The Foreign Service Journal, February 2012

14 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 2 has always been an aspiration that marks successful ambassadors. After all, they are generally the most senior U.S. government officials engaged full- time on the portfolio of problems and programs associated with their respec- tive countries of assignment. They are also the only federal officials with standing interagency executive author- ity, based on statute and specific pres- idential designation (albeit limited to in-country personnel and operations). The QDDR’s discussion of this sub- ject is worth repeating: “In order for our chiefs of mission to direct and co- ordinate the interagency in the field, they must not only drive the country team on the ground, but also be more effectively engaged in interagency de- cision-making in Washington. … To give them the voice they need in Washington and to draw on their knowledge and perspective, chiefs of mission will be invited to participate via secure telecommunications in Depu- ties Committee meetings in Washing- ton at the discretion of the National Security Council staff.” With that directive in mind, why not go all the way and use today’s com- munication technology to eliminate the organizational distinction between headquarters and field, empowering ambassadors/chiefs of mission to serve as their own “country directors?” Am- bassadors who are dual-hatted as their own country directors could then par- ticipate directly in Washington deci- sion-making. (Indian Ambassador Kishan S. Rana describes a similar vi- sion of their role in his 2004 book, The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipoten- tiary to Chief Executive .) Many U.S. ambassadors have infor- mally played this role in the past and, no doubt, some still do so today. It should become the standard opera- tional mode for all U.S. chiefs of mis- sion, although this change will require some formal restructuring of the rela- tionship between the COM and State on one hand, and between the COM and the deputy chief of mission, on the other. The “ambassador/COM as country director” model will require individu- als holding that title to devote signifi- cant time and effort to that task, accruing lots of frequent flier miles in the process. That investment will bring two important benefits, however. Formally recognizing each ambas- sador as the most senior official who works full-time on a specific bilateral portfolio should enhance the coher- ence and interagency coordination of U.S. government policy — bringing about greater “unity of effort,” if not “unity of command.” It will also lessen the incidence of the resident diplomat’s besetting sin— localitis — by immersing the chief of mission in headquarters activity. To paraphrase that wise comic strip philosopher of the 1950s, Pogo, the resident COM in the field will “meet headquarters and find that he is they.” Defining the role of the deputy chief of mission has long been a sub- ject of discussion, with no single con- clusion. Is he or she an “alter ego,” a senior assistant, an enforcer, a “straw boss” or a standby COM? Often, DCMs play all of these roles in varying degrees, and the answer in any given situation mainly depends on the chief of mission. Whatever the answer, an expanded role for COMs can only expand the role of the DCM, as well, making him or her the day-to-day de facto manager of the mission. This reality will proba- bly necessitate the formal inclusion of a limited version of COM authority in the job description of DCMs. In other words, deputy chiefs of mission will be- come even more important than they are today, which is saying quite a lot. Chiefs of Mission as Crisis Managers In addition to reinvigorating the standing authority of chiefs of mission, there are two further levels of reform worth pursuing. The first would be to expand their authority into crisis man- agement. A 2010 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (www.csis/org) on smart power makes a compelling case for reorganizing and re-equipping the executive branch to carry out such multifaceted tasks as economic development, contingency planning and post-conflict reconstruc- tion. (Recommendations from other sources have often used the term “mis- sion manager” to clarify the function envisaged here.) As currently constituted, civilian foreign affairs agencies lack the re- sources and expertise to undertake S P E A K I N G O U T Empowering or reinvigorating COM authority will require expanded support from the National Security Council and other agencies.