The Foreign Service Journal, December 2007

48 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 7 he activities of the United States Agency for International Development in Afghanistan during the Soviet occu- pation and its aftermath have been less well documented than the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. Unlike the CIA, USAID is an open institution. Its budget is a matter of public record and, typically, its offi- cers and activities are well known in the numerous countries where it operates programs with host-government counter- parts. It is perhaps worthwhile, given the situation in Afghanistan today, to consider the highly atypical and diffi- cult conditions under which USAID operated rather effec- tively from 1985 to 1994. The substantial involvement of USAID/Afghanistan in agriculture, health, education, public administration and dis- aster relief programs from the 1950s to the 1970s ground to a halt in 1978-1979. In rapid succession, a coup brought the Soviet-influenced People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan to power; U.S. Ambassador “Spike” Dubs was assassinated; and, faced with popular unrest, the Soviets invoked the “Brezhnev Doctrine” to invade in late 1979 in support of their client. With varying degrees of success under a string of Afghan leaders, the Soviets continued their support for the PDPA until after their military withdrawal in 1989. Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy maintained a skeletal staff until its closing prior to the Soviet withdrawal, reopening only in December 2001. From 1985 to 1994, USAID undertook to operate an interim Afghan “mission in exile.” Getting Started Until 1985, the U.S. funneled most of its non-lethal assis- tance through the Office of the United Nations High Com- missioner for Refugees in Pakistan. Many hundreds of thou- sands of Afghan refugees were pouring across the border. Pakistan’s principled support for the Afghan refugees inside its borders and the active resistance both to the PDPA and the Soviets inside Afghanistan helped to influence the U.S. decision to provide a wider range of assistance. Thus was born the Office of the USAID Representative for Afghanistan Affairs or, less formally, O/AID/Rep. It would deal with humanitarian assistance only and run a prin- cipally rural-based program, because the towns were held by the PDPA. Except near the Pakistan border, fighting in many of the rural areas was sporadic and shifting. Operating such a complex program from distant Wash- ington made no sense. And for security, logistics and other reasons, USAID could not operate directly from resistance areas inside Afghanistan. The bordering Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were off-limits, as was Iran, given relations with the U.S. following the hostage crisis. The Chinese-Afghanistan border was short, remote and otherwise unacceptable. The only possible major logistics base for the Afghan resis- tance was Pakistan, with its major seaport, airport and road transport routes. Its long, porous border, with a difficult ter- rain, was home to a large ethnic Pashtun community on both sides. U.S. support for the Afghan resistance depended upon R EMEMBERING USAID’ S R OLE IN A FGHANISTAN , 1985-1994 D URING A CRITICAL DECADE IN A FGHANISTAN , USAID SUCCESSFULLY OPERATED A “ MISSION IN EXILE .” T B Y T HOMAS H. E IGHMY Thomas H. Eighmy, Ph.D., was a Foreign Service officer with USAID from 1978 through 1997. He served in Moroc- co, Sudan, Liberia, Pakistan (Office of the AID Representa- tive for Afghanistan Affairs) and Washington (senior desk officer for the Central Asian republics, with assignments in Russia and Eastern Europe). Since retiring from the Ser- vice, he lectures, consults and volunteers from Bethlehem, Pa.