The Foreign Service Journal, February 2012

26 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 1 2 now delivers austerity and pain.” Nowhere is this more evident than in Greece. One of the main reasons Athens was admitted to the European Union in 1981 was to cement democratic governance in the land where democracy it- self first blossomed — but which was ruled by a military dictator- ship from 1967 to 1974. “For the Greeks,” says Serfaty, “getting into the E.U. was a way to end political instability and an undemocratic threat that defined Greece in the past. Being forced out of Europe would resurrect those things. Moreover, it would define an easy way out for other states with potential populist leadership.” If the technocratic government installed in Athens last November fails, the temptation will be for the Greek electorate to turn to populist politicians who promise less pain. A country where the standard of living de- clines sharply could also face a growing public backlash in the form of rising nationalism. History teaches that an effective way to distract a disgruntled electorate is to fo- ment external threats. A Greek politician intent on doing so would have ample opportunities to fan latent anti-Turkey sentiment in Cyprus or in the Aegean. At the same time, association with the European economy is likely to look less and less attractive to Turkey. Already, fewer than half of Turks (48 percent) think joining the European Union would be a good thing for their country, according to the German Marshall Fund’s 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey. And given Eu- rope’s current troubles, such support is likely to shrink over time. In addition, a Turkey that no longer aspires to join the European Union and whose behavior is no longer constrained by the need to meet conditions for admission could well become a more unpredictable, un- helpful free agent in the Middle East. As the E.U. looks less successful economically and less politically functional, it will also hold less appeal for the former nations of the Soviet Union, which are likely to slip further back into Moscow’s orbit. For that mat- ter, the idea of a united Europe has less allure for the Russians themselves. “Russian liberals used to present the European project as a model for Russia,” notes Dim- itri Simes, president of the Center for the National In- terest. “Now they cannot say this with a straight face.” With the future of North Africa up for grabs and the Balkans still unsettled, the last thing Washington should want is for the European Union to be- come a centrifugal rather than a centripetal force in its own corner of the world. Compounding the problem, European weakness and self-pre- occupation could dash all Ameri- can hopes for trans-Atlantic cooperation in dealing with the China challenge. An Opening for China Beijing is already flexing its muscles in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and extending its influence in Pakistan, Africa and Latin America. In addition, its brand of state capitalism looks more attractive to many govern- ments around the world than the form being practiced in Europe or even in the United States. Hard-pressed to counter this influence on its own, Washington could find itself without an effective Euro- pean partner. Already, European governments hoping to sell Beijing their sovereign debt have come under pres- sure to back off anti-dumping cases aimed at Chinese firms. If Beijing ever contributes to a euro bailout fund, as some in Europe hope, the foreign policy price for its co- operation could be steep. “The downside risk,” said Kupchan, “is that the U.S. will find itself navigating a new East Asia map very much on its own.” Left without an effective strategic partner, America’s drift toward an Asia-centric foreign policy will only accel- erate. Already, a majority of Americans (51 percent), in- cluding seven in 10 Americans born after the end of the VietnamWar, thinks Asia is more important than Europe to U.S. national interests, according to the German Marshall Fund survey. And as Europe appears more and more dys- functional, that sentiment is only likely to grow— a devel- opment that is in neither America’s nor Europe’s interest. For all these reasons, Europe’s problems are now America’s headache, too. So as Washington scrambles to cope with the economic consequences of the euro zone crisis, it must also reassess how much it will be able to de- pend on Europe as a strategic partner in the future. F OCUS The most immediate strategic problem for the United States will be the erosion of Europe’s capacity to share the burden of paying for global public goods.