The Foreign Service Journal, March 2010

M A R C H 2 0 1 0 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 69 An Eyewitness Account The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann, Potomac Books, 2009, $27.50, hardcover, 270 pages. R EVIEWED BY R OGER D ANKERT In the spring of 2005, just before Iraq imploded, virtually compelling a U.S. military surge, the senior U.S. diplomat for political-military affairs in the country, Ambassador Ronald Neu- mann, was asked to become ambassa- dor to Kabul. He took charge there just as that country, too, began de- scending into a spiral of stronger in- surgency and failing central govern- ment control. Until that point, Afghanistan had been “the other war” of his book’s title — largely ignored and conducted with the minimum pos- sible U.S. military effort. As former National Security Coun- cil Near East Affairs Director Bruce Riedel reminds us in his foreword, Washington supported the muja- hedeen as they liberated their country from the Soviet Union in the 1980s — but then walked away, allowing a Tal- iban takeover. Now, after being top- pled for their role in allowing al-Qaida to foment 9/11, Taliban leaders exiled in Pakistan are striving to push the U.S.-led International Security Assis- tance Force out of Afghanistan. Thus, the current crisis could represent the second time in the last quarter-century that the U.S. has squandered victory in Afghanistan by failing to follow through. In this account, Neumann — now president of the American Academy of Diplomacy— records his observations from August 2005 to April 2007, as the problems for the ISAF and Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government came into focus. Neumann brought 40 years of ex- perience to his posting, starting with three months of rambling all over Afghanistan in 1967 when his father was ambassador. After joining the For- eign Service, he studied Persian and Arabic, and later served as a deputy as- sistant secretary for Near Eastern af- fairs and as ambassador to Algeria and Bahrain. In the book, Neumann recalls his efforts to manage a host of complex is- sues that still plague Afghanistan: civil- ian-military relations, counternarcotics programs, unity of command, rules of engagement for U.S. and NATO forces, civilian casualties, staffing and management of provincial reconstruc- tion teams, coordination of interna- tional aid, and trilateral ISAF-Afghani- stan-Pakistan coordination. As the ambassador worked his way through “the fourth war he had experi- enced up close,” he came to a new ap- preciation of the frequent disconnect between policy formulation and im- plementation. (In particular, decision- makers repeatedly fail to secure the resources necessary to carry out their objectives.) However, he notes that this lapse is neither partisan nor ideo- logical, but generally stems from a lack of information and experience. He also cites many examples where Wash- ington did not act with appropriate timing or flexibility. In that regard, the author credits Anthony Cordesman with the term “armed nationbuilding,” which he says captures what the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan far better than “coun- terinsurgency” or “nationbuilding.” For instance, Pres. Karzai repeatedly raised the idea of rearming tribal forces, as have many other Afghans. But Neumann and Coalition Forces Commander General Karl Eikenberry (now ambassador to Kabul) resisted this approach on the grounds that even if it worked, the U.S. would be strengthening forces inimical to central government. Since then, police force creation has lagged and, remarkably, the idea of local militias is still on the table in 2010. Amb. Neumann notes that the U.S. has established armies in many coun- tries, but building a competent police force on the ruins of a destroyed coun- try in the middle of an escalating in- surgency was new to everyone. The failure he saw in Iraq — training only low-level members of a corrupt force — helped him to understand similar problems in Afghanistan. Regrettably, the resources directed to Baghdad were unavailable to Kabul. When the ambassador departed Kabul in April 2007, his final report said the U.S. was “on solid policy grounds, but we are still on a very, very thin margin. We do not need new poli- cies; we need the resources and sup- port to implement effectively what we have decided to do.” B O O K S In the book, Neumann recalls his efforts to manage a host of complex issues that still plague Afghanistan.