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



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President's Views

Liberia in Louisiana

By J. Anthony Holmes

After a three-year posting in a dynamic but impoverished African country, I spent August on home leave reconnecting with American society to be able to better represent our country abroad. Home leave this year reaffirmed a core truth in our business: there is a huge, fundamental link between U.S. domestic events and issues and our national security and foreign policy.

No one in the U.S. foreign affairs community needs to be told about the power of images. We spend billions annually to hone and project the images of the United States we want to convey abroad. We constantly battle negative stereotypes and hostile propaganda. The fight is difficult enough when right is on our side. Distortions, half-truths and missing context are even tougher to counter. If there is a disconnect between the images we project and the underlying reality, the reality inevitably wins out and our credibility and ability to alter perceptions abroad suffer. In this context, the footage I've been watching of events unfolding in New Orleans, and of officials' reactions to them, is haunting.

Hurricane Katrina is already having a significant foreign policy impact, both direct and indirect, that will continue for a long time. The direct effects on global energy and commodity markets, the physical flow of trade, and U.S. economic growth are already apparent. Longer lasting will be the impact of the images of Katrina's aftermath on our ability to use our power to influence other countries' decisions and behavior. I can think of no other purely domestic event during my 26 years in the Foreign Service with such a significant image-altering effect on how foreign peoples and governments view the United States, easily surpassing the Florida vote count fiasco during the 2000 presidential elections.

Based on my service overseas it is obvious to me that most Americans, in government and outside, misunderstand the true sources of U.S. power. The oversimplified post-Cold War view of our sole-superpower status as largely based on military power is no longer valid, if it ever was. More important are our economic might and, particularly, our moral stature. In economic terms, in addition to the sheer size of our economy, this depends on two things: our willingness to practice what we preach and live by the rules that we have so effectively had put in place to govern international economic relations; and our willingness to forgo the temptation to sacrifice our long-term competitiveness for short-term exigencies by, for example, investing in our infrastructure, maintaining R&D spending, and bearing some domestic political heat as we teach our citizens that future prosperity often requires near-term sacrifices.

In moral terms, our power is based on the degree to which the United States itself embodies the values that it preaches and can demonstrate the justice, empathy and democratic nature of our society and its institutions. Europeans are well aware of the racial and socio-economic divides in American society, but these issues were much less familiar to the rest of the world. Virtually everyone abroad was shocked and appalled by the live news footage of Katrina's aftermath, images we have grown callously inured to when they arrive from such places as Liberia or eastern Congo.

It is no less misguided, of course, to draw broad conclusions about the U.S. based on the Katrina images than it is to overlook Africa's many successes and focus only on its trouble spots. The difference is that we seek to lead the world and effect profound change through moral suasion. We jumped at the chance to show our generosity and global relief capabilities in responding to the Southeast Asian tsunami, earning real credit. But our planning and relief failures at home, in a situation where the victims were seen to be poor and black, are far more visible. Nothing better serves our power and influence abroad than an image of strength at home. But that strength must be real. If it takes a natural disaster to remind us of this, our national security interests demand that we learn this lesson and make major, long-term investments to address our weaknesses. ■

J. Anthony Holmes is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.

In Re: Personal Banking from Overseas (Peace of Mind Is at Hand!)

Dear *Journal* Reader:

There are many exciting experiences while on overseas assignment, but managing your finances isn't typically one of them. Actually, it can be quite challenging. Managing your pay, meeting financial obligations, maintaining a good credit rating at home, and sustaining and growing one's financial portfolio can all become a challenge. Additionally, once settled-in at your country of assignment, local obligations arise, requiring the need to transfer funds, be it in US Dollars or in Foreign Currency.

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

LETTERS

Immersion Study Works

Thanks so much for Steve Honley's excellent overview of the Foreign Service Institute ("FSI Settles into Arlington Hall," July-August *FSJ*). Having recently transitioned from the Foreign Service into university administration, I read with interest his analysis of FSI's language instruction quandaries.

We at Texas Tech University recently instituted an approach to learning Spanish which combines academic training with full-immersion study in Seville. This enables students to progress in one semester from zero knowledge to fully functional (probably a 3+/3+ rating). Student costs (aside from traveling there and back) are comparable to studying on campus. We're starting a similar program with German this year in Quedlinburg, and hope to eventually expand it to French and Arabic. Having myself struggled with FSI French when preparing for my first West African posting, and being disappointed at the deficiency of my level when compared with missionaries we met there who learned their language in a Francophone environment, I became a true believer in immersion study.

Honley's comments on the "area studies" program were also illuminating. Based on my 20-plus years experience in Africa, I am a strong supporter of the two-week concentrated regional overview (and have even replicated its core components for an Africa course here), because such a study provides essential background for officers undertaking their first assignments to a region. It could, however, be further enhanced by incorporating single-country computer learning modules for individuals or small groups to supplement the more generalized regional information provided to the entire class.

Tibor P. Nagy Jr.
FSO, retired
Associate Vice-Provost for International Affairs,
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, Texas

The More Things Change

I was very pleased to read the extensive coverage of FSI in the July-August edition. I had occasion to visit Arlington Hall a few years ago and was impressed greatly by the progress made since my days with the 54th A-100 class in early 1963.

Regarding the question of language training, the same problems raised in the *Journal* were present when I went through over 42 years ago.

I was fortunate to take the Foreign Service Examination in early December 1961 when it included an optional language section. One could choose among Spanish, Russian, Chinese, French and German. My score on the first-named was sufficiently high to earn me an extra five points, perhaps enough to ensure my passage to the oral examination, which I took successfully in late June 1962.

The optional language examination was dropped during the late 1960s; I'm not sure why. Over the years I noticed what I saw as an inordinate number of officers overseas in language classes. Had the language section of the test been continued, we might have been able to select more candidates who required little or no additional language training, freeing them, as it were, to devote more time to post duties.

I believe the optional language examination should be reintroduced; many more tongues could be added.

In my day, the Area Studies program didn't have enough time to cover in depth all the various countries. I remember the complaints of a number of officers about this. Instead of expecting the limited program to do everything, I felt they could benefit by consulting its well-chosen bibliography and spending some time at the Library of Congress.

Of course, there was no Metro then, no Xerox and, needless to say, no Internet. Even so, there was plenty of information available to the motivated and curious.

Louis V. Riggio
FSO, retired
Hollywood, Fla.

Treating All House Guests the Same

I am concerned about a section of the Foreign Affairs Manual —

Letters

3 FAM 4100, Appendix B — with the potential to explode in the face of all FS employees. It requires that employees report within one month any cohabitation with a foreign national, regardless of the nature of the relationship. The FS employee is expected to require house guests to sign sworn statements using the same form we all use for a security clearance, including permission to release criminal and medical records. From my experience, it is common for Foreign Service officers and specialists to have foreign visitors stay in their homes, both domestically and abroad. But the 3 FAM language covers anyone living in your home in exactly the same manner as it covers romantic relationships.

There is a yearlong process going on now to review and change all FAM policy — called the FAM-X Working Group — and this is exactly the kind of thing that needs to be reviewed for more than just plain language. Expecting temporary house guests to submit to sworn statements and release of criminal and medical records is extreme and unnecessary. Policy regarding non-sexual, non-romantic temporary house guests should be broken out into a separate section from that which deals with those romantic and/or sexual and (presumed to be) long-term relationships that 3 FAM 4100 is meant to address. Appendix B should be changed.

John Kane
FSO
Reston, Va.

Career and Marriage

Elizabeth Cobb ("FSI: Comments from the Field," July-August *FSJ*) states that until 1972, female FSOs were not allowed to remain in

the Foreign Service after marriage. That was generally true, but I know of at least one exception.

In 1969, on my second tour, in Madagascar, I fell in love with a young Frenchman. About the same time, one of my colleagues became engaged to a young Frenchwoman. He ignored all the regulations then in place about getting permission from Washington before marrying a foreign citizen, and married her within a few weeks (to my knowledge never receiving so much as a stern word of reprimand). I, too, wanted both marriage and a career, and I did not want to give Washington any excuse to deny them to me.

So I followed the regulations to the letter, submitting all the paperwork about my fiancé well in advance. I also submitted my resignation letter, but basically threw myself on Washington's mercy. As I recall, it said something along the lines that although I was turning in my resignation as required, I didn't mean it: I love the Foreign Service, and I'm still available for worldwide assignments. Please don't make me leave, I pleaded. To everyone's amazement but mine (in my innocence, I could not conceive that the answer might be negative), months later a cable arrived granting me permission to marry. We were wed on Aug. 7, 1969, in the city hall of Antananarivo, followed by a ceremony at the public affairs officer's residence, presided over by then-Ambassador David King, an elder in the Mormon church (a long story in itself, since neither my husband nor I was Mormon). I continued my career until my retirement in 2000 at the rank of minister-counselor.

Alas, I no longer have either the resignation letter or the cable from

Washington — or the Frenchman, for that matter, although I've been married for more than 21 years to a fellow Foreign Service professional. But I can still remember the consternation in the embassy about just how to treat this strange creature, a Foreign Service husband. One particularly embarrassing conversation — thanks to his leering and suggestive remarks, which today would likely be the basis for a harassment complaint — was with the administrative officer about my request to have my twin single beds replaced with a double, to befit my newly married status. Fortunately, others were incredibly supportive.

I have never come across any other female FSOs who married before 1972 and remained in the Foreign Service. My case shows it was possible, however, and I would love to hear of any other examples. Today I teach public diplomacy classes at FSI. I'm very pleased that so many of those in my classes are women, and so many of those have established solid family lives while maintaining bright careers.

Susan Ann Clyde
FSO, retired
Arlington, Va.

American Diplomacy

Thank you very much for the kind words (*AFSA News* Briefs, July-August) about then-AFSA President John Limbert's visit to North Carolina to speak to a luncheon meeting of the Carolina Friends of the Foreign Service. The meeting was well attended, and his talk was received enthusiastically, judging by the Q&A session. The CFFS is not a large group, but we are continually trying to recruit new members, and would like for more of the AFSA members living in North Carolina to join us. (Contact

me at Edwms8@aol.com.) We have four meetings a year — three speaker-luncheons and a summer social gathering.

You also mentioned the online journal *American Diplomacy* (http://americandiplomacy.org). This is a separate organization from the CFFS, though our memberships overlap. American Diplomacy Publishers Inc. is a nonprofit 501(c)(3). We encourage AFSA members to get acquainted with us.

J. Edgar Williams
FSO, retired
Carrboro, N.C.

Reaching Out

I am from Berlin, Germany. Some time ago I received some older issues of the *Foreign Service Journal* from a friend when he left Berlin for his next post. Only recently did I have the chance to read the first of these magazines. Having been born and raised in West Berlin, reading the May 2002 issue (focusing on FS families) brought back many sweet memories of all the American servicemen and FSOs and their families that my family and I have become friends with throughout the past decades. It also made me more aware of some of the difficulties and hardships they have to go through, foreign to those of us who stay in our own country.

Most of these Americans I met at church. Through their exemplary lives and friendships, they left a remarkable impression and many fond memories here with me and others as a legacy. In their own special way, these people have become ambassadors for their country.

Getting to know them and spending time with them not only helped me to learn about and appreciate the USA and its culture and consti-

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tution, but also helped me to see my own country from another perspective, and better appreciate its culture and history.

Please allow me to say to the FS communities around the world: Keep up the good work you are doing, reach out to the community you live in as much as possible. Even though you may think that the impression you left was insignificant or too small to be remembered by many, never underestimate it! You and your family and what you are doing may well be remembered by many more people than you think, for years and even decades to come.

Thank you for all that you have done for me, my family and my country!

Olaf Wenke
Berlin, Germany ■



Send your letters to: journal@afsa.org.

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CYBERNOTES

Hughes Revs Up Public Diplomacy Push

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes has finally hit the ground, and, by all accounts, she has hit it running. Named in mid-March for the critical post, Ms. Hughes' confirmation hearing was delayed to afford her time to prepare her son for college. Confirmed by the Senate on July 29, the presidential confidante whose job it is to transform America's image in the world, and particularly in the Muslim world, moved into her office at the State Department in the third week of August and jumped right into the fray.

By Labor Day, the first plank of her four-point policy program — engagement — was clear. On Aug. 30, she sent a cable to all U.S. embassies urging them to think of ways to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, such as attending interfaith services, that will demonstrate that terrorism is a challenge faced not just by the United States. "I think it's a very humble way, on the day of our national tragedy, to remember that other people have experienced horrible tragedies," said Ms. Hughes.

Her decision to appear Sept. 1 in Chicago at the convention of the Islamic Society of North America caused a stir in some conservative circles. Hughes has told reporters she has initiated discussions with Muslim leaders — clerics, students and scholars — to hear their concerns and ideas, and plans to travel to Europe and the Middle East.

The other three planks in Ms. Hughes' public diplomacy program are exchanges, education and empowerment. The administration has increased its request for funds for educational exchanges by 20 percent this year, to $430 million, and will try to make it easier to get visas for these programs.

Hughes also plans to promote "advocacy platforms," or debates about democracy and its values in ways that are relevant to countries experiencing authoritarian rule, as well as "rapid-response" teams to counter bad news and disinformation in a timely manner. "We are behind the curve in being able to put down rumors and myths," she says. An interagency public diplomacy operating group is another element of the plan, as is placing more emphasis on public relations skills in Foreign Service promotions.

The public diplomacy challenge Under Secretary Hughes faces is daunting. Her immediate predecessor, Margaret Tutwiler, quit last summer after less than a year on the job; her predecessor, advertising executive Charlotte Beers, had thrown in the towel after 18 months as U.S. prestige tumbled, particularly in the Middle East.

Panels and commissions have studied the problem, and there is no shortage of thoughtful reports (**http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/archive.htm**). A recent addition to the policy literature is from the Heritage Foundation, "Strengthening U.S. Public Diplomacy Requires Organization, Coordination and Strategy" (**http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1875.cfm**). Significantly, while Ms. Hughes prepared for her confirmation hearings, the State Department issued a new contract to establish what went wrong and identify the remedy. The department offered $250,000 for "a thorough and scientific study of how to address negative perceptions of the United States, particularly in Muslim countries," to be completed by Sept. 30.

You can follow this important issue online at the "What's New in Public Diplomacy" Web page of the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy (**http://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php**), at the Web site of George Washington

50 Years Ago...

Effective representation abroad in the hydrogen age of the global time of troubles demands the services of individuals with the paradoxical combination of the widest backgrounds and most intensive technical training available. Diplomacy has ceased to be a select art and become a total technique.

— Robert C. Bone Jr., from "From the Past into the Future: Suggestions for the Service," (Prize Winning Essay in Category 'C'), *FSJ*, October 1955.

CYBERNOTES

University's Public Diplomacy Institute (**http://pdi.gwu.edu/**) and at USIAAA's Public Diplomacy Web Site (**www.publicdiplomacy.org**).

New Index Tracks Rise of Foreign Policy As a Popular Concern

In January 2000, only a minority of Americans wanted the U.S. government to place more attention on international issues. Today, even with greater public attention paid to global concerns in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, more than half of the American public wants the government to place still more emphasis on international issues.

This is among the findings of the Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy Index, a joint venture of *Foreign Affairs* magazine and Public Agenda, with support from the Ford Foundation, released Aug. 3. Public Agenda, founded in 1975 by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and social scientist Daniel Yankelovich, is dedicated to nonpartisan policy research.

To be issued regularly, the Index is designed to explore the public's long-term judgments and beliefs about America's role in the world. It covers more than 25 issues through some 80 different survey questions.

Americans see relations with the Islamic world as the fundamental foreign policy problem facing the nation, the current Index shows — but there is no consensus concerning what to do about it. Three-quarters of Americans worry about losing trust and friendship abroad and about a growing hatred of the U.S. in Muslim countries — and fully 40 percent "worry a lot."

The Index also reveals that the public cares deeply and more unanimously about the problems of illegal immigration and protecting American jobs in a global economy than leadership attention to these issues suggests.

Full survey results can be found at **www.publicagenda.org** or **www.confidenceinforeignpolicy.org**.

A Focus on Fixing Failed States

In August, the barely-year-old Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., launched its first "prevent new Afghanistans" exercise. Members of humanitarian-aid groups joined military officers and U.S. Defense and State Department officials to find ways to work together to help turn around failed or failing states — in this case, the fictional country of Aliya, which has suffered an invasion and domestic revolt followed by years of warlordism and civil war.

"The world has changed," declared Carlos Pascual, head of the State Department's newly established Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, addressing the opening ceremonies of the unusual game. "We need to secure our nation and provide for global security. This is what the game is all about."

The Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was opened in August 2004. The coordinator reports directly to the Secretary of

Site of the Month
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/

The *Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection*, an outstanding resource for researchers, is unusually user-friendly. The University of Texas at Austin's main library has a general collection of more than 250,000 maps from all over the world. Most are listed in the library's online catalogue, UTNetCAT, and some 5,000 are available directly online.

The site's up-to-the minute "online maps of current interest" include such things as neighborhoods, levees and landmarks in New Orleans and highways in Mississippi; changes in Gaza; the current distribution of bird flu; wildfires in Portugal, and more. And its Cartographic Reference Resources is a goldmine of useful material, including explanations of all of the different map projections.

The site not only guides visitors to the library's own maps, but goes a long way to making the map resources of the entire Web accessible. One can find all different types of maps — country, city, state, historical and outline — depicting the different regions of the world; links are provided to the library's collections as well as to other sites for particular maps. At the same time, the site's helpful FAQ includes "Where can I find a map of … on the Internet?" and a comprehensive answer with links.

> There are still places that race and poverty are a huge problem in the U.S., and we've got to deal with that.
>
> — Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Sept 14, *cnn.com.*

State and is charged with enhancing our nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed and post-conflict states and complex emergencies (**http://www.state.gov/s/crs**). A month later the new center at the Naval Postgraduate School was established (**http://www.csrs-nps.org/public/home.cfm**).

Both stem from the work of the bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, whose 2003 report, based largely on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, outlines how and why failed and failing states matter (**http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/playtowin.pdf**). "We need to put as much effort into stabilization as war efforts, and we need everyone at the same table using the same playbook," Rep. Sam Farr, D-Calif., one of the seven members of Congress who served on the panel, says.

Meanwhile, in July, *Foreign Policy* magazine released the first Failed State Index, a joint project with the Fund for Peace to conduct a global ranking of weak and failing states (**http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098&print=1**). The problem is more serious than generally thought. Some 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict. The 10 most at-risk countries — Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia and Haiti — have already shown clear signs of state failure.

Though the index points to no easy fix for failed states, it does give some clues to the most reliable early warning signs of a problem. Among the 12 indicators used to identify weak and failing states, two consistently rank near the top: uneven development within states (as opposed to poverty), and criminalization or delegitimization of the state. For a complete discussion of the indicators and methodology used go to **www.foreignpolicy.com** or **www.fundforpeace.org**.

Cultivating a Career in Foreign Affairs

Young Professionals at State, or YPro, is an innovative grass-roots networking organization for entry and mid-level employees at the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. According to the group's 2004-2005 annual report, YPro "aims to create a sense of continuity in a dynamic workforce by linking tomorrow's foreign affairs leaders through professional and social networking activities."

Established in 2003, the organization currently has more than 500 members. YPro sponsors volunteer work, a monthly professional reading group, lunchtime seminars and a mentoring link, among other activities. Since its formation, the group has hosted more than 130 professional development and networking events.

YPro receives no government funding, and membership is free and open to all direct-hire employees of State and USAID, regardless of age, occupation or career track. You can find it at www.ypro.us. ■



SPEAKING OUT

Let's Use International Organizations to Fight Terrorism

BY LEON WEINTRAUB

The Bush administration made it clear from its first day in office that it does not care much for working with international organizations except on its own terms. Indeed, its attitude has often been little more than contemptuous. It has fought climate control measures, worked to dissuade countries from recognizing the authority of the International Criminal Court (e.g., by cutting assistance to countries that refused to sign agreements that would immunize American citizens from ICC jurisdiction), and shown little interest in nonproliferation issues.

The administration's recent decision to cultivate closer ties with India in the field of civilian nuclear activities at the expense of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is emblematic of this mindset. Following the July 2005 visit to Washington of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, his office issued a press release which sums up the U.S. decision: "The [India-U.S.] Joint Statement reflects the preparedness, on the part of the U.S. government, to begin a process of dismantling the restrictive technology denial regime that restricted India's access to nuclear technology and materials for [its] not having joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Enough has already been said about President Bush's appointment of John Bolton as ambassador to the United Nations in New York. Mr. Bolton has shown himself to be articulate, aggressive, intelligent, fiercely protective of his positions, and more than a little skeptical about the ability of the United Nations to accomplish a great deal of major import. It remains to be seen if this combination of characteristics will be an effective mix for promoting U.S. interests in the world body. There should be no doubt, however, that appointing a figure like Bolton, especially during a Senate recess, sends a message about the president's desire to deal with the U.N. on his own terms.

> *"Going it alone" is good domestic politics but bad policy, especially when it comes to fighting terrorism.*

Iraq represents the most blatant instance of this preference for unilateral action — except, of course, when Washington finds it convenient for others to share the burden, such as when it "invited" the United Nations back into Iraq to help conduct the Jan. 30, 2005, elections. Compare the use of the "Coalition of the Willing" of 2003 with President George H.W. Bush's use of such a coalition in 1991 in Operation "Desert Storm" to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. While the current campaign is overwhelmingly conducted by U.S. troops (although with a sizable British contribution), the 1991 military campaign, by contrast, made use of more than 500,000 U.S. troops supplemented by 160,000 coalition forces, or almost 25 percent of the total force, according to a CNN Web-based fact sheet. That earlier coalition — which included Egypt, Syria, France and Germany in the 34-nation fighting force — was a tremendous accomplishment for which both former President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker deserve great credit. And we should not forget that the other countries in the "Desert Storm" coalition also picked up the lion's share of the first Gulf War's cost.

Good Politics, Bad Policy

This "go it alone" approach is good domestic politics. It certainly reverberated quite well in the 2004 election campaign, when former Senator Zell Miller, D-Ga., told the Republican National Convention that "Senator [John] Kerry has made it clear that he would use military force only if approved by the United Nations. Kerry would let Paris decide when America needs defending." This obvious misrepresentation clearly won over the Republican delegates, but it is downright unhelpful when it comes to fighting terrorism — an area where collective action holds great promise. Yet apart from some post-9/11 measures against money-laundering promoted through the United Nations and the U.S.-backed Financial Action Task Force, there have been few sustained efforts to promote an organized international approach to counterterrorism that would build upon the multilateral strengths of international organizations.

The idea is not to replace U.S. and

other national initiatives, but to supplement and thereby strengthen them.

Regrettably, the interest in such an approach shown by the 9/11 Commission in its well-known report, issued last year, is scarcely better. In its chapter on recommendations ("What to Do: A Global Strategy"), it lists a "firm tripod of policies" that include attacking terrorists and their organizations, preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and protecting against and preparing for terrorist attacks. True, the text of the chapter includes some peripheral mention of the value of international organizations, such as how Western states meet with each other in NATO or the G-8, or how the international community works through the International Civil Aviation Organization to arrive at agreed standards for passport design. But there is not one recommendation in this otherwise comprehensive report calling for a concerted effort to place greater responsibility on international organizations.

When President Bush spoke to FBI and DEA agents at the FBI Academy this past July, he recited the litany of international locations of terrorist incidents, with "9/11" and London being followed by the mention of Bali, Casablanca, Riyadh, Jakarta, Istanbul and Madrid. The president then cited a "comprehensive strategy in place" for protecting the homeland, improving our intelligence, staying on the offensive and "fighting the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan and across the world so we do not have to face them here at home."

In his call to work with our allies, he appropriately praised the FBI, which has "deployed its personnel across the world," for questioning captured terrorists and uncovering valuable information. But our FBI assets, wherever they may be, will get much better and more reliable information if countries around the world believe we are working together with them in a mutually agreed framework to protect each other from the scourge of terrorism — rather than looking out only for ourselves. International organizations might not be a panacea, but they offer hope for global inclusiveness that ad hoc arrangements with key allies cannot match. After all, most of the problems don't originate with our key allies, but within countries where our relations are often strained, if not quarrelsome.

International organizations might not be a panacea, but they offer hope for global inclusiveness that ad hoc arrangements with key allies cannot match.

The Case for Collective Action

Don't get me wrong. We should have no illusions that an international organization made up of sovereign nation-states, each with its own agenda and with varied approaches toward working with us and other nations and collective entities, is going to solve the problem of terrorism. The often-Byzantine nature of the politics of international organizations and decision-making within them frequently fails to show positive results — either by selecting a country like Libya to head a human rights body or in dithering away on fruitless debate while 800,000 Rwandans were massacred or acts of genocide continue relentlessly in Darfur.

What international organizations can do, however, is forge a global consensus on an issue and then incrementally push their members to take steps to address problems that have been identified. Consider the issue of international trafficking in drugs, persons or materials. The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the European Union, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Organization for Migration (to name just a few) all administer programs dealing with this.

Some of these efforts are mutually reinforcing, while others are developed separately for distinct rationales and are likely duplicative. Wouldn't it make better sense for one lead agency to have a clear mandate, with the support of the international community, to develop a strategy, gather the appropriate intelligence, and then design and implement the operational activities to carry out that strategy? There would always, of course, be a need for specific components of these programs to be "outsourced" to specific national agencies (especially in the intelligence field). But a mutually reinforcing and layered series of activities pursuing a coordinated strategy would surely be better than the separately designed, funded and implemented programs that we have now (some of which actually compete with each other).

There is a precedent for this approach. When we were confronted with the first OPEC oil embargo in 1973, the insightful leadership and diplomacy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others eventually led to the creation of the International Energy Agency. The IEA was no

cure-all, to be sure, but it enabled those countries targeted by the embargo (the U.S. being a primary one) to deal with the difficulties by working together. More than three decades later, the IEA remains active and relevant by focusing on broader energy issues, such as "climate change policies, market reform, energy technology collaboration and outreach to the rest of the world," according to the agency's Web site. Born out of a crisis, the IEA now looks at a broader range of energy-related issues, taking what had earlier been one component of world trade and making it the central focus of a specialized agency.

Similarly, although the U.S may be a primary target of most terrorist actions, it is clear that terrorist groups, whether they are formally linked to al-Qaida or its spin-offs or are free-lancers, have an agenda that goes far beyond the United States. Indeed, such attacks, in addition to those that have affected Israel for decades, are taking place on a global basis, from Egypt and Indonesia, to Spain and the United Kingdom. An international structure to deal with this phenomenon that goes beyond ad hoc bilateral or even multilateral alliances could provide for a sustained focus in the so-called "war on terror."

Without that focus, we risk jumping from crisis to crisis without a prolonged and comprehensive approach to the problem. It remains to be seen what specific mandate, operating responsibilities, funding mechanisms and decision-making powers such an organization might have, but it is a subject that merits serious exploration.

Admittedly, we don't know yet if the world or the major victims of terrorism are ready for anything like an "International Counterterrorism Agency." Or, perhaps, rather than creating a new specialized agency, we could do a better job by strengthening the anti-terrorism components of existing agencies, like the U.N.'s Counter-Terrorism Committee, the ICAO, the International Maritime Organization, the World Customs Organization or the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime. The last organization is particularly useful in identifying and taking steps to counter the links with drug trafficking and other criminal enterprises that appear to be involved in funding terrorism. And, of course, there is always the International Criminal Police Organization, already known to most of us as

INTERPOL. All of these agencies, along with those mentioned earlier, such as NATO and the Financial Action Task Force, have a role to play — diplomatically, militarily, controlling smuggling or money laundering, sharing intelligence, carrying out investigations, or even facilitating extradition.

Even if the time has not yet come for one international agency to be given the mandate to fight terrorism in all its manifestations, let us launch a serious international dialogue on the issue. The fact that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his March 2005 report, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All," endorsed the working definition of terrorism as proposed by his "High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," leads me to believe that we are approaching a critical point. For if the world community can agree on a working definition of terrorism, we could be — if we wish to make the journey — on the path to developing a working strategy. And on that basis, perhaps we can design an organizational framework that can be used once and for all to link together the interests of most of the world's nation states in fighting the scourge of international terrorism. ■

Iraq represents the most blatant instance of the Bush administration's preference for unilateralism.

Leon Weintraub retired from the Foreign Service in 2004 after an almost 30-year career. Among many other assignments, he worked on U.N. Security Council affairs during a Washington tour and spent four years at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. He is currently an adjunct professor of political science at The George Washington University.

FS KNOW-HOW

Tips for Getting Op-Eds Published

BY DENNIS JETT

Can an op-ed piece by an FS retiree in a newspaper or magazine change history?

Probably not — but that does not mean you should not consider writing one. (Note: Because active-duty Foreign Service employees are almost always barred from expressing their personal views on policy matters, this article is not aimed at them.)

In this age of specialization, it is more important than ever for those who know about international affairs to share their expertise and opinions with those who do not.

Let me offer an example. In January 2003, Greg Thielmann submitted op-ed articles to the *Washington Post* and the *Des Moines Register*, but both were rejected for publication. Thielmann had recently retired from a 25-year career in the Foreign Service and in his last tour was acting director of the Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation and Military Issues in INR. The articles pointed out some of the exaggerations and scare tactics the Bush administration was using in its depictions of Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction programs.

Now we all know that Iraq had no WMD, ties to al-Qaida or involvement in 9/11. Had more people been aware of the administration's hype in early 2003, there might have been less of a rush to war. And who knows? Perhaps a few well-placed op-eds might even have encouraged people in positions of power to find the backbone to speak the truth, and the war might have been averted altogether.

> *Retired diplomats should share their expertise and experience with the general public, even if they are ignored by the politicians.*

But even if it is less than an opportunity to alter the course of history, retired diplomats should nonetheless speak out via opinion pieces. Their expertise and experience can be of great value to the general public, even if they are ignored by the politicians. But they will fail to get the audience they deserve if they forget who their readers are.

Remember Your Audience

Opinion pieces (known familiarly as op-eds) may cover the same subject matter as the cables and the action or briefing memos that are the staple of a career in the Foreign Service. But the approach needs to be much different. If one is writing for a sixth- or seventh-floor principal, that individual has probably requested input from your bureau or post. Equally important, he or she already has the factual background (or can get up to speed quickly), and just needs to know what the options are before deciding whether to act.

By contrast, the average reader of an op-ed on international affairs needs to be drawn into reading the article, and will almost certainly possess very little knowledge of the subject being discussed. So, even more than with a State Department audience, the first few lines of the piece have to set out what it is about and convince readers to take time out of their busy day to read it all the way through.

With that in mind, here are some tips:

Know who your audience is. Are you writing for a periodical with a predominantly local, small-town readership, or one with a more cosmopolitan audience? Shape your submission accordingly.

Keep the piece short (700-800 words maximum), clear and simple. Try to grab the reader's attention from the first paragraph, often known as the "nut" graph — the one that tells the reader why he or she would want to continue reading. While you can usefully draw on personal experience to underscore your thesis, do so only if it is relevant.

Take a position and suggest a solution. Don't just lay out all the alternatives or simply rehash facts available elsewhere.

Make your submission timely and relevant. You'll have a hard time placing an op-ed about Nepal or Lesotho, however worthy and insightful, while Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict and Afghanistan dominate the news. So be clear about what your piece brings to the debate, and pitch it accordingly.

Take a position and suggest a solution. Don't just lay out all the alternatives or simply rehash facts available elsewhere.

The Publishing Process

Besides keeping in mind your audience, you should also understand what it takes to get published. Newspaper editors don't just sit in their offices waiting for brilliantly written pieces to float over the transom and then carefully read each one and select the best. With limited space to fill, they usually already have a good idea of what they want and where to get it.

The more important the newspaper, the less room it will have for first-time contributors once it has slotted in the columns by regular writers, whether local or syndicated. The little space left will often be filled with pieces the editorial staff has commissioned from writers they have identified. I once asked a friend at a prominent newspaper what proportion of the opinion pieces published in his newspaper came in unsolicited. He admitted that it was only about half.

Obviously, each publication has its own bias and is more likely to publish articles that reflect its editorial line. When they do make a nod in the direction of balance, it is usually in the letters to the editor.

With all that in mind, how can you improve the odds of getting your article into print?

Lower your sights from the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, etc. There are plenty of good local and regional papers around the country, particularly outside major metropolitan areas, who will be willing to consider what you have written. While the prestige factor is lower, you may well have a greater impact there. In addition, consider the foreign press, particularly outlets in Canada and the many English-language Asian newspapers. But don't forget about newspapers in other languages; if they want your piece, they'll translate it.

Be aware that most newspapers want exclusive rights. This means you can't pitch the same op-ed to competing publications in the same market. That is especially true if your contribution is accepted by a newspaper that is part of a larger chain. However, some newspapers will agree to let it be placed in other newspapers if they are not in the same or neighboring markets (check with the individual editors).

In addition, it may be possible to reuse the central idea of an article in a second piece if you are skillful at putting a substantially new lead on it, and at presenting the concept in a different way. Or you can try the op-ed editors of the various newspaper chains and syndicates, which opens up the possibility of multiple placements.

Establish a personal relationship with the people who put the editorial and opinion sections together. That is not as difficult as it may sound, for you probably already have a network of contacts that can be used. If you have been interviewed by a journalist, you can ask that person to make the introductions to the appropriate staffer. Or if you know someone who has been published by the paper in question, you can ask that person to do the same.

Selling the op-ed means pitch-

ing it in the covering note. Remember that it's a waste of time to send a pitch and then wait for an okay to write the piece. Unless you're really well-known already, they won't respond. So go ahead and write the op-ed and submit it as a ready-to-go item.

Include a few sentences in the cover note explaining why that particular newspaper should want to publish your contribution. And in addition to attaching the column in a separate Word file, take the extra time to copy the entire text (with title, byline and, at the end, a line or two of biographical material) into the body of the e-mail.

Armed with these tips, do take the time to take a stand and share your opinion in 700 words or less with the masses. Admittedly, you won't get rich, as op-eds pay somewhere between nothing and several hundred bucks each.

Remember the many good local and regional papers around the country, particularly outside major metropolitan areas.

And no, your commentary probably won't save the world. But it could limit the damage to it that the politicians inflict as they promote themselves while maintaining they are serving the national interest. So do it for your country, just as you did in dedicating your career to government service — even if in the end it means nothing more than having the chance to say you told them so. ■

Dennis Jett, an FSO from 1972 to 2000, was ambassador to Mozambique and Peru and DCM in Malawi and Liberia. He also served in Argentina and Israel, at the NSC and in the State Department. Following his retirement, he assumed his current position as dean of the International Center at the University of Florida in Gainesville. He is the author of Why Peacekeeping Fails *(Palgrave, 2001), and has published over 60 opinion pieces in major newspapers.*

The Bush Doctrine and "Rogue" States

The Bush administration policy aims to tame "rogue" states or, failing that, destroy them. Will it be judged a success?

By Christopher Preble

The lovable rogue is one of the most enduring archetypes of literature. From Robin Hood to Rhett Butler, some renegades who operate outside the bounds of acceptable behavior are nevertheless embraced as heroes because their intentions are good. In other words, they break the rules for good reasons and, in the process, win both admiration and affection.

Nation-states saddled with the "rogue" moniker, however, are neither admired nor loved. And, since the 9/11 attacks, President Bush has communicated a clear message that rogue regimes are marked for destruction — one way

or another. It is still too soon to say for sure whether the Bush Doctrine will ultimately be judged a success or failure. Indeed, the interpretation of history being what it is, there are sure to be differences of opinion.

But while the president maintains, on the basis of largely circumstantial evidence, that the war waged to remove Saddam Hussein from power was instrumental in convincing Libya's Muammar Qadhafi to abandon his nuclear schemes, he cannot account for why the leaders in two other rogue states — Iran and North Korea — have failed to respond as the Bush Doctrine suggests that they would: by capitulating. And that raises questions about the efficacy of the Bush Doctrine toward all rogue states.

The traditional definition of a rogue state pertains to violations of state sovereignty. … In recent years, however, the definition has become increasingly muddled.

Knowing the Rules

The problem of rogues in the international system is not new, even if the terms "rogue state," "pariah state" and "outlaw state" might be.

From the assassins and bandits that patrolled the outer reaches of the Roman Empire, to the Barbary pirates of the early 19th century, there have always been outlaws. They thrived through much of human history not so much because they were strong, but rather because the institutions which existed to enforce certain norms were relatively weak.

Even today, however, when states are strong relative to their predecessors, and acceptable norms of behavior are generally embraced around the world, the non-state outlaw is still with us. When these men and women combine their efforts they can be very dangerous. International criminal enterprises exist, and not just in movies. The sky-high profits created by the criminalization of certain narcotics feed internal corruption from Colombia and Mexico to Afghanistan and Russia. Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations demonstrate that the emergence of the nation-state as the dominant form of political organization around the world does not ensure security, even in places where the state is very strong: the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and even the United States, just to name a few.

Meanwhile, even as more and more states have come together in the interest of stopping international terrorism, there remain rogue states that flout established rules and norms. The traditional definition of a rogue state pertains to violations of state sovereignty. Article 2 of the United Nations charter stipulates that all member nations shall "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Iraq clearly acted as a rogue state when it invaded Kuwait in 1990, and the international community responded with near-unanimity; Saddam was expelled from Kuwait by a group of nations acting with the official sanction of the United Nations.

In recent years, however, the definition has become increasingly muddled. It now takes account not simply of how states interact with other states, but also of how particular regimes treat their own people. As a result, the number of potential rogue states has expanded dramatically. Article 2 has been largely superceded by a particular interpretation of international relations based on a nebulous "responsibility to protect." Indeed, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan recently reaffirmed the world body's right to circumvent state sovereignty in certain circumstances. "Governments must assume their responsibility to protect their citizens," Annan explained at a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations in December 2004. "Where they fail to do so, the Security Council must assume its responsibility to protect."

The Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change expanded on this theme in its 2004 report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. The Security Council, the panelists explained, could authorize "military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humani-

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Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (www.cato.org) and a founding member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy (www.realisticforeignpolicy.org).

tarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."

President Bush has elevated a broader definition of respect for human rights; from his perspective, a state can be classified as a rogue if it denies freedom to some of its citizens. But he has arrived at this determination not out of fealty to the United Nations, nor to the niceties of international law. Rather, the president's reasoning hearkens back to the words of another president locked in a brutal struggle for justice, and who, like George Bush, perceived a divine mission in much that he did. "The rulers of outlaw regimes can know," the president declared during his second inaugural address, "that we still believe as Abraham Lincoln did: 'Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it.'"

The Bush Doctrine

There is a fundamental contradiction within international law between the inviolability of sovereignty and the conditionality of that same sovereignty. And there is also deep disagreement as to who gets to decide when and how the responsibility to protect trumps the established rules of the game.

President Bush views the rogue state as the chief threat to global order, and his foreign policies aim either to alter the behavior of rogue states, or, failing that, to eliminate those regimes that refuse to play by the rules. As Robert W. Merry explains in his recent book, *Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition* (Simon & Schuster, 2005), the Bush Doctrine advances three core propositions — pre-emption, democratization and dominance.

Pre-emption typically means attacking an enemy before he attacks you. But pre-emption as practiced by the Bush administration is more accurately understood as "preventive war." Although pre-emption of an imminent attack has long been accepted under international law, preventive war — whereby a government chooses to take

action before a threat materializes — has typically been shunned.

The president remains unapologetic for challenging this understanding. "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long," he told West Point cadets in June 2002. "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act."

Preventive war as advocated by the Bush administration is intertwined with the second premise of the Bush doctrine: namely, that of spreading democratic values. The decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power went beyond simply eliminating a nuisance or a potential threat. It was intended to dislodge a tyrant and establish a democratic government in Iraq.

As such, the Bush Doctrine goes beyond the narrow focus of discouraging rogue states from attacking the United States. Equally important is the demonstration effect that is expected to carry over to other rogue regimes: "Do you want this to happen to you?" With its coercive posture, U.S. policy aims to convince despotic regimes to forgo their autocratic ways, or else suffer the fate of Saddam Hussein. This ostensibly applies both to states that do directly threaten the United States, and those that don't.

But there's a problem: it doesn't work. The Bush Doctrine fails chiefly because the third element — the assumption of unchallenged American dominance — cannot be sustained indefinitely. And our adversaries know that.

Dominant, Not Omnipotent

The U.S. has sufficient power to engage in a war to change a regime such as Saddam Hussein's, and can do so in the face of opposition from other powerful states, including China, Russia, France and Germany.

As for our power to deter other nation-states from attacking us, our nuclear arsenal alone, irrespective of our political and economic power, is sufficient to devastate entire nations if not the globe. This power has been instrumental in safeguarding U.S. security, particularly since the advent of long-range weapons. A number of countries have the capability to attack the United States, but all have been deterred from doing so.

The odd thing is that, despite all this power, Americans feel profoundly insecure. And in one respect, at least, such feelings are justified. Al-Qaida obviously disdains international law, but is equally undeterred by our retaliatory power. Meanwhile, recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan are demonstrating each day that America, while powerful, is hardly omnipotent.

Frustrated by the fact that they would feel so insecure after having spent hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars per year on defense, Americans cry out for a national security strategy that does what it is advertised to do: advance national security.

Knowing that power is limited, and that resources must be deployed in a careful and judicious manner, scholars schooled in the realist tradition look to other major powers to do some of the heavy lifting in the international system. Driven largely by self-interest, these regional powers may take action against rogue states that threaten them. They might also intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring states if humanitarian crises give rise to dangerous disorder.

Some people, reluctant to sign on to the "old" realist theory of balance of power, yet convinced of our nation's limited means, favor burden-sharing through the United Nations, or a similar institution empowered to enforce international norms of behavior.

The shortcomings of this approach were first revealed during the late 1990s. While professing great sympathy for the goals of the United Nations as an institution, the Clinton administration showed its impatience with the United Nations when it circumvented the world body twice in a matter of six months, first to launch air strikes against Iraq (Desert Fox) in late 1998 and then to launch a war against Serbia in the spring of 1999.

The most committed multilateralists must concede that, in the end, national power is what prevails. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. Bush's national security adviser, admits as much. During remarks delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations late last year Scowcroft, a member of a high-level panel appointed by the secretary general to study U.N. reform, explained: "In the end … if one of the permanent members of the Security Council or a major state considers something to be in its vital interest, the U.N. is not going to be able to do anything about it." That, he went on to say, "is [the] imperfect nature of the body that we have."

Imperfect and uncertain. It is hardly surprising that North Korea and Iran, both rogue states by the Bush

administration's definition, are not content to stake their security on the good word but limited power of the United Nations. As Ted Galen Carpenter and Charles V. Peña explain in the summer 2005 issue of *The National Interest*, North Korea and Iran's apparent nuclear ambitions can be seen as "a logical, perhaps even inevitable, response to the foreign policy the United States has pursued since the end of the Cold War." These rogue states have responded to the threat of preventive war by developing the one instrument which enables even the smallest and most impoverished of countries to face down the strongest and richest — a nuclear weapon. For while most Americans believe that U.S. actions are guided by the best of intentions, Carpenter and Peña point out, "other nations may not concede that the motives of an activist power are benign."

With its coercive posture U.S. policy aims to convince despotic regimes to forgo their autocratic ways, or else suffer the fate of Saddam Hussein.

Knowing Our Limits

Recognizing that America's limited capacity for shaping the world in our own image may give rise to a host of unintended consequences, policy-makers must prioritize based on our vital interests, carefully defined. In this context, some rogue states prove useful allies; others are troublesome nuisances that do not threaten the United States. Still others might offend modern sensibilities in terms of how they treat their own citizens, but may at the same time be powerful or important enough that their precipitous regime change is either not in America's interest or beyond our capacity (China, for example).

Ultimately, therefore, U.S. policy toward rogue states should resemble our policies toward … well, states in general. Most of the time, we will maintain peaceful relations with most countries around the world; occasionally containment and isolation might be necessary; and in a few very rare cases, confrontation might be required. The rogue state of Afghanistan under the Taliban was actively and knowingly harboring individuals who had already committed, and were prepared to commit again, horrible crimes against American citizens. The United States, acting with allies both inside and outside of Afghanistan, removed the Taliban from power.

The particular policy options that we employ should be contingent upon states' actual behavior. The United States may cooperate with rogue states on some issues, even as we oppose them on other fronts. After all, a China that behaved like a rogue state by threatening to use "non-peaceful means" to prevent Taiwan from formally declaring its independence has proved to be a helpful state with respect to pressuring North Korea to return to the six-party talks on their nuclear program. The willingness of policy-makers within the Bush administration to work with Beijing on that issue does not imply that they condone the Chinese regime's behavior on any other issue. And, lest we forget, at least two of the states that assisted the United States in its war to remove the rogue regime of the Taliban — Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — are governed by petty despots who do not derive their authority from anything approaching the Jeffersonian standard (i.e., the consent of the governed).

If it were true that "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one," as President Bush declared in his second inaugural address, then there would be no hard choices in foreign policy. But the world doesn't work that way. Policy-making entails making choices, virtually all of them difficult. National interests and abstract "values" must be kept largely separate; otherwise, it becomes harder and harder to differentiate those actions that are necessary and warranted from those that are unnecessary and unwise.

A half-century ago, President Dwight Eisenhower had a vision of national security that was shaped by his perception of national interests — interests that were, in turn, shaped by his sense that American power was limited. These limitations necessarily forced policy-makers to pick and choose where and when to intervene, and in what fashion. This was crucially important during the Cold War, when miscalculation risked provoking a global thermonuclear war.

Neoconservatives enamored of America's unipolar moment in the aftermath of the Cold War believe that

the constraints are essentially gone. The end of the Cold War meant that the United States could aspire to global dominance — something it never sought to do during the Cold War — because no one could challenge her. Indeed, as William Kristol and Lawrence F. Kaplan argued in making the case for war with Iraq, to revert to a foreign policy guided by "the narrowest self-interest" — in other words, to adhere to any realistic conception of our country's limitations — would spell disaster because "the United States remains the hinge of the international system. And when it sits idly by in the face of threats to that system, international order erodes." By this formulation, the United States is responsible for dealing with all rogues, anywhere in the world, because global security is completely dependent upon U.S. action.

While our troops are eminently capable of defeating any force foolish enough to engage them on the battlefield, they cannot be everywhere, and they cannot do everything.

Domestic Constraints

But American power is not unlimited. There are constraints on how and when this power is deployed, and the most important of these are domestic, not foreign. While some might scorn the American public's reluctance to play the world's policeman, these attitudes reflect an accurate assessment of the high costs and dubious benefits of military operations that are not directly tied to the protection of U.S. vital interests. Few politicians will be willing to buck the trend if support for a particular overseas mission wanes.

An even more tangible limitation is the U.S. military itself. While our troops are eminently capable of defeating any force foolish enough to engage them on the battlefield, they cannot be everywhere, and they cannot do everything. We should be extremely careful about deploying our forces abroad, and we should be particularly wary of attempting to sustain a long-term military presence in foreign lands. In the meantime, in the interest of freeing up crucial resources in the war on al-Qaida and other threatening extremist groups, policy-makers should revisit Cold War–era military deployments that were dedicated to fighting a foe that has long since disappeared, and that have little, if any, relevance to fighting radical Islamists.

Beyond the military, however, policy-makers must focus on applying all of the means at our disposal — diplomatic, cultural, economic — that enhance U.S. security. Fighting terrorists will only rarely require the deployment of massive numbers of troops, but it will require other strategies and tactics that are not appropriate for fighting state-based threats.

Deterrence still works against states, even rogue ones. It did against Saddam Hussein. He never attacked the United States directly because he knew that such actions would be suicidal. The burden of proof should be very high for those who argue that the leaders of Iran or North Korea cannot be deterred in the same way as Saddam Hussein.

This is why the war in Iraq, the first manifestation of the broader strategy of confronting rogue states, is so tragic and unnecessary. The Bush administration opted to take action against an evil and despicable person who had been, and could have continued to be, deterred from taking action against us. Now, the U.S. military presence in Iraq plays into the feelings of resentment, humiliation and anger that Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other terrorists use to recruit new fighters for their global jihad. The broader strategy concurrently encourages and enables our diplomatic adversaries to arm against us so as to secure themselves against preventive American action.

As Carpenter and Peña observe: "Those who cheered U.S. military interventions, conservatives and liberals alike, need to ask themselves whether increasing the incentives for nuclear proliferation was a price worth paying — because greater proliferation is the price we are now paying."

There is time to change course. U.S. policy-makers should avoid an open-ended strategy of confronting all rogue states, not because they are lovable, but rather because the most immediate threats to our security — those posed by non-state rogues — demand their full attention. ■

War with Iran, or War with the Facts?

PJ Loughran

Efforts by the British, French and Germans offer hope that the day Tehran acquires nuclear weapons can be put off indefinitely.

By Henry Precht

Are those war drums tuning up again, this time for Iran? An exiled opposition group spreads "intelligence" about nukes, while respected Secretaries of State front for neocon hawks. As the president and vice president hint of an attack to come, other officials lash Iran, and pundits voice their support for strong measures. Meanwhile, as Washington blusters, Europeans take a softer line. And on and on to a repeat of the Iraq invasion?

Yes, it all sounds familiar, but I don't think so. The Bush administration may be ideologically motivated, but it

isn't stupid. For if the Iraq War has proved costly, hostilities against Iran would make it seem like a church supper. Here are some reasons why.

• Iran is about four times the size of Iraq and its cities are isolated across vast deserts. (Recall the lost helicopters of Desert One.)

• Its population, almost three times that of Iraq, has the same three large factions: Sunni, Shia and Kurds. But unlike its western neighbor, Iran is 90 percent Shia, and its people have historically remained united in times of great stress.

• Although a majority of the country certainly wants reform of the ruling clerical regime, Iranians are intensely proud nationalists. Decades of British, Russian and American domination have left them fearful that outsiders seek their oil and want to weaken their sovereignty.

• The country has tens of thousands of experienced and fanatical fighters organized into small cells committed to defend their homeland. An American invasion would drive many more citizens to join that defense.

For all these reasons, fighting Iran would be bloody and never-ending. Oil prices (already at record highs) would skyrocket, U.S. debt would soar and the dollar would plunge. Washington (and Israel) would stand alone in the world without the dubious "coalition of the willing" President Bush boasts of in Iraq.

Nor would the fighting be limited to Iranian territory. Heretofore, Iran (which, unlike some of its neighbors, has not invaded another country in over 200 years) has been largely passive in response to American initiatives in the region. It has even been helpful in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. But in the event of a U.S. invasion, that stance would likely morph into subversion and even active support for insurgents in Iraq and elsewhere. Those who are concerned about Iranian-backed terrorism could see their worst conjectures come to life.

While an invasion would be madness, precision attacks on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities would be almost as damaging to American interests at home and abroad.

Other Means of Pressure?

While an invasion would be madness, precision attacks on suspected Iranian nuclear facilities would be almost as damaging to American interests at home and abroad. If, as Vice President Cheney foreshadowed earlier this year, Israel decided to repeat in Iran its 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, the U.S. would be totally identified with its ally even if Jerusalem acted completely on its own.

Furthermore, some observers think the Israeli bombing actually spurred Saddam Hussein to accelerate and hide his program to develop nuclear weapons. Certainly that would be a predictable reaction in Tehran as well, driving it to seek a deterrent against pre-emptive action by Washington and Jerusalem.

As for other pressure tactics, we already know that a quarter-century of American sanctions only produced Iranian resentment without changing Tehran's behavior. As CEO of Halliburton, Vice President Cheney understood that history, and opposed unilateral sanctions.

But maybe the administration is just talking tough, playing bad cop to the Europeans' good cop. Or perhaps the White House has learned that heightening tensions and fear at home bolsters perceptions of presidential leadership. Whatever the explanation, the tactic is badly chosen. Threatening Tehran could have unforeseen consequences.

Let's step back in this argument. Having discussed problems inherent in responding violently to a feared Iranian nuclear weapon, we should examine what lies behind those fears. But first, the context: Nukes are one of the litany of four charges Washington has leveled at Tehran for decades. The other three — abuse of human rights, support for terrorism and opposition

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Henry Precht, a retired Foreign Service officer who was country director for Iran during the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis, has followed Iranian affairs for over 30 years. He is the author of A Diplomat's Progress: Ten Tales of Diplomatic Adventure in and around the Middle East *(Williams & Company, 2005).*

to an Arab-Israel peace — receive prominence seriatim. Although there is truth in each, none stand up to the regional hypocrisy test.

Human-rights abusers populate the Middle East. Iranians who oppose a fair and lasting peace settlement resemble Israeli and Arab extremists. Other regimes assassinate opponents as Tehran did, give women few of the rights granted in Iran, and permit only staged elections, if that. You will never hear that comparison out of Washington, however. Instead, for our friends, the U.S. reaction to offenses ranges from an occasional rebuke through silence to generous aid. At the core of the American position is a strong antipathy toward Iran that shuts out other considerations.

Certainly, the mullahs' record on human rights is abysmal, and constitutes the major reason for widespread popular discontent. Yet, as Iranian Nobel Peace Prize Winner Shirin Edbadi has written: "Respect for human rights can never be imposed by foreign military might and coercion. Foreign military intervention in Iran is the surest way to keep the goal [of getting Iran to adhere to international human rights laws] out of reach." Continuing to bad-mouth and threaten will only drive all Iranians together, weakening opposition to the clerical regime. Talk about unintended consequences! Shades of Iraq!

Countdown to Nukes?

But back to nukes. So far, no aluminum tubes, Niger yellow cake or mobile labs have been produced. There is, however, the assumption that Iran has long intended to develop nuclear weapons and could do so easily once its civilian program was established.

Perhaps the best statement of the "evidence" was given by Christopher de Bellaigue in the *New York Review of Books* of Feb. 24, 2005. He wrote that beginning in the summer of 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency "brought the Iranian program under

close scrutiny. It has since established that Iran has egregiously breached the safeguards agreement which was designed to keep its nuclear activities transparent and limited to peaceful purposes. These breaches include Iran's failure to report the purchase of nuclear materials and to declare the existence of several of its nuclear sites."

Washington's continuing pressure bolsters the clerical regime and sours ordinary Iranians on the U.S.

Confirming this information, IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei said in a *Washington Post* interview last spring, "Iran has clearly cheated in the past. Corrective action was taken. Now they say they are embarking on a new path of cooperation, and since then they are cooperating. If they are still cheating, we haven't seen any evidence of that." ElBaradei has also stated that the hidden activities were not related to a weapons program, that any nuclear program could be used to make bombs, but the development of nuclear energy makes economic sense and is perhaps inevitable in Iran and elsewhere (and, I might add, to the West's benefit by freeing up oil for export).

Incidentally, the Bush administration tried to prevent Mr. ElBaradei from being elected to a third term as head of the agency, but abandoned the campaign when no other candidates came forward.

Iran admits it acquired nuclear equipment on the black market from the Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan network, but says it declined offered guidance for assembling a bomb. Tehran insists it is only seeking nuclear power for peaceful purposes as guaranteed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although hiding purchases on the black market and nuclear sites from the IAEA is plainly a violation worthy of suspicion, does it merit the threats coming from Washington? One could argue that sanctions, threats and reports of U.S. spying — and memory of the Israeli bombing of Osirak — are understandable reasons for trying to keep nuclear activity hidden from Pentagon eyes.

In late February, to the great displeasure of Washington, Iran and Russia signed an agreement for the provision of nuclear fuel for the power plant at Bushire beginning next year and continuing for 10 years. The agreement stipulates that spent fuel would be returned to Moscow so that it could not be used for weapons.

Later, Secretary Rice offered support to the European negotiations by agreeing to remove the block to Iranian membership in the WTO and to consider provision of spare parts for civil aircraft. The initial Iranian reaction was dismissive as insufficient, but talks continued. In August the Europeans made their final offer to Iran: economic incentives, including a "guaranteed" supply of enriched uranium for its power plants, if Iran permanently gave up the NPT-authorized right to enrich its own uranium. Iran, having repeatedly made plain that it insisted on controlling all stages of nuclear power production from mining uranium to power generation, dismissed the European proposal and has taken steps towards resuming enrichment.

At this writing, there are two possible scenarios: either Iran and the Europeans will resume talks in a further search for a compromise, or the IAEA will condemn Iran and refer it to the U.N. Security Council for a vote on sanctions. There is now little likelihood that the U.S. and Europeans can muster the necessary votes in the IAEA, and less chance that the Security Council will impose sanctions without drawing a Chinese or Russian veto. Should sanctions be imposed, the result could well be that Iran would renounce the Non-Proliferation Treaty and end all inspections. For these reasons, the prospect is for continued talk, despite Washington's preference for toughness.

Washington's continuing pressure bolsters the clerical regime and sours ordinary Iranians on the U.S. — a great loss, as they are among the few Middle Easterners with friendly feelings for America. Virtually all Iranians, bitter opponents and loyal supporters of the regime alike, believe their country must have nuclear power if it is to have a growing economy like India and China. On this, the mullahs are no different from Shah Pahlavi; recall that he successfully wooed American companies and the State Department during the 1970s to work toward that goal.

The Jury Is Still Out

The case against Iran at this stage does not merit a guilty verdict, but rather deferred judgment. Still, let us not allow benefit of the doubt to obscure realism. At some point in the future, Iranian insecurity may well mean Tehran will move from its declared peaceful

nuclear program and seek covertly to make bombs. After all, Iran has an array of potential enemies: Iraq used poison gas and missiles against it; Pakistan, which has the bomb, supported the Taliban who murdered Iranian diplomats; Israel, with an estimated 200 nuclear warheads, regularly threatens Tehran; and American forces surround Iran on all sides. Iran is unlikely to initiate an attack against any of these powers, for example, by killing fellow Muslims, destroying the shrines of Jerusalem and inviting certain and vast retaliation. But, to fearful leaders under threat in Tehran, nuclear weapons could appear a deterrent against potential enemies, following the North Korean model.

An imaginative but unexplored course might be to offer Iran precise security guarantees; for example, a nonaggression pact with neighbors and outside powers. But that would require a dramatic change in the U.S. attitude.

Continuing talks with the British, French and Germans offer some prospect that the day Tehran acquires nuclear weapons can be put off indefinitely. But in the meantime, tough inspections would be required and meaningful incentives (trade, investment, technical assistance and precise security guarantees) offered to coax Tehran down a peaceful path. The Supreme Leader Ali Khameni (who calls the shots) and new President Mahmud Ahmadinejad are adamant that is where they want to go. Washington should end its hostility and not place obstacles in the way of that goal. After all, Iran and the U.S. share perspectives on global oil supply and some Middle East issues (though not the Arab-Israel conflict).

In time, given a bit of quiet and passive cooperation from Washington, the Europeans might defuse the nuclear issue and refocus Iranian energies on much-needed economic development. If they can be relieved of outside threats, Iranians will in time find their own way to ease the control of their religious masters. That would be the outcome the world needs, though it might not harmonize with the loud ideological drumming of the Bush administration. ■

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A ROGUE BY ANY OTHER NAME

PJ Loughran

RULED BY A DICTATOR WHO THREATENS THE REST OF THE WORLD, NORTH KOREA LOOKS LIKE THE PERFECT FOE. BUT THAT ISN'T THE WHOLE STORY.

BY LEON V. SIGAL

What's in a name? Plenty, if that name is "rogue state" or "pariah state." Rogue states, or pariahs with aggressive intent, are said to be the main proliferation menace in the world. Yet the United States does not brand Pakistan with either of those labels, even though it may have done more than any other country to enable other states to obtain nuclear arms.

North Korea has not been as fortunate as Pakistan. To many Americans, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the archetypal rogue state: implacable and inimical, with a master plan to deceive the world and acquire

nuclear weapons. Its one-man rule, its internal regimentation and its dogmatism would alienate any freedom-loving American. Pyongyang's harsh diatribes against Washington, its penchant for brinkmanship and its nasty habit of floating concessions on a sea of threats all continue to antagonize even the most level-headed observers. So did its past acts of terrorism, like the 1983 bombing in Rangoon that barely missed South Korea's President Chun Doo-hwan and killed 17 members of his entourage.

Pyongyang's harsh diatribes against Washington and penchant for brinkmanship have antagonized even the most level-headed observers.

Yes, in many respects, North Korea makes a perfect foe. Yet ever since 1988, it has been trying to end its historic enmity against the United States. Beginning in that year, it stopped sponsoring terrorist acts against other states, and even softened its anti-American rhetoric. Nevertheless, the image of a rogue state ruled by a latter-day Genghis Khan has been difficult to shake, leaving the North an easy target for demonization.

Name-calling does more than foster a domestic political climate of hostility. It also infects official thinking. Epithets like "rogue" or "pariah" become a pernicious premise of U.S. policy and intelligence estimates, blinding officials to the motives of states for acquiring nuclear weapons. They predispose American policymakers to take a coercive approach to stopping the spread of nuclear arms, threatening isolation, economic sanctions and military force. And they impede diplomatic give-and-take, which is the best way to probe the intentions of such states and try to induce them to change course.

After all, a rogue is a criminal, and the only way to handle criminals is to punish them.

Yet, again and again, the crime-and-punishment approach has failed to dissuade states from seeking their own nuclear arsenals. By contrast, American reassurances and inducements have a long record of accomplishment. They helped convince South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to abandon their nuclear ambitions. Only with Iraq and Pakistan did such efforts fail.

The Good Cop Approach

Branding potential proliferators as rogue states actually gets in the way of disarming them. Washington would be better off referring to them by a more appropriate name — perhaps "insecure states" — and treating them accordingly. That means offering encouragement and incentives instead of threats to get such governments to stop arming, and moving to contain and deter them only if that approach fails.

Hard-liners dismiss such talk as sympathy for the aggressor. They take it on faith, for example, that Pyongyang is motivated by paranoid hostility to America and will not stop its campaign to become a full-fledged nuclear power. So what if it is reaching out to its neighbors and the world and establishing diplomatic ties with them? That's just a tactic. So what if it agreed to freeze its plutonium program in 1994 — the only nuclear weapons program it then had? That was just a ruse to dupe the credulous while it began acquiring the means to enrich uranium.

So what if the DPRK is now offering to freeze and dismantle its nuclear weapons programs — if only the United States will normalize political and economic relations and provide assurances that it won't attack, interfere in its internal affairs, or impede its economic development by maintaining sanctions and discouraging aid and investment from its neighbors? Even to discuss such proposals, say the hard-liners, would amount to coddling criminals, or in their favorite turn of phrase, rewarding bad behavior.

But the trouble is that by not upholding the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States failed to reward North Korea's good behavior, even though the accord gave Washington what it most wanted up front: a freeze of Pyongyang's plutonium production, a program that

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Leon V. Sigal directs the Northeast Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York. He is the author of Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea *(Princeton University Press, 1998) and the editor of* The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Regional Perspectives, *which can be found at http://northkorea.ssrc.org/.*

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

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by now could have generated enough nuclear material for at least 50 bombs. But when the Republicans won control of Congress just days after the October 1994 accord was signed, they quickly denounced the deal as appeasement. Shying away from taking them on, the Clinton administration backpedaled on implementing the agreement. As a result, Washington did little easing of sanctions until 2000. Having pledged to provide two nuclear power plants "by a target date of 2003," it did not even pour concrete for the first foundation until August 2002. It did deliver heavy fuel oil as promised, but seldom on schedule. Above all, it did not live up to its commitment in Article II of the accord to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations" — to end enmity and lift sanctions.

Epithets like "rogue" or "pariah" have predisposed American policy-makers to take a coercive approach to states like North Korea.

When Washington was slow to fulfill the terms of the accord, Pyongyang threatened to break out of it in 1997. Its acquisition of gas centrifuges to enrich uranium from Pakistan began soon thereafter. Yet that was a pilot program, not the operational capability U.S. intelligence says it moved to acquire in 2001 after the Bush administration refused talks and instead disclosed that the North was a target for nuclear attack. However, U.S. hard-liners took it as conclusive evidence (as if they needed any) that North Korea was hellbent on arming. After confronting Pyongyang over enrichment in October 2002, Washington retaliated by halting shipment of heavy fuel oil promised under the Agreed Framework.

The Road to Pyongyang

Hard-liners were convinced that Iraq's fate would chasten North Korea. On the day Saddam Hussein's statue was toppled from its pedestal in Baghdad, Under Secretary of State John Bolton declared, "We are hopeful that a number of regimes will draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq."

Yet, far from becoming more pliable, North Korea became more determined to arm itself — and will remain so until the United States changes course. In 2003, as U.S. troops were deploying to the Persian Gulf, Pyongyang challenged Washington by lighting two nuclear fuses. It resumed reprocessing to extract plutonium from nuclear fuel rods that it had removed from its reactor in 1994 but had stored since then at Yongbyon under international inspectors' scrutiny. And it resumed making plutonium-laden spent fuel by refueling and restarting its nuclear reactor.

In an official statement on the start of the war in March 2003, North Korea noted that the United States had first demanded that Iraq submit to inspections, and it had. The United States next demanded that Baghdad disarm, and it began to do so. The United States then attacked it anyway. "This suggests that even the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the U.S. would not help avert war," a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman said on April 6, 2003. "Only military deterrent force, supported by ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the nation. This is the lesson drawn from the Iraqi war."

Pyongyang's rhetoric and tactics convinced many in Washington that it was determined to arm and should therefore be punished for breaking its commitments. Other policy-makers interpreted its actions as extortion, intended to secure economic aid without giving up anything in return. In fact, it was doing neither, but simply playing tit for tat — cooperating whenever Washington cooperated and retaliating when Washington reneged. It still is.

Hard-liners call this approach blackmail. But that's a misnomer. It's blackmail when a man menaces you with a baseball bat and demands that you hand over your wallet — and you do. It's not blackmail when he hands you his bat and says, let's play ball, and you don't. That's what North Korea did after October 1994 and says it is willing to do again now.

Skeptics may ask why we should believe Pyongyang would be willing to re-engage in the face of implacable hostility from Washington. One answer lies in President Kim Jong Il's October 2001 decision to reform his country's moribund economy, a policy he formally promulgated in July 2002. As a result of that policy shift, the North Korean economy has begun to revive — but reform cannot succeed without a political accommodation with the United States, Japan and South Korea that

facilitates reallocation of resources from military use and attracts aid and investment from the outside.

Misreading the Situation

In the belief that North Korea was on the verge of collapse, however, Bush administration hard-liners kept pushing for an economic embargo and naval blockade to strangle it to death. Yet all the North's neighbors think that regime change can best be achieved through prolonged engagement. They know that attempts to isolate and starve Pyongyang will provoke it to arm even faster, which is why they won't try. Instead, they have pursued talks of their own with North Korea, which persuaded them that it seems willing to deal.

In the belief that North Korea was on the verge of collapse, Bush administration hard-liners kept pushing for an economic embargo and naval blockade to strangle it to death.

So why, in contrast, have U.S. policy-makers been so unwilling to countenance negotiating with North Korea before reaching for their guns? For many, it is a blank screen on which to project their own predispositions and prejudices. Given the endemic uncertainty about the DPRK's nuclear capabilities and intentions, the years of hostility and the deep mistrust on both sides, the image of North Korea as a rogue state filled the vacuum of knowledge.

A prudent response to uncertainty would have been to treat estimates of North Korean nuclear capabilities and intentions as rough guesses rather than facts, and to probe Pyongyang's intentions through diplomatic give-and-take without running a high risk of war. The hard-

liners' response, instead, has been to leak worst-case assessments and pursue rash policies — threats of political isolation and economic coercion, even armed force.

By impeding a cooperative solution, the unilateralists have put Washington on a collision course not just with Pyongyang but, more importantly, with America's allies in Asia. This approach threatens to erode political support for the alliance in South Korea and Japan and jeopardize the U.S. troop presence in the region. In fact, the hard-liners would apparently rather pick a fight with China than negotiate with North Korea.

When Washington was slow to fulfill the terms of the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang threatened to break out of it in 1997.

Their intransigence has been the catalyst for unprecedented cooperation in Northeast Asia aimed at reining in the United States. The January 2003 Japan-Russia summit meeting and the Japan-DPRK summit meetings of 2002 and 2004 should be seen in this light, as should South Korea's warming relations with China. Given the history of antagonism in the region, such cooperation would have seemed unthinkable just a few short years ago.

"Action for Action"

The best way for the United States to avoid further erosion in its position in the region is to negotiate in earnest with North Korea and test whether it makes a deal and lives up to it.

An agreement in principle stating what each side wants at the end is a useful starting point. North Korea needs to agree to rid itself of its nuclear weapons programs and abandon plans to build longer-range missiles. The United States, in turn, should join other nations in providing written security assurances and move to normalize relations as the North eliminates its weapons and the means of making them.

The most urgent need for the United States is to restore inspectors' control over the plutonium that North Korea removed from its reactor at Yongbyon in 1994, and again earlier this year, and to shut down that reactor to keep it from generating more plutonium in its spent fuel. Shutting down and resealing the DPRK's reprocessing plant is another priority.

Satellites and other technical means can monitor a freeze of activity at the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing plant, though not enrichment sites at unknown locations. Inspections of these sites, as desirable as they are, will take time to arrange. But they can wait: U.S. intelligence estimates the North cannot produce much highly enriched uranium until later in this decade. Conversely, delaying a freeze to negotiate a detailed verifiable agreement on enrichment will simply allow time for Pyongyang to generate more plutonium, fabricate bombs and increase its negotiating leverage.

The key to verification is what the International Atomic Energy Agency calls an "initial declaration," listing all the North's nuclear facilities, equipment and fissile material, in whatever form they may now be. Once that declaration is cross-checked against what U.S. intelligence has already ascertained, elimination can begin. The time for challenge inspections will come, but it is not yet here. Why waste time and bargaining chips negotiating to verify that the North has what it says it has when the aim is to get rid of its weapons programs altogether?

Pyongyang's missile program can be dealt with in parallel. The first priority is what the North offered in Beijing — a ban on missile test launches and exports of missile technology. Next is to negotiate the dismantling of missiles and production sites.

Washington will have to reciprocate for each of these steps, of course. It will not get something for nothing. Words alone will not placate Pyongyang. Given the deep mistrust on both sides, and the belief on each side that the other reneged on the Agreed Framework, this cautious approach makes sense. Each side needs concrete results from the other to enable it to build trust and move forward.

The good news is that Pyongyang seems ready to deal. It says it wants to exchange "words for words" and "action for action." By "words for words" it means an agreement in principle that if Washington "gives up its hostile policy," it will "transparently renounce all nuclear-weapons related programs." By "action for action," it means phased, reciprocal steps. To start, it is offering a freeze on "all the facilities related to nuclear weapons," shutting down its nuclear

reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. Whether Pyongyang has "facilities" to enrich uranium or is in the process of building them it has yet to clarify. That discussion could begin if Washington engages in direct dialogue with its foe.

Most important, the proposed freeze covers "even products achieved through reprocessing," which meant putting the plutonium acquired in 1994 — five to six bombs' worth — back under inspection. In return, Pyongyang wants Washington to "participate" in providing heavy fuel oil promised under the Agreed Framework, take it off the list of "state sponsors of terrorism" and lift related sanctions. North Korea's negotiating stance is intended to drive home the point that if the United States remains its foe, it feels threatened and will seek nuclear arms to counter that threat. Conversely, if the United States takes steps to end its enmity, it will reciprocate.

American hard-liners like John Bolton were convinced that Iraq's fate would chasten North Korea.

North Korea insists on dealing directly with the United States, whether or not China, South Korea, Japan and Russia are also at the negotiating table, because none of them can provide such assurances on behalf of the United States. Direct dialogue is also the least a state can do to end enmity. To refuse to talk face-to-face is to deny the DPRK's legitimacy as a state.

Testing the Waters

For the past four years the United States has watched North Korea arm without trying what South Korea and Japan think just might get it to stop: negotiating in earnest. Instead, the Bush administration prefers to demonize North Korea as a rogue state and stick with a crime-and-punishment approach to disarming it. This is not surprising, given that most hard-liners are unilateral-

ists who could not care less what allies think. *(As the* Journal *went to press, news came of a tentative agreement at the six-party talks.)*

The Bush administration insists that the six-party talks are succeeding in isolating North Korea and that additional pressure by China and others will bring it to heel. And if not, well, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang will at least drive Seoul and Tokyo further into Washington's arms.

The crime-and-punishment approach — unlike reassurances and inducements — has failed to dissuade states from seeking their own nuclear arsenals.

But many Asians see a negotiated resolution as both desirable and possible. Indeed, the Washington hardliners' uncompromising stance has led some in Seoul and Tokyo to wonder whether they can rely on the U.S. for their security. That suspicion is threatening to unravel U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia and enhance China's influence there. Indeed, far from isolating the North, Washington is itself becoming odd man out in the region, dissipating political support for pressuring Pyongyang and enhancing China's influence.

The great divide in American foreign policy thinking is between those who believe that to get its way in the world the United States has to push other countries around, and those who think that cooperation can sometimes reduce threats to security.

Does Pyongyang mean what it says? The surest way to find out is sustained diplomatic give-and-take. That will require the United States to make a strategic decision to spell out the steps it is prepared to take to end enmity if North Korea eliminates its nuclear weapons programs — and this time carry them out. ■

LIBYA: AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM

PJ Loughran

THE U.S.-LIBYA DÉTENTE PROMISES GREAT MUTUAL BENEFIT, PROVIDED THE FORWARD MOMENTUM IS MAINTAINED.

BY DAVID L. MACK

Nearly 33 years after leaving Libya as a young diplomat in 1972, I recently returned to Tripoli for five days of meetings with officials, university faculty and students and businesspeople. While recognizing that I only got a partial and brief look at the Libya of 2005, let me offer a few general observations.

Muammar Qadhafi is still in charge and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Even senior Libyans are unsure how his policies might evolve, but the leader's current direction is the most reality-based and promising of his more than three decades in power. Internationally, he seeks acceptance by the West and integration into the global system. He

seems to have recognized that Libya's security is best assured by wary but peaceful relationships with the U.S. and other major governments, and that Libyan involvement with international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction had left the country less safe. He has also recognized that the future is about global economic integration and interaction with private companies representing the best technology and management that Libya's oil and gas revenues can buy, or attract, for investment.

Libya can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global community.

The strategic benefits to the United States of Tripoli's current posture are immense. Libya is no longer an adversary state located in the Mediterranean basin. Instead, it can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global community. To put it bluntly, there are too many bad governments seeking dangerous weapons for the U.S. to simply bomb them all into submission. The Bush administration needs an alternative paradigm for international cooperation. Détente, including intelligence exchanges on mutual terrorist threats, serves the security needs of both states.

Assets for Change

Domestically, Qadhafi views Western-style political reforms as unnecessary additions to international cooperation in foreign policy and economic matters. In the economic sphere, he appears to have decided to leave oil and gas development and marketing control to the generally apolitical, professionally managed Libyan National Oil Company and the foreign partners it attracts through competitive bidding in a transparent process. American companies benefited from this in the January 2005 round of awards of petroleum exploration contracts. But companies from Europe and the Far East have started to give them a run for their money, and bidding in the summer round was brisk. In this area, Libya has already reaped great benefit from improved relations with the U.S. Its oil and gas revenues will probably rise significantly as a result.

However, the process of rebuilding effective state institutions and encouraging the private sector to resume business activity (euphemistically called "expanding the popular sector") is going very slowly. Libya has not yet passed laws and established mechanisms to implement rational planning, budgeting and other economic reforms for the productive use of the country's rapidly increasing oil and gas revenues. Moreover, the mostly nontransparent powers of the military, security and intelligence apparatus remain intact.

The status of Libyan women represents the single most important change from 1972, when I left Tripoli. After three years there, I had not had an opportunity to meet a single Libyan woman. Their absence from the workplace and isolation in the home had a negative effect on the efficiency of the government and productivity of the private sector. Men often left their jobs early to do the family shopping or absented themselves entirely to take a sick child to the doctor. Now, women seem to be everywhere. They made up half of the university audience I addressed, and two of them rose afterwards to ask questions. Those I met in offices and at social occasions were self-confident and assertive. I would hazard a guess that Qadhafi is more popular among Libyan women than among the men, even if he can only take partial responsibility for their emancipation.

It is hard to assess the actual levels of education and evaluate whether Libyans are being trained in a manner relevant to the country's needs. But the rapid growth in the numbers of educated Libyans provides manpower for economic and social development. Effective employment of Libya's human resources, however, depends on the government's adopting sound macro-economic policies and

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Retired FSO David L. Mack is vice president of the Middle East Institute. He served as deputy assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs and U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, and also held diplomatic postings in Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia. Assertions and opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.

reforming a legal and commercial framework which does not meet global standards.

At this point, Libya is far from rich, but it does not lack capital. The government had an estimated $25 billion in reserves in 2004, and revenues of $16 billion over and above its operating budget. The problem is how to invest productively in education and health, and get capital into the hands of entrepreneurs who will create jobs and become effective partners for foreign business interests. Libyan businessmen expressed concern that there was no apparent mechanism to do this, and that the trend was to funnel money through a few cronies of the regime who would create monopoly interests.

Libya's strategic détente with Europe and the U.S. makes the country safer from future military pressures or economic sanctions. NATO countries that formerly viewed it as a threat now want to cultivate common strategic and commercial interests. Of course, this also means that the regime no longer has the excuse of being under siege from a hostile world.

The lack of visa issuance in Tripoli and Washington is the most immediate impediment to an expansion of U.S.-Libyan contacts in the areas of commerce, tourism and education.

U.S.-Libya Relationship Stalled

A theme I heard over and over was that Libya had done so much — offering up its citizens for trial at The Hague, giving a generous settlement to the Pan Am 103 families, giving up its chemical weapons and its option to develop nuclear weapons — and had gotten so little in return. In fact, Libya has already gained a great deal, but three elements are still lacking:

- Libya remains on the terrorism list;
- The U.S. is delaying the issuance of visas in Tripoli; and
- Relations are still well below the full ambassadorial level.

Removal of Libya from the terrorism list was complicated by the serious allegation of a Libyan attempt two years ago to assassinate then-Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. While not denying Libyan involvement in some kind of anti-Abdullah agitation, Libyans I spoke with in April charged that the U.S. was seeking any excuse to delay the country's removal from the terrorism list. They also said that Saudi Arabia was using this issue to put the U.S. on the defensive on at least one issue involving international terrorism. I suggested that Libya should find a way to resolve matters with its Saudi brothers. Shortly after his accession to the throne in August, King Abdullah pardoned the alleged Libyan intelligence agents it had under arrest.

Since this seems to be the only instance of alleged Libyan culpability in international terrorism in recent years, Tripoli now expects movement toward full relations by the Bush administration. In a strictly legal sense, the Bush administration could do so, but there is opposition from some members of Congress who espouse the grievances of American citizens dating back to 1986. The continued inclusion of Libya on the terrorism list has several practical effects, such as subjecting the sale of U.S. civil aircraft to onerous U.S. bureaucratic hurdles. More importantly, from the Libyan perspective, it constitutes an example of U.S. bad faith.

The lack of visa issuance in Tripoli and Washington is the most immediate impediment to an expansion of contacts in the areas of commerce, tourism and education. The hold-up on the U.S. side is purely technical — lack of a secure facility for visa procedures. The U.S. Liaison Office in Tripoli, like diplomatic posts elsewhere, has to meet the rigorous security standards of the State Department. Greg Berry, the able Foreign Service officer in charge, indicated to me during my visit that the mission had located a property to the west of town with enough space to be set back from traffic, and negotiations are currently under way to purchase the property. (Recently, zoning issues have arisen that are an additional complication.) Once the property issue is solved, the next step would be the entry of pre-fabricated buildings and equipment under diplomatic seal to ensure security.

In the meantime, the Libyan Liaison Office chief in Washington, Ambassador Ali Aujali, appears to be subject to instructions that he insist upon reciprocal steps by the U.S. before he starts to issue visas. I explained the situation to my high-level Libyan contacts, and suggested that this is an area where their interests would be better served

by not waiting to proceed.

Libya now enjoys full diplomatic relations with virtually every major government except for the United States. This is mostly symbolic — after all, we can have relations with other states, such as Syria, without those relations being very satisfying to either side. But symbolism is all-important to Qadhafi, who did not embark upon the dramatic changes in his foreign policy to be spurned as not respectable enough to have a U.S. ambassador in Tripoli who would deliver the occasional letter from the president. This is especially the case given that other states, including the U.K., have even engaged in summitry with Qadhafi. Libyans are becoming nervous that the U.S., having received a generous settlement for the Pan Am 103 families and a huge intelligence and security windfall resulting from Libya's surrender of WMD materials and documents, is now prepared to let relations stall at the present level of liaison offices with limited functions. At some point, this would probably result in Libyan retaliation of some kind, and several of my interlocutors hinted at that in vague terms.

Both Libya and the U.S. have gained strategically from the détente in their relations, but more forward movement is needed to prevent a relapse.

President Bush's second inaugural address, with its emphasis on the need for democracy as a basis for our relations with other states, together with Washington's enthusiasm about the "Arab spring," has set off alarm bells in Tripoli. To the Libyans, this looks like we are simply raising the bar higher for development of normal relations. I encountered hostile questions from the university audience in addition to the more predictable queries from senior Libyan officials. Quoting an Arab proverb, one senior official said, "Enter the house of a friend by its front door, not through the window." If we discuss internal political reforms, he said, we should do it on the official level. If a U.S. embassy in any Arab country goes behind the back of the government, or if we send NGOs into the country for this purpose, it will be viewed with great suspicion by the people of that country — not just the regime.

Suggested U.S. Initiatives

Libya's policy shift, even with its shortcomings, has been a dramatic success both for Libya and for its former adversaries in Europe and the United States. The strategic gains, as well as the benefits for business are nearly self-evident. At this point, however, an Iranian strategist or the ambitious political leader of another government considering how to mend bad relations with Washington would probably conclude that the U.S. was not honoring its understandings with Libya. Less obvious, but perhaps more important in the longer term, is the potential for Libyan citizens to gain economic and political reforms as the result of the country's new openness to the global community. Neglect of the budding bilateral relationship would risk both short-term and long-term strategic gains. There are steps that Libya should initiate itself, but let me focus on moves the Bush administration should make:

- Establish a target date for beginning visa issuance in Tripoli. Inform the Libyan government of the date, but say that implementation depends on meeting practical requirements connected with the security of our facility. We should offer to announce that date publicly, so the Libyans have cover to begin visa issuance in Washington.
- Assure the Libyans that we are reviewing their listing as a state sponsor of terrorism with an open mind and are not subjecting them to shifting standards. In the meantime, tell them we intend to proceed with the normalization process to the extent that is consistent with U.S. legal requirements.
- Formulate proposals for dialogue between Libyan and U.S. entities about the process of economic and political reform. It must be made clear that we are prepared to listen with an open mind to what they have to say about *The Green Book* and Libya's political system, known as Jamahiriyah. (This is a form of participatory democracy based on town-meeting-style gatherings called people's congresses, held at local, regional and national levels.)
- Endorse the establishment of private-sector business groups in both the U.S. and Libya to present the concerns of our respective business communities to the governments in each capital.
- Send a high-level visitor to Tripoli to convey these points to the Libyans. Public statements made about Libya should be neither unduly fulsome nor insensitive to their national pride. ■

Inextricably Linked: The U.S. and Syria

"The Bush administration could advance its objectives, not only in Syria but throughout the region, by offering carrots instead of sticks.

By Murhaf Jouejati

It takes two to tango" is perhaps the best way to explain why U.S.-Syrian relations are at an impasse: each has repeatedly engaged in behavior that alienates the other, yet neither can achieve its objectives without its reluctant partner. Damascus shot itself in the foot when it initially facilitated the infiltration of jihadists into Iraq soon after American troops marched into Baghdad. For its part, Washington has made it nearly impossible for Syria to provide the cooperation the U.S. needs to stabilize Iraq. Such miscalculations are all the more damaging because, in the long haul, both countries need each other to advance their respective interests —

which, in the final analysis, are convergent.

There have long been tensions in the U.S.-Syrian relationship, of course, which the war has exacerbated. Damascus opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq, not out of love for Saddam Hussein but as a result of its perceptions of threat. Despite the fact that the two countries share a history of Baath Party rule, Syria and Iraq were at loggerheads even before Saddam came to power in 1979. Yet Syria, like Iraq's other Arab neighbors, was satisfied with the status quo: Saddam was weak enough not to threaten the region, yet strong enough to keep Iraq united.

By ostracizing Syria, Washington is opening itself up to unintended consequences.

If Damascus became the most vocal regional critic of U.S. policy, it is because it had additional reasons for opposing the war. It opposed the concept of regime change, fearing it would become a precedent in international relations: if strong nations do not like the leadership of their weaker rivals, they could take unilateral action to change the regime of their foe. In particular, Syria feared that Israel, its militarily superior rival, might one day embark on such an adventure. Nor did it relish the prospect of having 140,000 American troops at its doorstep. Syria is already surrounded by U.S.-backed powers, whether to its north, where Turkey is a powerful member of NATO; to its south, where Jordan is Washington's closest Arab ally; or to its southwest — Israel. Moreover, it feared that the U.S. war in Iraq would cause northern Iraqi separatist Kurds to break away and proclaim an independent state of their own. Such an outcome would likely whet the appetite of Syria's own Kurdish minority for greater autonomy.

It is as a result of these perceptions of threat that Damascus facilitated, at least initially, the infiltration of jihadists into Iraq. Its aim in doing this was to tie down U.S. occupation forces in the hope that Washington would later turn to it for help in fighting the insurgents and stabilizing the new Iraqi government, much as it had done during the first Persian Gulf War.

All Sticks, No Carrots

Underlying Syria's initial policy is the carrot-and-stick approach that the late Hafez Assad, the current president's father, employed successfully vis-à-vis Washington. On the one hand, Syria frequently did Washington's bidding to demonstrate that it could be useful in advancing U.S. interests in the region. Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war, initially against the Muslim/Palestinian alliance, is one case in point. Its stabilization of Lebanon and the assistance it rendered in gaining the release of American hostages there during the 1980s is another example. And its participation alongside U.S.-led coalition forces against Iraq during the first Persian Gulf War is yet another.

On the other hand, Syria has never been shy about defending its national interests. Its support for Shiite groups resisting the U.S. peacekeeping presence in Lebanon during the early 1980s is just one example.

As it turns out, however, that approach backfired against Damascus. For in the post-9/11 era, Washington was in no mood to offer carrots. Moreover, Bashar Assad is not the master strategist his father was, nor does Russia provide the same patronage as the former Soviet Union did. Making matters worse, Assad, a political neophyte, badly underestimated longstanding American wrath against Syria and the intensity of the U.S.-Israel alliance, especially under the current administration.

Even when Syria belatedly took measures to stop the infiltration of jihadists into Iraq, including the erection of a 12-foot-high wall along a section of its 360-mile border, the deployment there of 15,000 troops, the arrest of over 2,000 Syrian and non-Syrian would-be infiltrators, and the repatriation of the latter to their countries of origin (Saudi Arabia and Jordan), Washington continued to pursue a policy of "sticks only" with Damascus. The U.S. imposed economic sanctions against Syria, withdrew its ambassador from Damascus, helped evict Syrian forces from Lebanon and, to further isolate Syria, pressed its European allies to postpone the signing of the E.U.-Syrian Associate Agreement. Nor would Washington provide Syria with

Murhaf Jouejati is the director of the Middle East Studies program and a visiting assistant professor of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University. He is also an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute.

night-vision equipment or even assent to British assistance to Syria. Over and above that, Washington stood in the way of joint Syrian-Iraqi patrols along the common border. In fact, Damascus is still waiting for an official Iraqi security team to initial that agreement.

There have long been tensions in the U.S.-Syrian relationship, of course, which the Iraq War has exacerbated.

Miscalculations

Such tactics indicate that Washington is lashing out in frustration, at least partially because it does not understand what makes Damascus tick. By virtue of its history, specifically its leading role in the Arab national revolt during World War I, Syria sees itself as the champion of Arab rights — an ideational constraint that limits the external action of any regime that dominates Syria. Accordingly, to retain its legitimacy any Syrian government is expected to defend Arabs, whether in Syria, Palestine or anywhere else in the region.

Thus, by ostracizing Damascus, Washington is opening itself up to unintended consequences. First, the little popularity that the U.S. enjoys in the Arab world is diminishing. Indeed, the perception on the "Arab street" — that the U.S., in cahoots with Israel, has occupied one Arab country and is targeting another — runs directly counter to American efforts to win Arab hearts and minds.

Second, U.S. pressure is forcing Assad to limit the domestic reforms he set out to implement. Indeed, the message of the Tenth Baath Party Congress that was held in June is one of defiance to both civil society and to the U.S.

Finally, Washington's persistence in its aggressive policy vis-a-vis Damascus might cause the Assad regime to implode. This might not be such a bad thing, were it not for the fact that (other than the ruling Baath Party) the Muslim Brotherhood — an Islamist political party that has been operating in Syria since the 1940s — is the largest and most organized political force in the country. Although some in Washington like to think that this is just the kind of disinformation that the Syrian government propagates to deter Washington from attempting to destabilize or even oust it, the reality on the ground speaks for itself: political Islam is continually gaining in strength in Syria, helped along by American miscalculations.

A Win-Win Scenario

This situation is unfortunate, for Washington and Damascus need each other to attain larger objectives. Syria needs America's influence with Israel to recover its Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Washington needs Syrian cooperation to control the border with Iraq to put pressure on the insurgency there. Beyond that, Damascus' staunchly secular government can help the U.S. check the rise of political Islam in the region.

Most broadly, Washington needs Syrian support to combat terrorism. Although this last point may, from Washington's perspective, seem a stretch in light of the country's long presence on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, it is not a contradiction in Syrian eyes. Whereas Damascus views militant Palestinian anti-Israel organizations as national liberation movements struggling to end Israel's occupation of Arab lands, it sees al-Qaida as a terrorist organization that has murdered thousands of innocent civilians.

To emphasize that distinction, Syria has been a valuable ally in the fight against al-Qaida. Consider the revelation that three years ago, Syrian security services tipped off the CIA to an impending al-Qaida attack against the administrative unit of the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. If successful, the operation would have killed a large number of American troops, according to Richard W. Erdman, a State Department specialist for Syria speaking at an American Israel Public Affairs Committee meeting in Washington. In addition, Syria provided information to the CIA on Mohammed Atta, the leader of the Hamburg cell who had lived in Aleppo during the early 1990s, and Marwan Derkazenli, the financial conduit to al-Qaida, enabling the CIA to break up the Hamburg cell and other al-Qaida entities in Europe. Syria also helped save American and Canadian lives when its security services tipped off Canadian authorities of an impending attack against American institutions there.

Indeed, American and Syrian agendas are not mutually exclusive. Washington could obtain Syria's cooperation on securing its border with Iraq, as well as controlling Hamas and Hezbollah (particularly in

Lebanon), if it were to press Israel to resume peace talks with Syria, this time in good faith. Although the Clinton administration attempted to do just that during the Syria-Israel peace talks of the past decade, it could have pressed Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak harder to withdraw from the Golan in exchange for Syria's recognition of Israel. After all, history shows that virtually every Israeli prime minister, Labor and Likud alike, had at least one showdown with the U.S. For David Ben Gurion, it was Dwight Eisenhower's order to quit the Sinai in 1956; for Menachem Begin, the most well-known face-off was Ronald Reagan's 1982 demand to stop the shelling of Beirut. Even the late Yitzhak Rabin, serving his first term as prime minister in the mid-1970s, suffered a "reassessment" of U.S.-Israeli ties when Henry Kissinger, then negotiating a Sinai disengagement agreement with Egypt, insisted upon a deeper territorial withdrawal than Israel thought necessary.

In the post-9/11 era, Washington was in no mood to offer Damascus any concessions.

Serious U.S. engagement in the Syrian-Israeli issue that leads to peace is a win-win situation for all concerned. For the U.S., such an agreement would help stabilize the Middle East. As for Syria, recovery of its sovereignty over the Golan would facilitate its desire to achieve an honorable peace. And for Israel, peace would accomplish what the Jewish state has sought throughout its embattled history: to be accepted in the region and to live within secure and recognized boundaries, free from the threat of war.

In the final analysis, despite the sometimes overheated rhetoric emanating from some quarters, Washington's regional interests and those of Syria are convergent, not mutually exclusive. It is time for U.S. policy to reflect that fact. ■

FOR THE RECORD

Breaking Through Diplomacy's Glass Ceiling

Secretary of State Rice can give well-qualified Foreign Service women more opportunities to serve in key countries and in senior positions not previously offered them.

By Ann Wright

Until 1997, the citadel of U.S. diplomatic white male service — the position of Secretary of State — had not been breached by a woman or by a member of an ethnic minority. President Clinton shattered the Secretary of State gender barrier with his appointment of Madeleine Albright in January of that year. President George W. Bush broke the ethnic/racial glass ceiling for the position by naming Colin Powell in January 2001. His subsequent appointment of Condoleezza Rice, an African-American woman, as Secretary of State in January 2005 continues the movement of women into the highest levels of government.

Ann Wright was an FSO from 1987 until 2003, when she resigned from the Service while serving as deputy chief of mission in Ulaanbaatar. She was also DCM in Sierra Leone, Micronesia and (for a short time) Afghanistan, and had assignments in Somalia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Grenada, Nicaragua and Washington, D.C. In addition, she attended the Naval War College and was a Pearson Fellow in the office of the governor of Hawaii. She received the State Department's Award for Heroism for her work as chargé d'affaires for leading the evacuation of a large part of the international community from Sierra Leone in 1997.

Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Wright was in the U.S. Army/Army Reserves and participated in civil reconstruction after military operations in Grenada and Somalia. She attained the rank of colonel during 26 years of military service.

Besides appointing female Secretaries of State, Presidents Clinton and Bush both dramatically increased the number of women appointed as chiefs of mission and to other senior positions in the State Department. In his eight years as president, Clinton appointed 116 women to senior levels, 87 as chief of mission and 29 to other senior posts. In his first term as president, Bush appointed 69 women, 50 as chief of mission and 19 to other top posts.

The rapid gains of the past decade contrast sharply with the incremental advances of the previous 70 years, and position women for new breakthroughs in the months and years immediately ahead.

A Slow Start

After women were permitted to join the U.S. diplomatic corps in 1922, they have slowly made their way to the highest positions in the State Department (see Charts 1 and 2, pp. 56 and 57). From the appointment of Ruth Bryan Owen as the first female chief of mission in 1933, through the end of 2004, 217 women were appointed to 313 slots as chief of mission (ambassador, minister or chargé d'affaires), assistant secretary of State and other senior-level positions. Of those 217, 111 were career Foreign Service officers and 106 were non-career, political appointees.

From 1933 to the end of 2004, a total of 2,450 persons filled chief-of-mission positions, as either ministers, ambassadors or chargés d'affaires. Of these, approximately 8 percent were women (see Chart 3, p. 58). Women have been appointed or nominated to 207 chief of mission positions at ambassador/minister rank and to 23 chief-of-mission positions at the chargé d'affaires level. American women have served as ambassadors in 115 countries. Sixty-six countries

have had two or more female U.S. chiefs of mission (ambassador or chargé d'affaires), while 11 countries have had four or more female chiefs of mission.

But progress was slow. In 1933, Ruth Bryan Owen was appointed as the first female chief of mission. She was appointed at the minister level to head the U.S. embassy for Denmark and Iceland (located in Copenhagen). The first woman appointed chief of mission at the ambassador level, Helen Eugenie Moore Anderson, was named ambassador to Denmark in 1949. The first female career diplomat to be appointed as a chief of mission (to Switzerland in 1953), Frances Willis, was also the third woman to be admitted to the Foreign Service. During her long career, Willis was named ambassador to two other countries and was the first woman to attain the rank of career ambassador.

In the first 42 years (1933-1976) following the Owens appointment as chief of mission, women were appointed to 31 senior positions (ambassadors or assistant secretaries of State) in the U.S. diplomatic corps (see Chart 4, p. 58). Career Foreign Service officers Carol Laise and Frances Willis were each appointed to three senior-level posts during this period, while political appointees Helen Anderson and Shirley Temple Black were each appointed to two ambassadorships. Black later was named to a third senior position, chief of protocol.

The number of female appointments as chief of mission or to other senior positions stayed well within single digits from the Roosevelt through Nixon administrations. The Ford administration broke that barrier, appointing seven female chiefs of mission and three women to senior positions. With the Carter administration, rapid progress began: 18 women were made chiefs of mission and 10 were appointed to other senior positions. Reagan and George H.W. Bush continued the trend, with 33 and 37 female appointments, respectively. The Clinton administration made a larger leap, appointing 116 women to the senior-most posts.

The rapid gains of the past decade contrast sharply with the incremental advances of the previous 70 years.

In its first term, the George W. Bush administration named 69 females to the highest diplomatic posts. Moreover, women played key roles in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Christina Rocca was the assistant secretary for South Asian affairs. Wendy Chamberlin was ambassador to Pakistan from 2001 to 2002, and was followed by Nancy Powell (2002-2004).

During this period several women were named ambassadors to Arab countries. Maureen Quinn was ambassador to Qatar from 2001 to 2004. During the same period, Marcelle Wahba was ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, and was succeeded by Michelle Sison, who had been the deputy chief of mission in Pakistan from 2000 to 2002. In late 2003 Margaret Scobey was appointed ambassador to Syria.

Measuring Progress

By 2003, 34 percent of Foreign Service officers and 31 percent of Foreign Service specialists were women. Women made up only 25 percent of the senior Foreign Service, however.

Historically, women are more likely to have been ambassadors to small countries (see Chart 7, p. 60), and progress up the ranks of other senior positions has been halting (see Charts 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10, pp. 59 and 61). Women are especially likely to be appointed as ambassadors to small countries in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. By the same token, although six women have served as assistant secretaries of geographic bureaus and 45 women have been appointed assistant secretaries of functional bureaus, no woman has served as deputy secretary of State, under secretary for political affairs, or as assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Near Eastern affairs or Western Hemisphere affairs — half of the geographic bureaus.

According to a column by former AFSA State Vice President Louise Crane, "How Are FS Women at State Faring?" (*AFSA News*, Jan. 2005), women have been promoted into and within the Senior Foreign Service at the same rate as men for the past three years. "Generally, if women make up 25 percent of the class," Crane found, "they receive 25 percent of the promotions." But Crane also found that of the 99 career-officer ambassadors in mid-2004, only 22, or 22 percent, were FS women from the State Department (one other career woman was from the Foreign Agricultural Service).

Crane noted that most officers appointed as chiefs of mission are in the OC and MC ranks, and added that as of Aug. 31, 2004, there were 853 officers at the OC and MC levels. Of those, 222, or 26 percent, were women. Thus, Crane concluded, career FS women from the State Department were underrepresented by 4 percent in the ranks of chiefs of mission.

My own calculations found that of the 175 U.S. chiefs of mission listed on the State Department's list of biographies for chiefs of mission as of December 2004 (www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog), including those assigned to missions at international organizations, 27 were women: 19 State Foreign Service officers, one Foreign Agricultural Service officer and seven non-career, political appointees. Thus, when political appointees are counted along with FSOs, women filled only 16 percent of the total U.S. chief-of-mission positions at the end of 2004.

Opportunity for Action

While women have made some progress in reaching the senior levels of the diplomatic corps, Secretary Rice has the opportunity to appoint women to several key positions where none have served before. Within the State Department, in addition to the top jobs listed above, no woman has served as assistant secretary for administration, international organizations, politico-military affairs or diplomatic security. Nor has a woman ever served as director of the Policy Planning Staff or the Office of Medical Services, or as the legal adviser to the State Department.

The number of female appointments as chief of mission or to other senior positions stayed well within single digits through the Nixon administration.

No women have been appointed as ambassador to countries of great political and economic importance to the United States such as China, Russia, Germany, South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, India, Spain, Canada, Mexico, Indonesia, Thailand or Nigeria. Women have served only once as ambassadors to European allies: United Kingdom (Anne Armstrong, 1976), France (Pamela Harriman, 1993), Belgium (Anne Chambers, 1977) and Italy (Clare Boothe Luce, 1953). All were political appointees, not career Foreign Service officers.

No woman has served as chief of the U.S. mission to: the European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, both in Brussels; International Organizations in Vienna; or

Dr. Rice's own appointment as Secretary of State should be a signal of more opportunities in international relations for women.

the European Office of the U.N. and Other International Organizations in Geneva.

Dr. Rice's own appointment as Secretary of State should be a signal of more opportunities in international relations for women. The new Secretary of State can break the mold on appointments for women in the Foreign Service and offer well-qualified women the opportunity to serve in key countries and in positions in the State Department that have not previously been offered to them.

Editor's Note: This article and the accompanying charts are taken from a study by Ann Wright that was completed in early 2005. Due to space constraints, several of the charts were omitted. You can find the complete report and all data online at the AFSA Web site at www.afsa.org.

Data for this study was taken from the State Department's list of Principal Officers, Chiefs of Mission by Country, 1778-2004 *and* Alphabetical List of Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officials, 1778-2003 *(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po). 2004 data on ambassadorial appointments was obtained from the new appointments section of* State *magazine.*

CHART 1

FIRSTS FOR FEMALE DIPLOMATS

1922 First woman admitted to the U.S. Foreign Service: Lucile Atcherson (FSO).*

1933 First female chief of mission at the minister rank: Ruth Bryan Owen, Denmark and Iceland.

1949 First woman chief of mission at the ambassador rank: Helen Eugenie Moore Anderson, Denmark.

1953 First female career diplomat chief of mission: Frances Willis (FSO), Switzerland. She was the third woman to be admitted to the Foreign Service.

1961 First female chief of mission outside of Europe and first to South Asia: Frances Willis (FSO), Ceylon.

1962 First woman to attain the rank of career ambassador: Frances Willis (FSO).

1965 First female African-American ambassador: Patricia Harris, Luxembourg.

1969 First female ambassador to a Caribbean country: Eileen Roberta Donovan (FSO), Barbados.

1971 First woman appointed to an international organization: Betty Dillon, representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization.

1972 First female ambassador to an African country: Jean Wilkowski (FSO), Zambia.

1973 First female assistant secretary of State: Carol Laise Bunker (FSO), Public Affairs.

1975 First female ambassador to a Pacific island nation: Mary Olmsted (FSO), Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

1977 First female Hispanic-American ambassador and first female ambassador to a Central American country: Mari-Luci Jarimillo, Honduras.

1977 First female Asian-American assistant secretary of State: Patsy Takemoto Mink, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

1977 First female under secretary of State: Lucy Benson, Security Assistance, Science and Technology.

1978 First female ambassador to a South American country: Nancy Ostrander (FSO), Suriname.

1979 First female ambassador to an Asian country: Patricia Byrne (FSO), Burma.

1981 First female U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations: Jeane Kirkpatrick. In 1993, Madeleine Albright became the second woman appointed as U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N.

1985 First woman to head a geographic bureau: Rozanne Ridgway (FSO), Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs.

1994 First female Asian-American ambassador: March Fong Eu, Micronesia.

1995 First female ambassador to a Middle Eastern country: Frances Cook (FSO), Oman.

1997 First female Secretary of State: Madeleine Albright.

2005 First female African-American Secretary of State: Condoleezza Rice.

** (FSO) Foreign Service officer. All others are non-career, political appointees.*

CHART 2

AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN WHO HAVE SERVED AS AMBASSADORS OR IN SENIOR POSITIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1965	Patricia Roberts Harris	Ambassador to Luxembourg
1968	Barbara Mae Watson	Administrator for the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
1977	Mabel M. Smythe	Ambassador to Cameroon
	Barbara Mae Watson	Administrator for the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
	Barbara Mae Watson	Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs
1979	Anne F. Holloway	Ambassador to Mali
	Mabel M. Smythe	Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
1980	Barbara Mae Watson	Ambassador to Malaysia
1986	Cynthia S. Perry	Ambassador to Sierra Leone
1989	Cynthia S. Perry	Ambassador to Burundi
	Ruth V. Washington*	Ambassador to The Gambia
	Jewel S. Lafontant-Mankarious	Ambassador-at-Large as Coordinator for Refugee Affairs
1990	Aurelia Erskine Brazeal (FSO)	Ambassador to Micronesia
	Arlene Render (FSO)	Ambassador to The Gambia
1992	Ruth A. Davis (FSO)	Ambassador to Benin
1993	Aurelia Erskine Brazeal (FSO)	Ambassador to Kenya
1995	Mosina H. Jordan** (FSO)	Ambassador to Central African Republic
1996	Arlene Render (FSO)	Ambassador to Zambia
	Sharon P. Wilkinson (FSO)	Ambassador to Burkina Faso
1997	Susan Rice	Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
	Ruth A. Davis (FSO)	Director of the Foreign Service Institute
	Aurelia Erskine Brazael (FSO)	U.S. Representative to the Organization for European Cooperation and Development
	Betty Eileen King	U.S. Rep. to the U.N. for ECOSOC
1998	Shirley Elizabeth Barnes (FSO)	Ambassador to Madagascar
	Elizabeth Davenport McKune (FSO)	Ambassador to Qatar
1999	Harriet L. Elam-Thomas (FSO)	Ambassador to Senegal
	Carol Moseley-Braun	Ambassador to New Zealand
	Sylvia Gaye Stanfield (FSO)	Ambassador to Brunei
	Diane Edith Watson	Ambassador to Micronesia
2000	Pamela E. Bridgewater (FSO)	Ambassador to Benin
	Sharon P. Wilkinson (FSO)	Ambassador to Mozambique
2001	Arlene Render (FSO)	Ambassador to Cote d'Ivoire
	Mattie R. Sharpless (FSO)	Ambassador to the Central African Republic
	Wanda L. Nesbitt (FSO)	Ambassador to Madagascar
	Ruth A. Davis (FSO)	Director General of the Foreign Service
2002	Aurelia Erskine Brazeal (FSO)	Ambassador to Ethiopia
	Robin Renee Sanders (FSO)	Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo
	Gail Dennise Mathieu (FSO)	Ambassador to Niger
	Ruth A. Davis (FSO)	Career Ambassador
2004	Margarita Dianne Ragsdale (FSO)	Ambassador to Djibouti
	June Carter Perry (FSO)	Ambassador to Lesotho
	Joyce A. Barr (FSO)	Ambassador to Namibia
	Jendayi E. Frazer	Ambassador to South Africa
	Constance B. Newman	Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
2005	Condoleezza Rice	Secretary of State

**Killed in automobile accident en route to post.*

***Career Foreign Service USAID Officer*

CHART 3

FEMALE CHIEFS OF MISSION BY REGION, 1933 – 2004

	Ambassador	Chargé d'Affaires /Principal Officer
Western Hemisphere	32*	6
Europe and Eurasia	62**	3
South Asia	10	0
Near East	14***	
East Asia and Pacific	23	10
Africa	66****	4
Total	**207**	**23**

* *Three did not assume the post*
** *Two did not assume the post*
*** *One did not assume the post*
**** *One did not assume the post*

From 1933, when the first woman was appointed chief of mission, to the end of 2004, 2,450 persons filled chief-of-mission positions either as minister, ambassador or chargé d'affaires. Of those, 199 (8 percent) were women.

A total of 207 women have been appointed/nominated as chief of mission at the rank of ambassador or minister. Twenty-three women have been chiefs of mission at the chargé d'affaires level.

A total of 115 countries have had female U.S. ambassadors. Sixty-eight countries have had two or more female U.S. chiefs of mission, while 13 have had four or more female chiefs of mission.

CHART 4

APPOINTMENT OF WOMEN AS CHIEFS OF MISSION AND TO OTHER SENIOR POSTS BY ADMINISTRATION, 1933 – 2004

President	COM	Other
Roosevelt (1935-1945)	2	--
Truman (1945-1953)	2	--
Eisenhower (1953-1961)	4	--
Kennedy (1961-1963)	2	--
Johnson (1963-1969)	4	1
Nixon (1969-1974)	4	2
Ford (1974-1977)	7	3
Carter (1977-1981)	18	10
Reagan (1981-1989)	22	11
G.H.W. Bush (1989-1993)	28	9
Clinton (1993-2001)	87	29
G.W. Bush (2001-2004)	50	19

CHART 5

FEMALE UNDER SECRETARIES OF STATE, 1933 – 2004

Since 1933, when a woman was first appointed to a senior position in the State Department, through 2004, 105 persons have served as deputy secretary or under secretary of State. Eight of these individuals (8 percent) have been women. All were non-career, political appointees.

Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology
1977, Lucy Wilson Peters Benson

Under Secretary for Global Affairs
2001, Paula J. Dobriansky

Under Secretary for Management
1997, Bonnie R. Cohen

Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs
1993, Joan Edelman Spero

Under Secretary for International Security Affairs
1993, Lynn Etheridge Davis

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
1999, Evelyn Simonowitz Lieberman
2001, Charlotte L. Beers
2003, Margaret DeBardeleben Tutwiler

CHART 6

FEMALE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS, 1933 – 2004

Since 1933, when a woman was first appointed to a senior position in the State Department, to the end of 2004, 115 persons have served as assistant secretaries of geographic bureaus. Six of these individuals (5 percent) were women.

Three of the six geographic bureaus have not had female assistant secretaries. No woman has served as assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere affairs, Near Eastern affairs or East Asian and Pacific affairs.

Assistant Secretary for European and Central Asian Affairs
1985, Rozanne Lejeanne Ridgway (FSO)
2001, A. Elizabeth Jones (FSO)

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
1997, Susan Rice
2004, Constance B. Newman

Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs
1993, Robin Lynn Raphel (FSO)
2001, Christina B. Rocca

CHART 7

WHERE FEMALE AMBASSADORS ARE MOST FREQUENTLY ASSIGNED

Europe and Central Asia

Norway:	5	(1937-2000)
Switzerland:	5	(1953-2003)
Luxembourg:	5	(1949-1985)
Malta:	4	(1979-1997)
Austria:	3	(1983-1997)
Denmark:	3	(1933-1964)
Estonia:	3	(1997-2004)
Moldova:	3	(1992-2003)

Female U.S. chiefs of mission have served twice in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Portugal and Turkmenistan, and only once in Great Britain, France, Italy, Albania, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus (as chargé d' affaires for six months), Finland, East Germany, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Slovenia.

The U.S. has never had a female ambassador assigned to Germany, Spain, Russia, Poland, Ukraine, Greece or Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovakia, Sweden, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.

Asia and the Pacific

Micronesia:	5	(1990-2004)
Burma:	4	(1979-2002)
Laos:	4	(1983-2004)
New Zealand:	4	(1979-1999)
Papua New Guinea:	4	(1975-2000)

Women have served as ambassador twice in Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, Brunei and Mongolia, and once in Australia, East Timor (as chargé d'affaires) and Fiji. Women have never been appointed as ambassador to China, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam.

Western Hemisphere

Barbados*:	6	(1969-2004)

In the Western Hemisphere, women have served twice as ambassador to Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Suriname. Women have served as ambassador only once in the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba (chief of U.S. Interests Section), Guyana, Haiti (as chargé d'affaires), Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. No woman has been named U.S. ambassador to Argentina, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico or Uruguay.

** Also accredited to Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Antigua, Barbuda.*

Africa

Ghana:	4	(1974-2002)
Madagascar:	4	(1986-2001)
Mali:	4	(1976- 2002)
Benin:	3	(1989-2000)
Burundi:	3	(1980-1999)
Cameroon:	3	(1977-1992)
Kenya:	3	(1986-1996)
Mozambique:	3	(1987-2003)
Niger:	3	(1991-2002)
Sierra Leone:	3	(1980-1992)
Togo:	3	(1974-1997)

Women have been appointed chief of mission/ambassador twice to Djibouti, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau (one as chargé d' affaires), Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Lesotho and Zambia. Women have served as ambassador only once in Angola, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon and Sao Tome/Principe, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire).

The first female ambassador was assigned to South Africa in 2004. No woman has served as ambassador to Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, nor to Botswana, Chad, Eritrea, Liberia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania or Zimbabwe.

Near East Area

In the Middle East, women have served as ambassador twice in Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and once in Iraq, Morocco, Oman, Syria and Yemen. No woman has served as U.S. ambassador to Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya or Saudi Arabia. A woman has served once as consul general in Jerusalem.

South Asia

Nepal:	4	(1966-1993)

In South Asia, women also have been posted twice as ambassador to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. No woman has served as ambassador to India or Afghanistan.

CHART 8

FEMALE REPRESENTATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

From 1947, when the U.S. first appointed officers to international organizations, to the end of 2004, 145 persons have been appointed to these organizations. Fourteen women (10 percent) have been appointed to international organizations.

Permanent Representative to the United Nations

1981, Jeane Kirkpatrick

1993, Madeleine Albright

Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations

2004, Ann Patterson (FSO)

U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States

1993, Harriet Coons Babbitt

Representative, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

1997, Amy L. Boudurant

2003, Constance Albanese Morella

Representative, International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal

1971, Betty Rose Dillon

1994, Carol Jones Carmody

Representative of the U.S.A. to the Vienna Office of the United Nations and Deputy Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the rank of ambassador

1991, Jane E. Becker (FSO)

Representative to U.N. Agencies for Food and Agriculture, Rome

1983, Millicent Fenwick

Representative to United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

1980, Barbara Warne Newell

1981, Jean Broward Gerard

2004, Louise V. Oliver

Senior U.S. Official to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum

2004, Lauren Moriarty (FSO)

CHART 9

FEMALE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS (OR EQUIVALENTS)

Bureau of Arms Control
1999, Avis T. Bohlen (FSO)

Bureau of Nonproliferation
2004, Susan F. Burk

Bureau of Consular Affairs
1977, Barbara Mae Watson
1983, Joan Margaret Clark (FSO)
1989, Elizabeth M. Tamposi
1993, Mary A. Ryan (FSO)
2003, Maura Harty (FSO)

Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
1968, Barbara Mae Watson
1977, Barbara Mae Watson

Originally commissioned as administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, the title was changed to assistant secretary of State for Consular Affairs on Aug. 17, 1977.

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
1975, Dixie Lee Ray
1977, Patsy Takemoto Mink
1993, Elinor Greer Constable (FSO)
1996, Eileen B. Claussen

Bureau of Verification and Compliance
2002, Paula A. DeSutter

Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
1997, Patricia Murphy Derian
1992, Patricia Diaz Dennis

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
1978, Alice Stone Ilchman
2001, Patricia DeStacy Harrison

Bureau of Public Affairs
1973, Caroline Clendening Laise (FSO)
1989, Margaret DeBardeleben Tutwiler

Bureau of Legislative Affairs
1989, Janet Gardner Mullins
1993, Wendy R. Sherman
1996, Barbara Mills Larkin

Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
1994, Phyllis Elliott Oakley (FSO)
1997, Julia Vadala Taft

Bureau of Intelligence and Research
1993, Toby Trister Gati
1997, Phyllis Elliott Oakley (FSO)

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters
1986, Ann Barbara Wrobleski

Bureau of Counterterrorism
1993, Barbara K. Bodine (FSO), Acting Coordinator

Executive Secretary of the Department of State
1998, Kristie Ann Kenny (FSO)
2001, Maura Harty (FSO)

Director General of the Foreign Service
1975, Caroline Clendening Laise (FSO)
1981, Joan Margaret Clark (FSO)
1992, Genta Hawkins Holmes (FSO)
2001, Ruth A. Davis (FSO)

Director of the Foreign Service Institute
1995, Teresita Currie Schaffer (FSO)
1997, Ruth A. Davis (FSO)
2001, Katherine Hubay Peterson (FSO)

Chief of Protocol
1976, Shirley Jane Temple Black
1978, Edith H. J. Dobelle
1981, Leonore Annenberg
1981, Selwa Roosevelt
1993, Mary Millonzi Raiser
1997, Mary Mel French

Inspector General
1995, Jacquelyn W. Williams-Bridgers

CHART 10

WOMEN WHO HAVE HELD OTHER KEY POSITIONS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Counselor of the Department of State
1980, Rozanne Ridgway (FSO)
1997, Wendy R. Sherman

Director of Management Operations
1977, Joan Margaret Clark (FSO)

Coordinator for International Communications and Information
1983, Diana Lady Dougan
1988, Sonia Landau

Ambassador-at-Large (U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs)
1989, Jewel S. Lafontant-Mankarious

Career Ambassador
1962, Frances Elizabeth Willis
1999, Mary A. Ryan
2002, Ruth A. Davis
2003, A. Elizabeth Jones



BOOKS

Holy Terror

Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill
Jessica Stern, Harper Perennial, 2004, $15.95, paperback, 400 pages.

REVIEWED BY EDWARD MARKS

There is a plethora of "terrorism" books available these days, explaining how to define the phenomenon, how to explain it, how to fight it. They vary in quality and insight, of course, but two years after its original publication, Jessica Stern's *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* is still one of the better ones. Her objective, quite simply, was to obtain by direct interview with religious terrorists and their supporters, an understanding of "why, when they read religious texts, these terrorists find justification for killing innocents, where others find inspiration for charity."

Professor Stern makes clear that the desire for political power, land and money, and wounded masculinity, inter alia, also play motivating roles for even the most religiously characterized movements and individuals. But it is the religiously motivated terrorists (not just Muslims or Arabs, either) who most fascinate and apparently most threaten us today, so Professor Stern's focus on them is both understandable and welcome.

Stern's technique is quite simple. Drawing on her extensive contacts as a well-known academic on the subject, she interviewed extremist members of three religions: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Some were in jail at the time, but most were out in society. She describes the problems inherent in this approach, most notably: Why should they wish to speak with any outsider, particularly an American, Jewish, female professor from Harvard? But speak they did, and Professor Stern's description of her effort to demonstrate empathy (as distinct from sympathy) is successful.

With respect to the theological component of terrorist motivation, Stern sees similar grievances among varied religious terrorist groups and organizations.

The conversations, which she relates in detail, are fascinating and insightful. The conclusions she draws from them are sobering if not altogether new. For example, her research clearly confirms the findings of previous studies, such as the American Academy of Science's 2003 report ("Strong Religion"), that across the various religions, the theological as well as psychological motivations and justifications are remarkably similar.

With respect to the theological component of terrorist motivation, Stern sees similar grievances among varied religious terrorist groups and organizations. The Islamic Jihad organization in Pakistan and Christian fundamentalist bombers in Oklahoma have much in common. Essentially, they are unhappy with the new world order, seeing themselves "as under attack by the global threat of post-Enlightenment Western values such as secular humanism. ... The point of religious terrorism is to purify the world of these corrupting influences."

There is nothing new here in one sense, but her discussion of how this attitude is fostered by self-proclaimed leaders and by organizational participation is thoughtful and important. She notes how the perspective of individuals, often inchoate and unformed, is molded and channeled by organizations. Her discussion of leaders and the key role they play is equally enlightening. Few terrorists wake up on a given morning and decide to play the martyr; rather, moral fervor must be recognized, cultivated and directed — and requires organizational support for action.

This is all sobering stuff, providing insight not only into contemporary terrorism but also into much contemporary politics. What motivates some to become terrorists motivates others to political activity just short of terrorism but still important. In one sense, religious terrorism is merely the froth on the wave of political unrest rampaging throughout the Middle East and sig-

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I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.
(signed) Mikkela V. Thompson, Business Manager

nificant parts of Latin America, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. It may not be strictly a clash of cultures, but conflict is certainly rife. Professor Stern's book provides a good deal of insight into what is going on.

Ambassador Edward Marks, a retired FSO, is a former chairman of the Journal's *Editorial Board. For the past several years, he has been a consultant to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group on Counterterrorism at the U.S. Pacific Command in Honolulu.*

Behind Enemy Lines

Inside the Vatican of Pius XII: The Memoir of an American Diplomat During World War II
Harold H. Tittmann Jr., edited with an introduction by Harold H. Tittmann III. Image Books/ Doubleday, 2004, $13.95, paperback, 213 pages.

Reviewed by Damian Leader

Serving as an American diplomat at the Vatican is a great stimulus for autobiography: three of our past four ambassadors have published accounts of their achievements. Harold Tittmann's memoir stands apart, however, because he was an FSO who spent nearly three years during World War II holed up inside the Vatican, a tiny patch of neutrality surrounded by occupied Rome. The present book is his account of those years as edited and abridged by his son, who, as a teenager, shared much of the experience. It is a remarkable story.

President Franklin Roosevelt, with war imminent, recognized the role the Vatican could play in influencing European states. Since he knew the

Senate would block the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the Holy See, in 1939 Roosevelt named businessman Myron Taylor to be his "personal representative" to the Vatican, thus avoiding Senate confirmation. Based in the U.S., Taylor traveled to Rome periodically on Roosevelt's orders, and Tittmann was seconded to run his office there.

When the U.S. and Italy went to war in December 1941, Allied embassies to the Holy See had to close or move inside the Vatican's walls. Although Tittmann's office was not, strictly speaking, an embassy, the State Department instructed him to do the same, and the Vatican accredited him as chargé d'affaires. Still, conditions were difficult. Italian and, later, German authorities periodically threatened to expel the diplomats, and all messages had to be sent back to the department via open channels. Accommodations were less than ideal for a Protestant family with two teenagers, and relations between Tittmann and his secretary deteriorated so badly that she eventually left after safe passage could be assured. On the plus side, he had unparalleled access and numerous private meetings with Pope Pius XII.

Tittmann's account gives unique insight into the wartime mind-set of Vatican officials and the context in which they operated. It illustrates the interplay of politics and religious concerns that informed diplomacy on a variety of issues, including Roosevelt's efforts to keep Italy out of the war and, later, his opposition to Vatican peace efforts that might have undermined the Allied goal of unconditional surrender. The Vatican, for its part, guarded its neutrality jealously. While Pius XII hated the Nazis and considered them a threat to civilization, he opposed Allied strategic bombing — especially of Rome itself. He also tried with little success to get the U.S. to pressure the Soviets to stop persecuting the Church (and was astonished by FDR's benign assessment of Stalin).

Many readers will find Tittmann's discussion of the Vatican's attitude toward the Holocaust to be particularly illuminating. Much has been written on this subject, but Tittmann is rare in writing from first-hand experience. He acknowledges that expectations of the pope's role as a moral spokesman 60 years ago were very different than they are today. Pius thought his often delphic pronouncements and veiled condemnations of the persecution of Jews were clear. On Christmas Day in 1942, he spoke of "the hundreds of thousands who, through no fault of their own and solely because of their nation or race, have been condemned to death or progressive wasting away." A few days later Tittmann met with him and then cabled the department that the pope believed "he had spoken therein clearly enough to satisfy all those insisting ... he utter some word of condemnation of Nazi atrocities, and he seemed surprised when I said there were some who did not share his belief."

Tittmann's confinement in 1944 ended with the advancing forces of the U.S. Army throwing Hershey bars and cigarettes up to his sons on the walls of the Vatican. Tittmann's next assignment was as ambassador to Haiti, and he eventually retired as a career ambassador. To the end of his life, however, he said the high point of his career were his years in the Vatican. This account goes a long way toward explaining why. ■

An FSO since 1985, Damian Leader is deputy director of the Office of Russian Affairs. He served earlier as political officer (and sometime chargé d'affaires) at the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See.

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REFLECTIONS

Thank You

BY STEVEN MENDEL

What does it say about a country when the one indispensable phrase is "thank you"? Let me explain. My wife and I just got back from a two-week visit in Japan. The crucial phrase for the European countries that we had visited over the years was "where is." As in, where is the museum/church/bathroom, etc? We assumed the same would be true in Japan. Wrong. Saying "thank you" and being polite are the keys for getting along in Japan. This is true throughout the entire country.

Japan is a country that functions. The streets are spotless, the trains run on time and the crime rate is infinitesimally small. The people are helpful, friendly and always polite. At every restaurant, in unison, the waitresses, the bus boys and the cashier shout out "welcome." When we left an eating establishment the entire staff once again became a chorus thanking us. We responded with our one word of Japanese, an enthusiastic "arigoto!" When we asked for directions, the Japanese would unfailingly do their best to help, sometimes leading us to our destination. Other times they would walk blocks out of their way or insist on driving us. We live in New York City, so we're used to crowds, but in Tokyo the crowds were denser, yet somehow less intrusive. For instance, when a subway car was already jam-packed with riders and someone wanted to get on, they would back their way into the crowd. This was done in such a non-confrontational way that none of the other riders took offense. Everyone else would just squeeze in tighter to make room.

So Japan works — but only up to a certain point. The high value placed on being polite is a force for conformity. There is a beauty in Japan in the minutiae of everyday interactions, but these rituals can become oppressive and have had far-reaching consequences for Japanese society. It seems that all the major social changes in Japan have come from the top down. Buddhism became the state religion with the conversion of the emperor. The contemporary version of this fealty to power is the fierce loyalty to one's employer. People talk about their employer or "the company" with a reverence that Westerners reserve for God and country.

Back when the Japanese economy was touted as the wave of the future, the assumption was that corporations would guarantee lifetime employment in exchange for total dedication — a sort of corporate noblesse oblige. The government was part of this social contract, too, establishing an industrial policy to assist the corporations in their growth. The partnership worked because it linked the two institutions at the top of Japanese society.

But this contract broke down when the economic bubble burst in the 1990s, and corporations did the unthinkable: they fired employees. People, young and old, we talked to still spoke of "the company" in reverential tones, although I sometimes detected a hint of irony absent before.

I am not so naïve as to say that changes in American society come only from below. It is usually an alliance between elites and mass movements that produce change in our country. But the inability of popular opinion to drive the process of change in Japan is striking. This may be slowly evolving, however. We talked to several young people who said that they did not intend to work for the same company their whole life. They also said they envied what they perceived to be the relative ease of starting your own business in the West. Others decried the erosion of tradition in Japan among young people and the declining importance of being polite.

There seemed to be a widely shared concern among all ages that Japan continue to develop economically, while retaining its Japaneseness. The fundamental question for this unique country that works so well is how to retain the aspects of being polite that make things run so smoothly while at the same time loosening the ties that restrict creativity and initiative. ■

Steven Mendel is a psychologist and free-lance writer who lives in New York City. The stamp is courtesy of the AAFSW Bookfair "Stamp Corner."

AFSA NEWS

American Foreign Service Association • October 2005

AFSA NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL ESSAY CONTEST

Youth Honored for Essays and Community Service

BY SHAWN DORMAN

On July 19, Acting AFSA President Steve Kashkett presented the winners of the 2005 AFSA National High School Essay Contest with their awards during the annual Youth Awards Ceremony in the Department of State Benjamin Franklin Diplomatic Reception Room. Family Liaison Office Director Faye Barnes opened the ceremony and introduced Ambassador Ruth A. Davis, who gave introductory remarks. The 2005 AFSA essay contest winners were: 1st place — Alison Noll from Tustin, Calif.; 2nd place — Andrew Scheineson of McLean, Va.; and 3rd place — Alice Nian-en Lee of Niskayuna, N.Y.

The essay contest is one of AFSA's most successful outreach activities and is designed to encourage students and teachers from all over the United States to think about the role and functions of the U.S. Foreign Service, the craft of diplomacy and America's role in the world. The contest receives funding from the Nelson B. Delavan Foundation. This year for the first time, Diplomatic Automobile Sales became an essay contest sponsor and gave a generous contribution. Lynn Griffiths of Diplomatic Automobile Sales came from New York City to attend the ceremony, and enjoyed a lunch with the essay contest winner.

AFSA received 550 essay submissions this year. Over the six years since the establishment of the contest, a total of more than 3,000 submissions have been received. Submissions have come in from all 50 states, with the largest number coming from California and Florida.

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Jay Mallin

Director General W. Robert Pearson (center) with winners of the essay contest and youth awards. From front left: Rueben Luoma-Overstreet, Alice Nian-en Lee, Alison Noll, Julia Lange, Pearson, Charlie Jesmer, Alex Jesmer, Caroline Perkinson. Back row, from left: Kevin McGrath, Andrew Scheineson, Stuart Symington.

Inside This Issue:

FORMER PITS, PREPARE FOR BUYBACK

Interim Regulations Issued for Retirement Buyback

BY BONNIE BROWN, RETIREE COORDINATOR

AFSA has worked for years, along with other groups and the department, to get legislation passed and implemented that would allow former PIT (part-time, intermittent or temporary) employees to buy back retirement coverage. Success is finally upon us.

In 1998, the Department of State created a new hiring mechanism, a five-year limited non-career appointment (the Family Member Appointment, or FMA), which provided PIT employees with Civil Service retirement benefits. In 2002, the State Authorization Bill included a provision that would permit PIT employees

Continued on page 5

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Katrina Relief: How You Can Help

On Sept. 8, the Internal Revenue Service announced a program to allow federal employees to trade in their annual leave or sick days in exchange for cash to help victims of Hurricane Katrina. AFSA is working with the foreign affairs agencies to set up a mechanism for Foreign Service employees to participate in the leave donation program. We will let you know when this has been set up and how to donate.

In addition, if you would like to donate to the State Department's Employees Emergency Fund to support the families of colleagues in the hurricane-hit area, send a check (payable to the U.S. Department of State, designation for Employees Emergency Fund) to Donna Bordley, Department of State, 2201 C St. NW, RM/CFO, Rm. 7427, Washington, DC 20520.

Briefs • Continued on page 8

Life in the Foreign Service

BY BRIAN AGGELER, FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER

How to Contact Us:

AFSA HEADQUARTERS:
(202) 338-4045; Fax: (202) 338-6820
STATE DEPARTMENT AFSA OFFICE:
(202) 647-8160; Fax: (202) 647-0265
USAID AFSA OFFICE:
(202) 712-1941; Fax: (202) 216-3710
FCS AFSA OFFICE:
(202) 482-9088; Fax: (202) 482-9087

AFSA WEB SITE: www.afsa.org
AFSA E-MAIL: afsa@afsa.org
AFSA NEWS: afsanews@afsa.org
FSJ: journal@afsa.org
PRESIDENT: holmes@afsa.org
STATE VP: kashkettsb@state.gov
RETIREE VP: 42reuwash@earthlink.net
USAID VP: wcarter@usaid.gov
FCS VP: donald.businger@mail.doc.gov
FAS VP: laura.scandurra@fas.usda.gov

AFSA News
Editor Shawn Dorman: dorman@afsa.org
(202) 338-4045 x 503; Fax: (202) 338-8244
On the Web: www.afsa.org/news

PERSONNEL NOTES

Military Leave Credit

BY JAMES YORKE,
LABOR MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST

Foreign Service members who took military leave during the 1990s will be aware that a 2003 decision (Butterbaugh v. Department of Justice) ruled that employees were required to take military leave only on days on which they were required to work. Under the ruling, agencies should have allowed 15 workdays of military leave for reserve training, rather than 15 calendar days. The court ruled that agencies should not have charged military leave for non-workdays that occurred within the period of military duty prior to Dec. 21, 2000. On this date, the law was changed to allow employees to take military leave on an hourly basis.

Many federal employees filed claims and had annual leave recredited for those non-workdays, but there was a six-year limit, so many employees have only been able to have leave recredited for some of the time, depending on when they filed their claims.

However, a July 15 decision this year by the Merit Systems Protection Board directed that the six-year limit did not apply, because the periods of service fell under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. USERRA contains no time limit, but because it was enacted in 1994, its effect can only go back that far.

This decision appears to authorize recredited annual leave for employees who were previously denied it based on the so-called "six-year rule." This will apply to employees who were forced to take annual leave for reserve training between 1994 and 2000.

AFSA can provide information and copies of the MSPB decision so that members can claim a recredit of annual leave. In addition, anyone who has not taken advantage of the Butterbaugh decision in the past will want to ensure that all their allowable leave is recredited. ❑

V.P. VOICE: **STATE** ■ BY STEVE KASHKETT

The 700 Club

For those who doubt that today's Foreign Service has changed dramatically from what it was even a decade ago, here is an astonishing number for you: **700**. That is the number of unaccompanied positions overseas that will need to be filled in the summer 2006 assignment cycle alone, which is just getting under way now. That means another 700 people in the Foreign Service who will dutifully go off to dangerous hardship postings for a year or two of their lives without their families.

Last month, I wrote about the outdated and false image of a cushy, pampered life in the Foreign Service, a quaint misperception that lingers in the minds of many of our critics. Let them reflect on this growing number of unaccompanied posts. There was a time just a few years ago when there were only a couple of countries deemed so dangerous that we did not allow families at our diplomatic posts there. Today the list includes not just Lebanon and Liberia, but also Iraq and Afghanistan, Burundi and Congo, Bosnia and Kosovo, Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and others.

Needless to say, this unaccompanied list represents just a small subset of the many dozens of overseas posts that are classified as hardship posts. The majority of Foreign Service assignments now fall into this category. This is the unstable, rough-and-tumble — and decidedly not very "cushy" — world in which most Foreign Service employees serve out their careers.

The people of the Foreign Service will undoubtedly rise to the challenge, as we always do. Some will enthusiastically volunteer for these unaccompanied positions. Others will allow themselves to be persuaded reluctantly to rearrange their lives and their family situations for a year or two in order to answer the call of duty. Still many others may not be willing or able to leave their families at this moment in time.

The urgent need to fill these 700 unaccompanied positions will put enormous pressure on Career Development Officers and others throughout the personnel system to bend the rules, to make dubious promises, to engineer behind-the-scenes deals, to lean on people to take those jobs … in short, to do whatever they need to do to plug all the pigeon-holes.

AFSA's role will be to make sure that management plays fair in filling these 700 positions. We want to guarantee some degree of equity in assigning people to unaccompanied and other hardship posts. We want those who become part of the "700 Club" to receive appropriate incentives and rewards for doing so. At the same time, we want to prevent those who cannot take unaccompanied assignments from being unfairly penalized or disadvantaged.

In an era when so many Foreign Service members have to serve in remote places without their families, AFSA will press the department to find ways to facilitate visitation and make things easier for families that have to live apart. The Separate Maintenance Allowance is woefully inadequate and should be substantially increased. It is a disgrace that people serving at unaccompanied posts should have to pay for their own flights and use their own annual leave to see their children more than once a year. There is certainly much more that department management could do to help ease the blow of prolonged separation from family. ❑

V.P. VOICE: **RETIREES** ■ BY DAVID REUTHER

Join Us

With this inaugural message, I would like to introduce the new retiree contingent of the 2005-2007 AFSA Governing Board. We have a particularly robust group of retiree representatives in Gil Sheinbaum, Larry Lesser, Roger Dankert and Len Baldyga. We intend to be accessible, and we encourage you to contact any of us.

A top-ranked mission for this board's retiree contingent is to encourage an increase in retiree membership in AFSA and to apply that increased voice to professional and practical retiree issues, particularly through getting our voice heard in Congress. Six in 10 Foreign Service retirees have annuities of less than $50,000 a year, so it is entirely appropriate that bread-and-butter issues be on the table.

Let Congress know that retirees want the same premium conversion that active-duty government employees get.

I have served as a retiree representative on two AFSA Governing Boards and have great appreciation for the role of Congress in controlling the framework of our retirement — whether you are talking cost-of-living increase, pre-tax payment of health premiums (the "premium conversion" issue) or removing the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset on Social Security benefits. These issues involve thousands of dollars of actual or tax benefits per year to retiree members and we plan to explain and illustrate them in great detail in coming *Foreign Service Journal* and *Retiree Newsletter* issues.

As a start, I urge you in the strongest terms to heed AFSA's Aug. 10 AFSANET call to let Congress know that retirees want the same premium conversion that active-duty government employees get. (This alone would be worth $1,000/year if you are paying $3,000 in premiums and your combined state and local tax bracket is 33 percent.) AFSA has joined with the National Active and Retired Federal Employees Association in seeking to repeal or reform the two Social Security offsets (the WEP and the GPO), and to extend premium conversions to retirees.

From this group of retiree representatives, I guarantee you will hear more calls that you intercede on your behalf with Congress. You will also hear more from us, because one of the enormous changes in AFSA over the years has been the building of an excellent professional staff. Bonnie Brown is our guru on retiree benefits and counsels members on their rights and privileges. Norma Reyes is focusing on our recruitment effort. Janice Bay is running the Foreign Service Elderhostel program. Communications Director Tom Switzer directs a program that often calls on retirees to serve as speakers and to help tell the Foreign Service story to the American public. Key to monitoring congressional activity on retiree benefits is Bonnie Brown, who coordinates responses and initiatives with Legislative Affairs Director Ken Nakamura.

As you read through the *FSJ* each month, I hope you are reminded that AFSA is a strong advocate not only for the issues dealing with the legislation that governs the conduct of our diplomacy, but also for issues that personally affect Foreign Service retirees. AFSA is *your* voice, *your* lobbyist, *your* advocate. That is why we encourage each of you to help us expand retiree membership. ❒

SEEKING NOMINATIONS

Sinclaire Awards for Language Study

AFSA is currently accepting nominations for the Sinclaire Language Awards, which seek to honor outstanding achievement in the study of hard languages and their associated cultures. Candidates for the awards are nominated by language-training supervisors or instructors at the FSI School of Language Studies. Candidates may also be nominated by supervisors or post language officers. The winners are selected by a committee composed of a member of the AFSA Governing Board serving as chair, the associate dean of the FSI School of Language Studies and the AFSA Coordinator for Professional Issues.

Nominations should include the following documents:

1. Completed Sinclaire Award Nomination form (obtained from FSI or AFSA), signed by the nominator and his/her immediate supervisor.

2. Evidence of enrollment, if nomination is based on formal training (in the case of FSI students, the End-of-Training Report, DS-651).

3. A nominating statement.

Each winner receives a check for $1,000 from the Matilda W. Sinclaire Endowment and a certificate of recognition signed by the president of AFSA and the chair of the AFSA Awards Committee. Over $150,000 has been awarded since the establishment of the program in 1982 to members of the Foreign Service.

For further information, please contact AFSA Coordinator for Professional Issues Barbara Berger at berger@afsa.org or (202) 338-4045, ext. 521, or the School of Language Studies at FSI at (703) 302-7242. ❑

PIT • Continued from page 1

with creditable service between 1989 and 1998 to buy back retirement coverage for that period. On Aug. 29, the Office of Personnel Management, the implementing agency, finally issued interim regulations to implement the PIT buyout provision. There is a 60-day comment period, which ends Oct. 28.

Applicants, including annuitants, will be required to demonstrate that they meet the criteria for the buyback and to document their creditable service during the years 1989-1998. AFSA encourages applicants to begin this process now.

According to the proposed regulations, applicants must meet eligibility requirements for family-member limited non-career appointments (in effect on Sept. 30, 2002). In addition, the service must have been performed at a U.S. mission abroad, been of a temporary nature (one year or less), lasted for periods of 90 days or more and would have been creditable under the Federal Employees Retirement System if it had been performed before 1989.

Applications for a buyback must be made within 36 months of the effective date of the final regulations. Applicants who were enrolled under the Federal Employment Retirement System must submit Form 3108, called "Application to Make Service Credit Payment," which is available at www.opm.gov.forms/pdf_fill/SF3108.pdf. Applicants enrolled under the Foreign Service Pension System must submit a DS 5001, called "Application for Service Credit," which is available online at www.rnet.state.gov under forms. In support applicants should gather notices of personnel actions (Form SF-50), pay adjustments and leave statements for submission to the Retirement Office (HR/RET).

Once HR/RET verifies creditable periods of employment, the department will calculate and inform applicants of the deposit needed to purchase service credit. Applicants must then make one lump-sum deposit within 180 days of being notified of the required amount. ❑

V.P. VOICE: **FCS** ■ BY DONALD BUSINGER

Plus ca Change

As I write my first column as the new AFSA FCS Vice President, we have yet to have our first meeting with management on the fall 2005 midterm proposals (which is scheduled for Sept. 1). AFSA FCS Representative Will Center and I posted both the results of recent agreements, as well as topics for future consideration, on the AFSA Web site (www.afsa.org/fcs) under "current issues."

There have been a host of other problems requiring significant attention — from domestic relocation allowance to time-in-class issues and Personnel Audit Reports. As one who personally benefited from the domestic relocation allowance 10 years ago, I was more familiar than most with 14 FAM 630 and FTR 302-11. But I remain seriously concerned about recent changes both to the regulations and their application by our agency in times of tightening budgets. Consult with me or your Office of Foreign Service Human Resources manager if you need to know more about this allowance.

Time-in-class regulations affect all Foreign Service agencies and FCS officers in a fundamental way, and I thought we had a set policy, but I discovered that there are — surprise — some major issues lurking here as well, which we are currently revisiting.

We all know the really big issues surrounding "strategic disbursement," involving significant cutbacks both overseas and in HQ and the domestic field.

For the 2005 Selection and Promotion Boards, all of you were asked to certify your Personnel Audit Report. The PAR is meant to be a brief but accurate snapshot of each officer's record in FCS, including assignments, promotion record, language proficiency and awards. I personally spent over an hour poring through my official personnel file, finding a number of minor errors in addition to issues I "disputed." While I had nothing major to change, other officers remain upset that in some cases their assignment history merely refers to "training complement" and does not reflect their actual jobs. To some extent this relates to "programming deficiencies" — the computer does not let us be fully accurate!

I am proud to report that I just completed an unofficial count of our AFSA active-duty members — 168 out of 255 FCS officers (66 percent). Of these, 134 are overseas and 34 are in the United States at headquarters, in training or at Export Assistance Centers around the country.

In closing, we all know the really big issues surrounding "strategic disbursement" (aka "supersized"right-sizing), involving significant cutbacks both overseas (post closings) and in HQ and the domestic field (the latter two including Foreign Service but mostly affecting the Civil Service). As our Civil Service colleagues in the International Trade Administration move back to the old five-level performance system (anyone remember merit pay?) and the administration pushes for systematic Civil Service reform with unknown consequences for the Foreign Service system, we all may experience "back to the future" in these times of increasingly rapid change. Your AFSA VP and representative will make every effort to ensure that the changes represent progress. ❑

Essay Winners • Continued from page 1

A comment from first-place winner Alison Noll illustrates just how well the contest succeeds in its outreach and educational goals: "While doing the research for the AFSA essay contest, I learned a tremendous amount about the many and varied roles that Foreign Service officers play within United States embassies, consulates and at the State Department headquarters. I became much more aware that diplomacy is not just carried on between governments. I learned many specific ways that Foreign Service officers interact closely with all segments of the population in the nations where they are posted. I discovered how Foreign Service officers develop working relationships with local businesses, NGOs, schools, women's groups and journalists, as well as government and law enforcement officials. I was impressed with how Foreign Service officers function on so many levels to help our government understand the issues in each country and develop strategies to implement our government's foreign policy objectives."

Noll's essay topic was "The Role of the American Foreign Service in the Battle against Human Trafficking." She chose to write about human trafficking because, she explains, "it is a form of global crime that victimizes the most vulnerable people in society. It is present in some form in every country. I learned that our government and the Foreign Service are working diligently to prevent human trafficking throughout the world." Noll was struck by the enormous reach of trafficking when she heard about the plight of a 12-year-old Egyptian girl who was enslaved only blocks from her home. Noll's essay can be found on the AFSA Web site at www.afsa.org/essaycontest/winningessay05.cfm.

Jay Mallin

AFSA National High School Essay Contest winners, from left: Alice Nian-en Lee, Andrew Scheineson and first-place winner Alison Noll.

Foreign Service Youth Awards

Alison Noll and the other two essay contest finalists were not the only outstanding young people honored at the Youth Awards Ceremony, which was hosted by Director General W. Robert Pearson. Also honored were the winners of the Foreign Service Youth Foundation's Una Chapman Cox Foreign Service Youth Award for Domestic Community Service and the Harry M. Jannette Foreign Service Youth Award for International Community Service, and the joint Foreign Service Institute Transition Center's Overseas Briefing Center and FSYF Kid Vid Awards, funded by Clements International Insurance.

The winner of the Cox Award was Julia Lange (age 17), for her continuing service to Foreign Service teens through involvement in the FSYF, including work as the editor of the FSYF publication, *Wings of AWAL*, and for her dedication to serving others through her enthusiastic participation in the FSYF community service program.

The winners of the Harry M. Jannette Award for International Community Service were 13-year-old Reuben Luoma-Overstreet, for his work in Cotonou, Benin; and 16-year-old Kevin McGrath, for labors of love in Budapest and Moscow. While learning about his temporary home country, Luoma-Overstreet found that the materials in the Historic Museum of Abomey — a UNESCO-designated world heritage site — were entirely in French, limiting access to the information. He translated all of the museum's written materials into English, something the museum had long wanted to do but could not because of a lack of funding.

McGrath was honored for raising funds and organizing a project to renovate a church kitchen serving political and religious émigrés in Moscow. His work in Budapest was also recognized: immediately after moving to Budapest, McGrath became deeply involved in volunteer service activities in his school and in the community. He worked in soup kitchens for the homeless, raised funds for several worthy projects and began an altar boy training program. Also, a special certificate of appreciation was bestowed on Foreign Service teen Stuart Symington Jr. for his extraordinary commitment and leadership to his Washington, D.C.-area Foreign Service peers.

The first-place winner of the Kid Vid Award — honoring Foreign Service youth for the production of videos that depict life for children and teens at posts worldwide — was Cassandra Ruggenbuck, for her video of Abu Dhabi.

"The Youth Awards ceremony at the State Department was a wonderful and memorable experience for me, as well as for my mother and both grandmothers, who flew in from California," essay winner Noll told *AFSA News*. "It was a great honor to be selected as the winning AFSA essayist and to have the opportunity to meet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the day before [the ceremony]. The entire experience of the ceremony and the time at the State Department were unforgettable." ❑

LETTER FROM AFGHANISTAN

Diplomats on the Front Lines

BY MICHAEL METRINKO, IN CHEGHCHERAN, AFGHANISTAN

Editor's note: The following letter is from retired Foreign Service Officer Michael Metrinko, who is serving in Ghor province, Afghanistan. He is responding to criticism of U.S. diplomats aired in one of the recent discussions held on GULF 2000, an Internet forum on the Middle East run out of Columbia University. Several experts in the group derided diplomats, American diplomats in particular, as being out of touch with the real world.

"At first I was just amused by the generalization, and then I realized someone had to correct it," Metrinko explains. "I served as an FSO from 1974 until 1996, and since then have been a WAE (While Actually Employed, a hiring mechanism for retirees) in Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan. My present State Department assignment is for a full year to Afghanistan. Trust me when I say I know how my colleagues and I have lived in these places." Here is his letter, one that AFSA will use as an example of real Foreign Service work in our many responses to cheap shots at the Foreign Service.

I am a State Department representative assigned to a Lithuanian Provincial Reconstruction Team (under NATO's International Security Assistance Force) in Cheghcheran, the capital of Ghor province in Afghanistan. I share a dusty tent with three other guys (including a very capable Lithuanian diplomat), which we can't keep clean because of the incessant dust storms that send 95-mph whirlwinds through the area every day. The wind last week was much stronger, and the tent next to mine simply disappeared.

The sink spigots and showers are outside, near the outdoor toilets — all about a block-and-a-half from where I sleep. We get one hot meal a day. My feet are cracked open from wearing heavy boots and never having a flat surface to walk on (the camp is covered with loose stones to keep the lunar quality dust at a livable level, and there is no asphalt road or flat sidewalk that I know of anywhere in this area), and the temperature extremes have removed — painfully — a thick layer of skin from my face and head.

My clothes are always dirty because of the dust, and because we have to wash our clothing in mesh bags that can't be opened during the washing. But this is the pleasant season: roads to Cheghcheran become inaccessible most of the winter, and the temperatures in this mountainous area hover far below zero. And yes, my colleagues and I will be staying through it all.

I meet with Afghans of all kinds all day long, and I conduct my meetings in Dari. I speak Dari, along with a couple of other regional languages. (But I am also giving an English class every night to our local interpreters so that they can communicate with the soldiers better.) My colleagues and I walk on the streets, go shopping, visit the local villages, listen to what the Afghans are saying and laugh and joke with them. We cooperate with our Afghan friends here on a range of assistance projects involving the local schools, bridges across the town river, construction of better facilities for the town hospital and general security for the upcoming elections so that the voters in the province can cast their ballots freely and safely.

The funny thing is, there are lots of diplomats like me who have left their cuff links and silk ties and dark suits back home. We tend to show up for meetings in jeans carrying backpacks.

In between these activities, I try to write reports that will help the State Department and NATO recipients understand this area better. And late in the evening, I finally get to my e-mail (we have a generator here), where I sometimes enjoy the luxury of accessing the Internet to remind me that there is a wider world.

The funny thing is, there are lots of diplomats like me in places like this in Afghanistan: Americans and Europeans and many others who have left their cuff links and silk ties and dark suits back home. We tend to show up for meetings in jeans carrying backpacks. And funnier still, we think we have the best of worlds here. I know I wouldn't trade my tent for the biggest ambassadorial residence in London, Paris or Rome. If any of the recent critics of the State Department and Foreign Service care to make the three-day overland trip here (via a very bad dirt road from Herat), I would be happy to introduce them to this version of the diplomatic life. ❑

AFSA BOOK IN MOSCOW CLASSROOM

Teaching Future Russian Diplomats

BY DEBORAH SISBARRO, EMBASSY MOSCOW

In a unique new partnership demonstrating how much the U.S.-Russian relationship has changed from Soviet days, diplomats from Embassy Moscow have been team-teaching future Russian diplomats at the prestigious Moscow State Institute for Foreign Relations (called MGIMO in Russian). During Academic Year 2004-2005, Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Deputy Chief of Mission John Beyrle and 18 other embassy officers lectured on U.S.-Russia relations to approximately 60 international relations students, many of whom aspire to become diplomats. The course also involved students in embassy events, such as the "Election Night 2004" reception at the ambassador's residence, and gave them a chance to meet and talk with American foreign policy specialists including Walter Russell Mead, who was a guest of the embassy for a week in May.

Embassy Moscow Public Affairs Officer Deborah Sisbarro (left) handing out copies of *Inside a U.S. Embassy* to Russian students.

The final class was hosted by DCM John Beyrle in his residence and featured Mead, the visiting Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, who provided the students with an overview of the philosophical roots of American foreign policy and engaged them in a discussion about its future direction. Each student was given a copy of the AFSA book, *Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America.* Next year, this book will serve as supplementary reading material for this course. (Note: Copies of the book were also purchased by the embassy for American Corners and Centers throughout Russia.)

The course is the brainchild of former Moscow Public Affairs Officer Anne Chermak, who served as a visiting professor at MGIMO for the academic year 2003-2004. She created the first yearlong American-taught course on U.S. diplomacy at Russia's most prestigious foreign affairs institution. The weekly course was so popular that MGIMO asked the embassy to offer the course again this year, even though the diplomat-in-residence position was not continued. The public affairs section coordinated the weekly class, thereby gaining a unique opportunity to work directly with Russia's next generation of leaders.

Embassy officers volunteered to cover topics including the history of U.S. diplomacy as well as foreign policy in various geographic regions and functional areas. The students visited the embassy for a video conference with the U.S. mission to NATO. This proved a fascinating opportunity for the officers to speak directly with these students and dispel misconceptions about U.S. intentions. As the class size was relatively small, officials typically began with a brief lecture, followed by intense discussion.

The students — a critical audience for embassy outreach efforts — enjoyed the chance to hear from front-line American diplomats, and expressed appreciation to the embassy for organizing the course. The Americans, including the ambassador, equally enjoyed the experience, which gave them a novel opportunity to engage with some of the best and brightest Russian students of international relations. ❑

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RETIREES IN ACTION

At Home and Abroad, Wygant Serves On

BY BROOKE DEAL, EDITORIAL INTERN

"There is foreign service after the Foreign Service," says Michael Wygant. Retirement doesn't mean relaxing holidays in the tropics or a quiet life at home for the former ambassador, who retired to Maine in 1990. On the contrary, Wygant has been busy in public service all over the world ever since he retired from the State Department 15 years ago.

Shortly following his formal retirement, Wygant assisted in opening the first U.S. embassies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1992 and 1993. He refers to his work in Kazakhstan as "a great introduction into 'retirement.'" In 1994, Wygant went on to serve with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the world's largest security organization. The OSCE's main goals include the resolution and prevention of conflict, particularly in countries of the former USSR and the Balkans, and active involvement with nation-building in newly-independent states. Wygant's first assignment was in Georgia, where he spent several months as part of the organization's conflict-resolution mission.

From the Georgia assignment, he went on to head OSCE missions to Moldova, Ukraine and Croatia, still concentrating on conflict resolution and nation-building, from 1995 to 2000. The 1997-1998 mission to Ukraine was no easy task, as his workforce consisted of only four staff. The team was challenged to achieve more with less, and Wygant calls the mission "a small but significant success."

In 1999, Wygant served as head of the election observation mission to Estonia, supervising a small team to monitor the election process before, during and after election day. The team observed campaigns by political parties and candidates, the work of the election administration and local authorities, and the media, as well as election-day proceedings and the resolution of election disputes. Wygant then led OSCE election observation missions to five other nations, including Ukraine, Slovakia, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, from 2002 to 2004.

While it would seem that this busy overseas schedule would leave no time for work at home, Wygant has been just as busy stateside. He collaborated with Brown University to prepare a training course for Americans selected to work with the OSCE. As program chairman of the World Affairs Council of Maine, Wygant has been in charge of recruiting foreign affairs speakers since 1991. He has spoken extensively in northern New England, addressing students and faculty alike about his diplomatic experiences in conflict resolution and nation-building. He has made numerous presentations at Bowdoin College and the University of Maine in Orono, focusing on the former USSR and the countries that have emerged from the Soviet Union.

Mike Wygant, center, with European colleagues in Moldova, 2003.

"Amb. Wygant has provided outstanding support for AFSA initiatives in recent years," says AFSA Director of Communications Tom Switzer. "His leadership resulted in increased involvement of Foreign Service retirees in a wide array of outreach programs all over New England. He himself has been one of the most energetic and effective AFSA speakers in recent years, explaining the key role of American diplomacy to leading universities, world affairs councils and civic associations in his region."

Although his tenure at the State Department ended 15 years ago, Michael Wygant's career in foreign service is far from over. ❑

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