The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2017

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2017 15 SPEAKING OUT Why U.S. Ambassadors Should Be Career Professionals BY EDWARD L . PECK T he United States is unique among developed nations in that nearly a third of U.S. embassies—and more than 60 percent of those located in major devel- oped countries—are headed by politi- cal appointees without experience in diplomacy. Though some governments do send political appointees to represent them in Washington and other key capi- tals, the vast majority of their missions are headed by trained career diplomats. Without a doubt, the ability to raise millions of dollars for a presidential campaign is a valuable skill. But reward- ing a fundraiser or “bundler” with the job of heading a U.S. embassy reveals total ignorance of what the job entails. Almost unknown outside diplomatic circles, an ambassador’s responsibilities are numerous, complex and impor- tant—sometimes critical. And, as with any and all top management positions, they cannot be effectively carried out by beginners. Moreover, selling an important federal position in this manner impedes attainment of our international objec- tives, violates the basic principles of good governance, ignores existing law and is understandably resented by the nations Edward L. Peck, a Foreign Service officer from 1956 to 1989, served as chief of mission in Mauritania and Iraq, among many other assignments including postings to Swe- den, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. Ambassador Peck later served as execu- tive secretary of the American Academy of Diplomacy. In that capacity he prepared evaluations on the qualifications of more than 150 political and career nominees for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, using the same materials those nominees had submitted to the committee. on the receiving end of such appoint- ments. I do not mean in any way to cast aspersions on the abilities, character, successes, skills, patriotism or other commendable attributes of the nomi- nees. But as a new administration takes office, I submit that it is high time to abolish the spoils system once and for all, for U.S. diplomacy. America does not benefit from this practice. The Chief of Mission Mandate In the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-465), Congress spelled out what chiefs of mission are expected to do, as well as the qualifications required. Section 207, Responsibilities of the Chief of Mission, merits a close reading: “Under the direction of the president, the chief of mission to a foreign country: (1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervi- sion of all government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and (2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activi- ties and operations of the government within that country, and shall insure that all government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable direc- tives of the chief of mission.” These explicit and extensive respon- sibilties also appear in the letter of instruction each COM receives from the U.S. president on appointment: “As chief of mission, you have full responsibil- ity for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States gov- ernment executive branch employees (except for employees under the com- mand of a United States area military commander).” The letter ends with, “As chief of mission, you are not only my personal representative, but that of our country.” The COM’s mandate encompasses a massive list of activities to direct, coordinate and supervise. More than two dozen agencies with active roles in foreign policy formulation have person- nel operating programs abroad; predict- ably, these are most numerous in the more important (read pleasant) coun- tries sought by most political appointees. Since agencies cannot instruct each other, effective management of manifold overseas activities is often difficult from Washington, requiring careful coordina- tion. But foreign policy is only an expres- sion of intentions until it is implemented, and that is an effort that takes place over-