The Foreign Service Journal, October 2011

O C T O B E R 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 15 S ecretary of State Hillary Clinton released the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report last December. Much of the at- tention of the international develop- ment community was focused on what role the QDDRwould articulate for the U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment. Yet the study’s embrace of the “whole of government” approach to diplomacy and development, in which multiple governmental elements are enlisted, passed almost unnoticed. The same was true of its declaration that am- bassadors are now “CEOs of complex interagency missions.” The lack of controversy about these two operating assumptions may stem from the fact that the whole-of-govern- ment concept has become integral to the implementation of U.S. foreign as- sistance programs over the past decade. Beginning with Operation Iraqi Free- dom, it has become the modus operandi for U.S. efforts to bring stabil- ity to states already experiencing con- flict or attempting to recover from it, as well as fragile societies in danger of falling victim to conflict. Until fairly recently, USAID had al- most sole responsibility for foreign as- sistance. But more than a dozen other agencies and government organizations now have their ownmini-foreign aid of- fices, all ostensibly under the authority of the chief of mission—or at least part of a “unified effort,” the term popular- ized by the military where it is present but not under COM authority. In par- ticular, the Defense Department has become ever more deeply engaged in operations that are indistinguishable from civilian stabilization and recon- struction efforts, even in theaters where there is no obvious need for a uni- formed presence. Consequently, U.S. embassies are growing larger, and increasingly dis- parate agencies are competing for scarce foreign aid dollars and often working at cross-purposes. The propo- nents of “whole of government” main- tain that the application of more human and bureaucratic resources ipso facto leads to the efficient production of a better result, because competition en- genders rigor. But does it? Is there any empirical evidence that the vast bureaucracies we created in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are any more effective than the far smaller, “flatter” country teams we used in the past? Just how good are domestic agen- cies at disbursing foreign assistance and operating in foreign environments? Are ambassadors, by training and experi- ence, prepared to be CEOs of “complex interagency missions”? And with the present imperative to cut deficits and shrink the federal work force, does the QDDR, which calls for staff increases at State and USAID, offer a sustainable business model? These questions are particularly relevant given President Barack Obama’s promise to overhaul the fed- eral bureaucracy and consolidate its functions, and the Republican Party’s drive to trim the federal work force — with special focus on the size and re- sources of State and USAID, revers- ing the recent trend to increase staffing at both. For instance, the president has spo- ken of overlapping federal rules, re- sponsibilities and jurisdictions. There are currently about 17 federal depart- ments and agencies engaged in some form of foreign assistance— the poster child for the whole-of-government phi- losophy — even though the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 established USAID to consolidate all foreign assis- tance activities under a single federal agency to eliminate the polyglot of competing federal departments and agencies that foreign assistance had by then become. What was seen as a vice 50 years ago some now celebrate as a virtue, positing that the world of diplo- macy and development has become so Not-So-Smart Power B Y J AMES S TEPHENSON S PEAKING O UT The QDDR’s vision for projecting smart power, rooted in the “whole of government” approach, is neither smart nor fiscally sustainable.