The Foreign Service Journal, May 2005

also used force to restore an elected Haitian government that had been deposed in a military coup. But in the Venezuelan case, the United States was slow to condemn Chavez’s ouster. This reflected either confusion about what was happening in Caracas or contentment over the prospect of a Chavez-free future for Venezuela, or both. The confusion was understand- able. Hours after Chavez’s resigna- tion, the highest-ranking military offi- cer in the country went on television to confirm that the president had resigned, only to be contradicted by Chavez’s attorney general. The 2002 report of the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General found that U.S. Ambassador Charles Shapiro and embassy officials “repeatedly stressed U.S. opposition to undemocratic and unconstitutional moves against President Chavez.” Shapiro served notice that, if invited, he would not attend Carmona’s inau- guration and, when asked by a Venezuelan military opposition leader to facilitate Chavez’s departure from the country, Shapiro declined. The ambassador also warned Carmona against dissolving the Supreme Court and the National Assembly, advice that was ignored. By the time Carmona reconsidered, it was too late. The pro-Chavez forces, the OIG report noted, were already set- ting in motion the chain of events that would lead to restoration of his presidency. Still, the report leaves room for doubt about whether Chavez’s oppo- nents in Venezuela really believed Washington’s stated policy of oppos- ing Chavez’s ouster. It allows for the possibility that Chavez’s enemies would have sought his ouster no mat- ter what the U.S. said or did. Given the long list of U.S. grievances against Chavez, “it is certainly possible that some of those who sought to remove Chavez did so reckoning that Wash- ington would shed no tears over his ouster,” the report notes. Furthermore, it continues, “the weight of embassy contacts fell heavi- ly on the side of the opposition. Aside from meetings with the president himself, and key ministers, there appears to have been limited outreach to others inside and outside govern- ment who supported President Chavez.” The report also points out that embassy officials only occasional- ly spelled out to the president’s oppo- nents “the consequences of failure to take the United States at its word that we were opposed to the use of unde- mocratic and unconstitutional means to oust Chavez.” At a minimum, it is clear that Chavez does not believe Washington’s assertions of non-involvement, re- peatedly blaming the U.S. for the attempt to oust him. He says the United States was responsible not only for the April coup attempt, but also for a strike by oil workers eight months later that was designed to force Chavez out. Citing those actions, he has called 2002 “the year of imperialism.” Lately, after keeping a low public profile, the United States has begun stepping up criticism of Chavez, pro- voked by his moves in recent months to neutralize or eliminate potential threats to his rule. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick foreshadowed a possible U.S. strategy for dealing with Chavez when, in February, he called on Latin Americans to join with the United States to combat “creeping authoritar- ianism” in the region. He suggested that the hemisphere, through institu- tional changes, has done a good job of protecting elected governments against military takeovers. He said it now needs measures to curb elected authoritarians — pointing to Chavez as Exhibit A. ■ M A Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 69