The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2022

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2022 91 Jacobs makes a convincing case that insubordination has been a consequential characteristic of American diplomatic history. it says a lot that the author characterizes Trist’s pattern of idiosyncratic conduct as “the zenith of U.S. rogue diplomacy.” Although Congress ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Trist never held a government job again and sank into rela- tive obscurity. A supplementary source of information on Trist is Agent of Destiny , John S.D. Eisenhower’s outstanding 1997 biography of General Winfield Scott, the U.S. commander in Mexico. Napoleon Bonaparte once wrote that “insubordination may only be evidence of a strong mind.” Unbending in their views and seemingly devoid of introspec- tion, the major players featured in Rogue Diplomats seem to fit that description. In a vivid example of their insouciance, John Adams, when looking back on the 1783 negotiations, stated that it was “glory to have broken such infamous orders.” More than a century later, U.S. Ambas- sador in London Walter Hines Page underhandedly and successfully worked to scupper U.S. neutrality policy during the First World War. Page was emphatic when he wrote: “I cannot conceal, nor can I repress my gratification that we are in the war at last ... I have accomplished something.” In drawing conclusions based on his case studies, Jacobs makes a convinc- ing case that insubordination has been a consequential characteristic of American diplomatic history. That said, he offers only a sketchy argument that it’s an endur- ing feature. The rise of instantaneous communication technologies has made replications of the sort of rogue diplo- macy that occurred in 1783 and 1848, for example, difficult to envisage. Indeed, the case studies in Jacobs’ book concluded in 1940 and 1963. That was decades before the “CNN effect” and the use of new communication tech- nologies—such as email, WhatsApp and Microsoft Teams—significantly amplified Washington’s inclination and capability to micromanage far-flung events in real time. The author also does not make a compelling case that roguish diplomacy is something unique to the United States. He straightforwardly states, without provid- ing much evidence, that “British, French, German, Japanese and Russian diplo- mats almost never displayed comparable refractoriness.”This assertion seems hol- low without evidence. Although it sometimes raises more questions than answers, Rogue Diplomats is a groundbreaking work. Jacobs deserves high praise for assembling the documen- tation and illustrating that insubordina- tion was a recurring motif in U.S. diplo- matic history. The intricate detailing and acid-etched characterizations also make for an evocative read. n Joseph L. Novak is a Foreign Service officer serving in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the State Depart- ment in Washington, D.C.