The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2021

44 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2021 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Events can always take an unexpected turn, and as diplomats, we must adapt quickly and effectively. ton’s seemingly incessant appetite for information by adapting to its battle rhythm. Offering creative solutions is an embassy’s most important contribution during a time of upheaval. Just 11 days after Ben Ali’s departure from the scene, large-scale demonstrations against the Mubarak regime began in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, fol- lowed soon thereafter by similar protests in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and elsewhere. Bandwidth in Washington was tested, but our embassy’s policy recommendations were welcomed with interest rather than dismissed as “not invented here.” We pro- vided Washington with relatively low-cost, easy-to-implement steps it could take to signal support in a cable we sent in Febru- ary 2011, a message we referred to within the embassy as the “low-hanging fruit” cable. 8. Think big. At the same time, we did not just aim for singles or doubles. One of our more ambitious recommendations was to make Tunisia eligible for the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s threshold program. While our recommendation met with initial skepticism, the White House announced Tunisian eligibility for the program less than seven months later, when President Obama hosted interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi (who had reemerged on the political stage after decades of ostracism) in the Oval Office. Three years later, the MCC announced its selection of Tunisia for a compact (i.e., a five-year grant). 9. Encourage visits; then capitalize on them. Visits by foreign dignitaries spark the need to identify “deliv- erables” and, more often than not, force Washington to make tangible decisions rather than extend debates into another inter- agency meeting. Several programs— not just the MCC—moved forward as a direct result of the Caid Essebsi visit. Similarly, visitors fromWashington afford embassies the rare opportunity to make their case directly. In February 2012, during a visit by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, we highlighted our recommendation that the U.S. government provide $100 million in emergency budget support for the new Tunisian government. She agreed, and as soon as she boarded her plane for her next destination, she called the department to make it happen. We also won support from her and, separately, from visiting senators to initiate negotiations on a free-trade agreement. While those negotiations have yet to begin, they have broad bipartisan sup- port in the Senate. Engagement with Washington was generally a good idea, but we had to be alert for instances when its enthusiasm got the better of its judgment. One office pushed the idea of build- ing an online platform connecting young Tunisian activists with aging Polish parliamentarians to discuss political transi- tion. While we did not know how many Polish parliamentari- ans were fluent in Arabic or French, we figured we were on safe grounds in assessing that there were few Tunisians who spoke Polish. We were also inundated with a seemingly steady stream of diplomatic tourists, officials who wanted to come and see the aftermath of the revolution firsthand, without any clear (or stated) purpose. We succeeded in turning off some less- than-essential visits by simply asking what the objective was. 10. Seek force multipliers. External partners often augmented the embassy’s resources, and we welcomed them. While one can reasonably question whether the military is the appropriate entity within the U.S. government to initiate development projects, we capitalized on U.S. Africa Command funding for humanitarian assistance projects in Tunisia. The concept was sound: aim for small- budget ($500,000 was the ceiling), high-impact projects throughout the country. We were able to support Tunisian non- governmental organizations (NGOs) that fostered rural employ- ment for women, educated autistic children, and addressed drug addiction. In addition to the obvious benefits for the Tunisian people, these programs demonstrated concrete steps the United States was taking to support Tunisia’s transition. Ribbon-cutting ceremonies might not be the most original or exciting public diplomacy idea, but they helped drive home our message that the United States supported the Tunisian people— wherever they lived—and their transition to a more open politi- cal and economic system. Not all U.S. support was traditional: one of my favorite projects was the brainstorm of an embassy dependent who loved to skateboard. The public affairs section identified sports diplomacy funding, which brought skateboard- ers to conduct workshops in several cities and towns, notably including Sidi Bouzid, where the Arab Spring demonstrations began following Bouazizi’s self-immolation. After the revolution, U.S. and international NGOs became