The Foreign Service Journal, February 2005

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 45 F O C U S O N T H E P O W E L L L E G A C Y T HE R ICE D OCTRINE he departure of Colin Powell as Secretary of State marks the formal end of the Powell Doctrine. That doctrine, originally attributed to Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, called for the United States to engage in foreign military inter- ventions only when there was broad, bipartisan support for the use of force. The force was to be deployed with a clear, obtainable objective and applied massively so as to easily overwhelm any potential adversaries. The mil- itary was expected to accomplish its goals quickly, and then leave. The series of hurdles that would have to be cleared under the Powell Doctrine in order to deploy such power were often seen as an attempt to discourage political elites from resorting to the use of force in a reckless or haphazard way. Critics interpreted Powell’s warnings about the limits of American power as an effort to unduly constrain civilian policy-makers. This frustration was perhaps best encapsulated in Madeleine Albright’s complaint, as Powell recorded in his memoir My American Journey , “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” The Clinton administration failed to silence Colin Powell, but the precepts of his doctrine did not deter Clinton from sending the military on missions to far- flung places with little strategic or economic relevance. Many of these missions also lacked widespread popular support or a clear exit strategy (for example, Somalia, 1993, Kosovo, 1999). The Bush administration tried a different approach toward Powell. From his position within the Bush inner circle, Powell failed to dissuade the president from launching an ill-considered invasion of Iraq. His warnings that America would “own” Iraq if it “broke” Iraq were eerily similar to George Herbert Walker Bush’s reasoning for not seeking to topple Hussein in 1991. In his memoirs, Bush Senior warned that there was no viable “exit strategy” and that, by invading Iraq, the United States would have been seen as “an occupy- ing power in a bitterly hostile land.” It is unclear whether Condoleezza Rice appreciates the lessons of Iraq, both those from 1991 and those that the country is still learning from the current invasion and occupation. What is clear, however, is that an overly ambi- tious foreign policy, such as that articulated in the Bush national security strategy, is unsustainable. If Rice is not already acutely aware of this fact, she soon will be. T C ONDOLEEZZA R ICE HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE REALISM IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY . T HE ALTERNATIVE COULD PROVE RUINOUS . B Y C HRISTOPHER P REBLE