The Foreign Service Journal, September 2004

excellent example of the challenge of interagency policy coordination and coherence for the success of democ- racy programs. In Nigeria one can clearly see that U.S. democracy pro- motion efforts, such as these ESF- funded programs, would benefit if the State Department worked through diplomatic channels to generate greater political will for reform. The first program component, anti-corruption, was severely ham- pered by the Nigerian government’s move in February 2003 to begin the process of repealing the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act. It is difficult to imag- ine the level of potential impact of any such civil society-led efforts when the regime in power repeals the major piece of enabling legisla- tion needed as a starting point for such efforts. Moreover, President Olusegun Obasanjo’s political cor- ruption, including his manipulation of the April 2003 presidential elec- tions to assure his re-election, casts additional doubt on the level of his regime’s political will for reform. The second component, conflict reduction and peace building, was undermined by Obasanjo’s decision to harbor Charles Taylor, Liberia’s former president, after he fled Liberia under pressure from the international community and from a rebel siege of Monrovia in August 2003. Obasanjo refuses to hand over Taylor, who is wanted by the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone on charges of “murder, mutilation, abduction of children and mass rape and … crimes (that) took place under Taylor’s orders…” Without a doubt, Taylor has created the greatest amount of conflict and violence in the subregion, causing incalculable levels of suffering and instability. His presence in Nigeria, the Obasanjo regime’s protection of him and the U.S. tolerance of this deci- sion all undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the USAID pro- gram activities aimed at preventing, reducing and mitigating conflict. There may be any number of explanations for the apparent con- tradictions among U.S. government objectives, but the most likely is that the State Department places a high- er priority on achieving the foreign policy objectives of maintaining strong commercial ties to Nigeria, the fifth-largest petroleum product supplier to the U.S. In addition, the U.S. government would prefer to reinforce the Nigerian government’s continued leadership in the U.S. Department of Defense’s push for a greater African role within a mecha- nism, to be supported financially and logistically by the U.S., for a rapid response to the region’s con- flicts. This mechanism would rely heavily on the leadership of Nigeria’s military, which is the largest, best-equipped armed force in West Africa. Unfortunately, the Nigerian military’s leadership of the Economic Community of West African States’ interventions over the last 14 years has been character- ized by international and regional civil society organizations as ruth- less, including large-scale corrup- tion, looting property, arming local militias and conducting summary executions. Summing Up The examples above illustrate the challenges inherent in achieving multiple foreign policy objectives simultaneously, especially without either (a) an overriding policy ratio- nale or (b) the effective collabora- tion of the U.S. government agen- cies involved. When a tension exists between competing policy objec- tives, it will often disrupt the work- ing relationship between the organi- zations tasked with implementing the policy. The State-USAID Strategic Plan fails to address these and associated other challenges: How will the U.S. Department of State, through diplo- macy and other core functions, help create a more enabling environment where USAID democracy and gov- ernance programs can achieve suc- cess? Or, at the very least, how will State diplomats reconcile compet- ing, sometimes conflicting U.S. for- eign policy objectives more effec- tively and more consistently so as not to undermine USAID democracy and governance programs? If the Bush administration is truly committed to elevating democracy promotion to the same level as U.S. strategic and commer- cial interests in our foreign policy, then it must face up to several chal- lenges. Foremost among these is a long-overdue restructuring of the foreign policy apparatus — not just USAID, but also the Department of State and all other organizations that play major and minor roles in U.S. foreign policy. This restructur- ing must assure a greater degree of coherence in the pursuit of multi- ple, sometimes competing strategic goals and objectives. As this article has tried to demon- strate, the United States ignores the linkages between democracy promo- tion and other foreign policy priori- ties at its own peril. Doing so only reduces U.S. credibility as a partner and ally, and detracts from its legiti- macy as the leader among the world’s democracies. It is possible to protect our interests without sacri- ficing our values, but doing so will require a concerted effort across the entire foreign policy apparatus to narrow the gap between policy rhetoric and reality. Efforts to nar- row this gap will in large part deter- mine whether U.S. foreign policy can continue to secure peace and promote prosperity, both at home and abroad. S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 81