The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2019

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2019 49 the war rice production in South Vietnam—though the country was comprised largely of the fertile Mekong River Delta—had turned from surplus to deficit. Rural sections of the country were still self-sufficient. But the cities, especially Saigon with its two million people, were another matter. To meet their requirements, imports were needed. The question was howmuch domestic production could be expected, leaving how large a gap to be filled by imports. Stock levels, both urban and rural, also had to be taken into account. We lacked reliable statistics, and with large sections of the Mekong Delta under Viet Cong control and travel in the countryside haz- ardous, answering this question was difficult. Yet we were able to do so with sufficient accuracy. Pork came second only to rice in the Vietnamese diet, but supplies were easier to track: Most pigs were brought to the municipal slaughterhouse in Saigon, and figures could be obtained from its director. One of my jobs was to bicycle there once or twice a week, riding through Saigon’s streets in the dim light of early morning (slaughtering was performed before dawn on account of lack of refrigeration). In view of urban dependence on the countryside for rice, pork and other foodstuffs, members of the economic section were required to make frequent trips outside of the city to check on conditions. Travel was in almost all instances by air, the provincial roads being too insecure to drive on. Provincial cities like Can Tho were reasonably safe, but forays into their environs were dangerous. Still, this did not deter us. Equally important was the demand side of the inflation equation, distorted by the massive purchasing power injected by the rapid American military buildup. There was not much scope for curbing inflationary pressures through fiscal policy. Collecting—let alone increasing—taxes in the midst of the war presented great difficulty for the South Vietnam government, which at the same time had to make large war expenditures. The principal instrument remaining to curb inflation was the exchange rate. American spendingmeant that abundant dollars were avail- able to finance imports. And when importers bought dollars with piasters (the local currency), the amount they paid was taken out of themoney supply, thereby reducing domestic demand.These amounts depended on the piaster-dollar exchange rate: the higher the rate, themore piasters were removed. Devaluation of the piaster was therefore essential, but it would have to be coordinated with the South Vietnamgovernment. Further, the discussions would have to be kept secret, so as not to tip off speculators. As negotiated by the section’s leadership, both these conditions weremet. Devaluation of the piaster by a third in June 1966 was decisive in ensuring the country’s economic stability and the welfare of its people. Despite the efforts of the economic and other embassy sec- tions, we lost the war. Were our section’s efforts then wasted? Not entirely, for they remain a shining example of economic achieve- ment through courage and commitment. The Reverend Theodore (Ted) Lewis is a retired FSO who worked for both USAID and State from 1951 to 1984. He served in Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Korea and Laos, and did three tours in Vietnam. His book, Theology and the Disciplines of the Foreign Service, was reviewed in the April 2015 FSJ . Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation Vietnam, 2015 By Kimberly Rosen and Paul Fekete For many years, USAID has supported global efforts to promote international trade and foster economic growth in developing countries. Since the early 2000s much of the focus has been on the reduction of “frictions” to trade flows— those policies and practices that constrain the physical move- ment of goods. Trade facilitation, as it has come to be known, is based on the acknowledgement that policy liberalization alone cannot ensure the growth of trade if businesses continue to face barriers to the movement of their products into and out of other countries. One of the most significant initiatives undertaken by USAID in this realm has been the 2015 creation of the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation, a public-private partnership to develop effective, private sector-based solutions to trade problems. Established with four other donors and with such multinationals as Walmart, FedEx and UPS, GATF’s objective has been to sup- port the implementation of the World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement by making sure that the private sector is included in the development of commercially meaningful tech- nical assistance interventions. The WTO TFA, which entered into force in 2017, requires par-