The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2017

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2017 19 stan where we have invested so heavily. You will need to earn back their trust, again with some early wins, a lot of open and frank discussion, and the development of a strategy and frame- work that is comprehensible to the average citizen. It will be more FDR in 1939, cajoling a reluctant America, than Bush in 2002, channeling the unbounded energy of an America seized with a global mission. Seized or not, that global mission remains. There is simply no one else positioned, resourced and able to lead the free world. As Australian Prime Minister John Howard told the Canadian Parliament in 2006, at a time when many were tempted to seek a world without American leadership: “Be careful in what you wish for, because a retreating America will leave a more vulnerable world. It will leave a world more exposed to terrorism and it will leave a more fragile and, indeed, danger- ous world.”The American people must be convinced that a world without America will not just be poorer and more conflicted for others, but for them. Toward a Post-Cold War Doctrine One thing that would help is a strategic framework for dealing with the world, something we have not had since the end of the Cold War. Your last three predecessors had an aversion to post– Cold War doctrine, fearful it would miss something in an increas- ingly complex world, while limiting their operating space. This aversion has probably run its course. One such framework would divide the world into Westphalian and post-Westphalian spheres. The Westphalian world, enshrined in 1648 to end the horrific violence of a Europe that had com- pletely unraveled, is one in which the state has a monopoly on the use of force within its borders, and each state’s sovereignty is respected by other states. This now defines most of the world, and the global systems for trade, travel, diplomacy, conflict resolution and deterrence are all dependent on the core ability of states to function effectively. With the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, U.S. and world attention focused increasingly on the many countries and regions that had entered a kind of post-Westphalian exis- tence in which governance broke down, or was so weak as to be irrelevant. Somalia collapsed into a non-state haze of anarchy in 1991. It was for a time the anomaly, but then Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Afghanistan, Sudan, the Central African Republic and a dozen other states joined the club to vary- ing degrees and in differing conditions. Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria are the most recent additions. But the post-Westphalian world is more than just the collapse or weakening of states. Adding fuel to the fire are the forces of modern technology, globalization and religiosity. Today criminal groups can amass capital on par with Fortune 500 com- panies, who themselves are as wealthy as some nations; insurgents and drug traffickers can outfight their state counter- parts; and religious fanaticism can electronically jump borders to inspire violence with an image or an appeal. Larger threats loom, too: cross-border pandemics that can kill thousands, terrorists with advanced weaponry. Managing the challenges within the nation-state systemwhile working to return failed and fragile states to that system is an operating concept around which a robust new strategy could be built. Managing the Westphalian World The orderly part of the world will require undistracted focus, new resources, a shared vision and assertive U.S. leadership to maintain course. Here are some things to consider as you look at the globe: Europe remains the primary champion of international order and the postwar liberal order, and our most stalwart ally on most issues. But it has rising demons and fundamental challenges. The Balkans will deserve special attention, as will the steady flow of forced migration, which is testing European solidarity as the conti- nent faces its worst migration crisis since the Second World War. Europeans need to know we are in this together. Brexit will continue to reverberate—the European Union was the mechanism by which the continent ended its long civil war and became a major force for good in the world. It is in our inter- est to keep the project of European integration alive and healthy. Fear of Russia continues to be a big part of Europe’s equation, and the Atlantic Alliance has never been more important in the post–Cold War era. Containing and reversing Russia’s expan- sion and unhelpful meddling, while keeping the door open to collective work with Moscow on shared interests, will be key to regional stability. We need to constantly update and expand NATO’s capacity, and take seriously our longstanding issue of burden-sharing, while recognizing the burden NATOmembers There is simply no one else positioned, resourced and able to lead the free world.