The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2019 21 than taking one officer from a 10–person section. An economic-track senior officer recalled to me her experience running a 10-person combined pol/econ section, attributing her relatively rapid promo- tion to the leadership and management skills she had had the opportunity to demonstrate in that combined section. That rang true to me, in contrast to many of her peers who struggled to demon- strate their management chops with so few direct reports. That said, there are arguments for and against combining political and eco- nomic sections. Aggregating sections can bring more officers under an FS-1’s man- agement, which is a good opportunity for the FS-1 to bolster their own manage- ment skills. An FS-2 section deputy then has the opportunity to serve in an acting capacity in a section of more meaningful size and impact. A downside to combined sections is the elimination of either the politi- cal or the economic section at country teammeetings, as well as the potential elimination of an econ skill code posi- tion. Promotion rates are related to the number of billets (i.e., positions by skill code). With fewer skill code positions, you get to promote fewer officers in that cone over time. This is true across all career tracks, and sensibly so—why promote people into a rank if you don’t need their spe- cific skills at that rank? Combining sec- tions may, therefore, lead to a downward trajectory in promotability for the econ skill code. Second, I concluded that many candidates simply did not have enough, or even any, in-cone experience at their current grade. The relatively rapid promotion speed to FS-2 levels overall at that particular point in time may have contributed to this pattern, as well as the push to get out-of-cone experience codi- fied under the Professional Development Program requirements. While I can attest to the value of out- of-cone experience, particularly with regard to the management of human or other resources, notching only a couple of tours as an econ officer does not inspire absolute confidence in promo- tion board members that an officer can hold their own at the FS-1 level in cone, where they are still likely to have to serve. And that’s precisely what promotion panels are looking for—clarity from the documentation in the file that an officer can successfully serve at the next level. A Broader Issue In my opinion, however, there is a broader issue that has led to the distor- tions cited above. It is this: The relative allocation of billets in the Foreign Ser- vice has simply not kept up with the real- ity that political influence and national interests are closely intertwined, indeed interdependent, with economic issues. I think that is the underlying problem we need to solve, not just for the develop- ment of career econ officers, but to ensure the most effective American diplomacy. In my view, no one can truly under- stand a country and serve to advance America’s interests there without some knowledge about what is happening in its economy. This holds true beyond the political and economic sections. The interests of traveling or resident American citizens are directly affected by the state of the local economy, as are security interests and the management section’s work. Meeting payroll for local staff usu- ally depends on whether the banks are functioning in the host country. I still have vivid memories of (literally) measuring safes with the management counselor and financial management officer in Athens, two years before the Greek banking system finally collapsed in 2015, and obtaining a waiver from State to keep enough cash on hand to make payroll. We did this because of what we were hearing about the viabil- ity of Greek banks, their non-performing loans, and the fears of Greek citizens (who were keeping cash on hand just in case). Our Athens consular team had count- less examples of U.S. citizens who were affected by the collapsing safety net. And our regional security officers were constantly monitoring and advising the mission and American business com- munities of protest and other activity related to the long downward spiral in the economy and the negotiations with Greece’s creditors. I won’t even get into the impact of the local economy on U.S. interests from the standpoint of our Defense Department colleagues, or the many other critical sections that contribute to mission suc- cess in all our posts overseas. But I don’t think any would contradict the view that The relative allocation of billets in the Foreign Service has simply not kept up with the reality that political influence and national interests are closely intertwined, indeed interdependent, with economic issues.