The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2017

16 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2017 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL seas. The COM needs to be able to inject a critical level of control and coordina- tion into the implementation stage of for- eign policy on the ground. This requires a firm grounding in the byzantine work- ings of the domestic interagency arena. Applying the level of control expected by Congress and the president also demands knowledge of agency mandates and what they are actually doing. Expecting a novice ambassador to perform these tasks effectively ignores the universal requirement of experience for the senior position in any operational entity engaged not in establishing strategic objectives but in producing the desired results. Our embassies are the diplomatic equivalent of “boots on the ground,” endeavoring to implement Washington’s decisions. There is no time for on-the- job-training program for the boss of such missions, who must thoroughly know the business in order to direct it. The Job Outside the Embassy Section 304 (a) (2) of the Foreign Service Act specifies that “positions as chief of mission should normally be accorded to career members of the [Foreign] Service, though circumstances will warrant appointments from time to time of qualified individuals who are not career members of the Service” (empha- sis added). Further, nominees “should possess clearly demonstrated compe- tence to perform the duties of a chief of mission, including … useful knowledge of the language … and understanding of the history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the inter- ests of that country.” The law also states: “… contributions to political campaigns should not be a factor.” COMs have two basic external functions. First, they must keep host governments informed about Ameri- can opinions, interests and objectives. Second—equally important, but some- times more difficult—they are to report local reactions to U.S. initiatives back to Washington and analyze them. The recipients of such reporting at the White House/National Security Council, the State Department and other agencies should be able to rely on the COM’s previous diplomatic experience and knowledge, as stipulated in the law, and thus his or her ability to present a complete and rational picture. In that regard, it is useful to bear in mind that career diplomats work seamlessly for administrations of either political party, while political appointees are closely tied to the party in power, a bond that can influence their reporting. Why “Pay to Play” Does Not Hold Up Despite the irrefutable logic concern- ing the advantages of relying on experi- enced professionals for top jobs in every line of endeavor, advocates of political appointees for top diplomatic positions put forward the following arguments in support of novice U.S. ambassadors. Presidents can choose anyone they want. Wrong. They can nominate whom- ever they want, but the Senate has a con- stitutional “advise and consent” role. The only criterion for confirmation should be the expectation of high-level performance. Yet with rare exceptions even the egre- giously unqualified are confirmed, since both parties relish their turn to reward bagmen or bagwomen (aka “bundlers”). (It is worth noting that political nominees seldom purchase an embassy with only their own money. Much of what they donate is collected from others.) Other nations welcome political appointees . Nope. Celebrities may thrill part of the population, but host govern- ments do not want to discuss compli- cated, important issues with a neophyte, especially one representing a super- power. Consider: Anyone with a health issue would prefer to consult a medical school graduate who earned an M.D., rather than someone handed the degree in return for a large donation. It is true that few governments publicly complain about such appoin- tees, but editorials in local media make their true feelings about unqualified U.S. ambassadors quite clear. To put it bluntly, sending a beginner with no connection to the host country instead of a trained diplomatic professional is correctly seen as demeaning. Businesses do the same. Wrong. No company puts a manufacturing facil- ity—the operational equivalent of an embassy—under a neophyte. Embas- sies are engaged in the hands-on tactics of implementation, not headquarters’ formulation of strategy. The political appointee can raise issues directly with the president. Conceivable, but highly doubtful. Even if a chief of mission is a friend of the president they might not get through the White House switchboard, let alone broach an arcane subject. And even if they did, an end-run around established communication channels would be more likely to backfire than succeed. Political appointees can bring fresh perspectives. Inexperience is not a qualification. Dealing with the interests of other nations, often involving conten- tious, convoluted, long-standing issues, can make new approaches irrelevant or worse. Fresh ideas, if needed, can come fromWashington. The same approach is employed in the Defense Department. Wrong. The COM is equivalent to a field commander.