The Foreign Service Journal - January/February 2018

46 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2018 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL After the Coup: From Power Plays to Peacekeeping Côte d’Ivoire, 1999 • James Stewart For decades after independence, Côte d’Ivoire was a bastion of political stability and a regional economic power. But on Christ- mas Eve 1999, a military mutiny changed all that. U.S. Ambassador George Mu, a career FSO, insisted to General Robert Guéï, who had taken power in the coup, that the junta must uphold political and humanitarian rights and return quickly to civilian rule. Yielding to diplomatic pressure and the voices of Ivorian society, the junta permitted elections in October 2000, but our independent monitoring found them seriously flawed. Gen. Guéï claimed victory over the only viable opposition candidate allowed to run, Laurent Gbagbo. Guéï dissolved the National Electoral Commission part way through the count, and pro- claimed himself president. Laurent Gbagbo insisted that he had won, and the partial polling results seemed to confirm that. Gbagbo called his loyal “democrats” into the streets to protect his victory, and tens of thousands from several political parties followed suit. After days of street fighting, in which several hundred died on all sides, Gbagbo declared himself president. The vicious struggle for political power, overlaid with ethnic, religious and economic tensions, continued as it had since the mutiny. Ethnic tensions pitted Ivorians from the south and center against mainly Muslimnortherners. In the south, loyalist radicals spread hate speech while their militias destroyed property. Nativ- ists accused Alassane Ouattara, a prominent northernMuslim (who had been prevented fromparticipating in the 2000 election, but was later elected president), of destabilizing the country. Meanwhile, rebels completely suppressed dissent in the north. Even worse, death squads were operating across the country. In Yopougon, the most populous sector of Abi- djan, death squads killed 150 civilians; in Bouake, in the north, rebels executed 100 national police; and in one night our Reuters contacts counted 180 bodies of civilians with lethal gunshot wounds in Abidjan morgues. We knew who had likely perpetrated these outrages and reported what we knew to Washington. We also helped the British ambas- sador move a U.K. company’s 250,000 machetes out of the country as we realized what terrible weapons they can be. This tangle of complex issues was explosive. And explode it did. In September 2002, an armed column emerged from the north aiming to take Abidjan. The Abidjan-based French Battalion stopped the advance on an east-west line across the country. Soon after, the Economic Community of West African States (known as ECOWAS) stationed peacekeepers across the line between the two sides, establishing a demilitarized zone (DMZ). On our several visits to Ghanaian and Beninois peace- keepers (two of the five countries represented), we saw how thin on the ground they were. Still, they kept the sides apart, even when Ivorian Army elements tried to penetrate the DMZ. Dozens of episodes of machine gun fire, burning road- blocks and killings erupted, shutting down the country for days and keeping the situation fluid, difficult to track. We reduced embassy staff considerably and positioned military support next door in Ghana for a possible evacuation. To make sense of all this, embassy officers hustled to speak with dozens of government officials; political parties; nongov- ernmental organizations, especially human rights organiza- tions; the international press; businesses; United Nations agen- cies; and other embassies, especially the French. Our cocoa company contacts became invaluable sources in the volatile west toward Liberia, itself wartorn. “Contacts, contacts and more contacts” was our motto. Reporting officers routinely put in 60- and 70-hour weeks to support the ambassador and keep Washington apprised of events essential to U.S. interests and to deliver formal messages from the United States to the host govern- ment. The political-economic section worked long and hard to compile thorough and honest annual human rights and religious freedom reports mandated by Congress, as well as the detailed yearly Invest- ment Climate Statement—all part of the essential public record for future reference. Seeing little progress on the many Reporting officers routinely put in 60- and 70-hour weeks to support the ambassador and keepWashington apprised of events essential to U.S. interests. –James Stewart