as a worthy aid recipient; that is why the Millennium Challenge Corp- oration inked a compact with Vanuatu in early 2006. This compact will even- tually provide over $60 million dollars in assistance to the country, and is a potential model for other countries that aim to sign compacts with the MCC. There are other ways in which the U.S. remains engaged in the Pacific, too. We provide, via the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, some $18 million to South Pacific states in order to have access to their waters for tuna fishing. The U.S. gives tens of millions of dol- lars per year in grants to Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands through its Compacts of Free Association with those nations. The Peace Corps plays an important role in promoting sus- tainable development and people-to- people ties in many countries in the region. There are other examples, too. 18 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7 The U.S. Is Engaged in the South Pacific B Y C. S TEVEN M C G ANN I N R ESPONSE Far from retrenching, we have recently expanded our presence in the region.