The Foreign Service Journal, October 2012

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | OCTOBER 2012 25 S tate and USAID appear to be permanently on a pendulum that swings from budget cuts (followed by severe shortages of personnel and capacity) to the reactive damage-control funding burst that comes just in time. The 1990s saw the post-Cold War “peace divi- dend” turn into major cuts in Foreign Service staffing and resources. But emptying embassies and USAID missions created problems: the U.S. still needed to be engaged in all the same (and new) places and, in many cases, even more so than before as the world could no longer be divided in two, and black-and-white turned to gray. The pendulum swung back and a new hiring surge began in 2001. The State Department’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and USAID’s New Entry Professional program increased State’s ranks by about 30 percent and USAID’s by about 25 percent, respectively. The new hires were quickly absorbed into the system, primarily to meet the new demands for Foreign Service employees to staff Baghdad (the largest embassy in the world) and Kabul. And as a result of earlier hiring slow- downs, many members of the new generation were sent out to jobs above their rank. Equally troubling, the training reserve (also called the training float), which so many studies had determined was necessary to allow for professional education and develop- ment of the Foreign Service, never materialized. By 2007, State and USAID were again severely understaffed: 20 percent of positions in embassies worldwide were unfilled. In 2008, the pendulum began to swing back. The State Department’s Diplomacy 3.0 hiring initiative and USAID’s Development Leadership Initiative aimed to increase the State Department’s Foreign Service personnel by 25 percent and double the number of USAID Foreign Service officers by hiring an additional 1,200 people. Congressional funding to repopulate the ranks of the Foreign Service was approved, and the hiring surge took off. At the same time, to better compete with the private sector for the best candidates and to increase diversity, the State Department revamped its hiring process, implement- ing the “Total Candidate” approach in 2007. By 2011, in the wake of the financial crisis and a new Congress, funding for these hiring initiatives dried up, and the pendulum began to swing back. State had managed to increase its ranks by about 17 percent, and USAID had hired more than 800 of the 1,200 goal. But by late 2012, hiring was slowing down to about the rate of attrition. The staffing troubles do not appear to have abated, however. A June Government Accountability Office report concludes that, as of October 2011, “28 percent of over- seas Foreign Service positions were either vacant or filled by upstretch candidates … a percentage that has not changed since 2008.” The report notes that the gaps persist—especially at the mid-level—because while the number of personnel has increased, so has the number of positions overseas. The GAO report also points out that 40 percent of new positions are in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, and most of them are mid-level rather than entry-level positions. But new hires come in at the entry level, which leaves a serious imbalance between capacity and staffing needs. —Shawn Dorman The Hiring Pendulum The GAO report notes that 40 percent of new positions are in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, and most of them are mid-level rather than entry-level positions. iStockphooto.com/Mipan

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