The Foreign Service Journal, October 2009

30 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / O C T O B E R 2 0 0 9 was, they were convinced, the “real” work of any embassy. The State Department employees who did administrative or consular work were merely performing support functions, as were the representa- tives of other agencies such as USIA or the departments of Com- merce and Defense. No one ever publicly discussed this hierarchy, but everyone sensed it. In Washington, the physical separation of USIA from State (in buildings on opposite sides of town) helped to make this distinction even more apparent to the people involved. USIA directors from Edward Murrow to Bruce Gelb often felt their agency was not being given the re- spect it deserved. Many USIA Foreign Service officers were, however, perfectly happy with careers that gave them increasing responsibility, and they did not regret the fact that they had little chance to become an ambassador one day. This was especially true of those who preferred cultural or ed- ucational jobs, because they believed very much in the importance of that work. These FSOs were content to be assigned to the cultural side of the USIA operation in in- creasingly large posts, or to be a public affairs officer at almost any post. Even many USIA officers who pre- ferred the information side of the work only aspired to be assigned to information officer positions or as a pub- lic affairs officer in important or interesting posts. Whatever their motivations, these officers had all joined USIA because they wanted to perform public service, they were fascinated by the challenges of cross- cultural understanding, and they were convinced that they were doing useful work for their country and the world. They were proud of what they were doing, even though they were aware that some of their State De- partment colleagues tended not to appreciate its impor- tance. As long as they continued to get periodic promotions and advanced into increasingly responsible USIA assignments, that was enough. No Longer Separate, but Still Unequal Because the career paths of USIA Foreign Service of- ficers were quite separate and distinct from those of their State Department counterparts, the latter had little di- rect exposure to the details of USIA programs and re- sponsibilities. Moreover, even those State officers who were in- terested in what their colleagues from other agencies did had their hands full trying to excel at their own jobs so they could be pro- moted. (The competitive environ- ment for all Foreign Service personnel was, and is, rather in- tense, because it is an up-or-out system with a certain percentage of each grade level being “selected out” each year.) So the typical State Department officer was simply not in- terested in USIA work because it was not career-en- hancing to understand it or do it. When the idea arose in the 1990s to merge USIA into State, the principal argument advanced in its favor was that it would bring public diplomacy (what USIA did) closer to policymaking (what State does). Although many career officers at USIA were apprehensive — rightly, as it turned out — that public diplomacy would be swal- lowed up in the much-larger State bureaucracy, some of them were also attracted by the idea that the merger might indeed make State officers more aware of the value public diplomacy officers add to the process. Once it was inside State instead of outside it, the PD function would perhaps gain more respect and its practitioners would have more input into policymaking. (Also, those USIA officers who really did want to become ambassador some day thought they might have a better chance as part of State.) But soon after the 1999 merger, it became apparent that nearly all of these hopes would be disappointed. A 2008 survey of more than 200 former senior USIA offi- cials, many of whom had worked at State after the con- solidation, found that 79 percent rated the merger into State as a “disaster,” and 91 percent said the merger did not increase the role of public diplomacy professionals in the policymaking process. Some of the officers transferred to State from USIA ended up in one of the six regional bureaus. The assistant secretaries who headed those bureaus tended to regard these new arrivals primarily as additional bodies to be used wherever they were needed, often filling in as reg- ular desk officers, just like other State Department per- sonnel. Some did PD work, but it was rare that they were consulted in policymaking sessions about the public F O C U S The principal argument for merging the two agencies was to bring public diplomacy closer to policymaking.