INSIDE: Tom Shannon on the Future of Diplomacy Elections and the Foreign Service Working a Presidential Transition
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 5 January-February 2025 Volume 102, No. 1 TRANSITIONS TRANSITIONS TRANSITIONS TRANSITIONS TRANSITIONS TRANSITIONS PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2025 INSIDE: Tom Shannon on the Future of Diplomacy Elections and the Foreign Service Working a Presidential Transition FOCUS 18 Liberate the Future Today’s diplomats have an opportunity to play a historic role in reshaping the direction of U.S. foreign policy. By Thomas A. Shannon Jr. 22 A Look Back: The Foreign Service and Presidential Elections From the FSJ Archive Exploring the “time capsule” that is the FSJ Digital Archive yields insights into the importance of presidential elections for the U.S. Foreign Service. 35 Working a Presidential Transition: FirstPerson Accounts Stories from past presidential transitions, as told by the Foreign Service officers who worked through them. Compiled by Daniel Evensen TRANSITIONS TRANSITIONS PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2025 INSIDE: Tom Shannon on the Future of Diplomacy Elections and the Foreign Service Working a Presidential Transition TRANSITIONS PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION JANUARY–FEBRUARY 2025 INSIDE: Tom Shannon on the Future of Diplomacy Elections and the Foreign Service 18
6 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL STRAIGHT FROM THE SOURCE 41 Management Matters: New Tools for Middle Managers at State The Bureau of Global Talent Management has new tools to improve management practices. By Sarah Wardwell and Jean Akers FEATURE 46 DACOR Bacon House Turns 200 Special 2025 programs mark the bicentennial of this historic gathering place for discussions of international affairs. By J. Thomas Brannan PERSPECTIVES 7 President’s Views Time of Transition By Tom Yazdgerdi 15 Speaking Out Defending Values: The Case for Strategic Clarity By Robert S. Wang 85 Reflections A Latin Love Affair Spanning 60 Years By Louisa Rogers 86 Local Lens Portillo, Chile By Martin Claessens DEPARTMENTS 9 Letters 11 Talking Points 73 In Memory 77 Books MARKETPLACE 80 Real Estate 83 Classifieds 84 Index to Advertisers 50 Call for Nominations: 2025-2027 AFSA Governing Board 51 S tate VP Voice— Flourishing in Our Career Paths in 2025 and Beyond 52 USAID VP Voice—Why USAID? 53 FAS VP Voice— Toward a Culture of Dissent 53 Foreign Service Labor Relations Board Appointments 54 A FSA Meets with Secretary Blinken 54 A FSA Governing Board Meeting, Oct. 15, 2024 54 2025 High School Essay Contest 58 2024 Federal Tax Provisions for the Foreign Service 72 A FSA Honors 2024 Sinclaire Language Award Recipients 72 AFSA Dues Increase for 2025 AFSA NEWS THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION ON THE COVER: Design by Nathan Putens. 86 46
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 7 Time of Transition BY TOM YAZDGERDI Tom Yazdgerdi is the president of the American Foreign Service Association. PRESIDENT’S VIEWS As of this writing in late November, the transition to a new administration is in full swing. I know this can be a time of anxiety for many of our members, especially with the continued political polarization in our country and the uncertainty that our Foreign Service will continue to be valued and adequately funded as America’s first line of defense. Presidential transitions, of course, are nothing new to the U.S. Foreign Service. Indeed, the Foreign Service has always provided the institutional memory and continuity in foreign policy, serving as a bridge to the next administration and onthe-ground link for policy implementation. This edition of the Journal is focused on the future, starting with the Trump transition and the current environment in which America’s diplomats work. Ambassador Tom Shannon’s thoughtful lead piece, “Liberate the Future,” argues that the highly polarized political culture at home coupled with a rapidly changing world requires a refocus not unlike what our diplomatic forebears faced in the aftermath of World War II, and that this presents members of the Foreign Service with a great responsibility—and opportunity. As Shannon also notes: “We are a disciplined Service. But obedience does not mean obsequiousness.” In other words, our job is to carry out the president’s foreign policy initiatives, but we must continue to have the courage to provide the best analysis and advice that we can to our elected and appointed leaders. If you believe, like Shannon, that we may be on the brink of a “Present at the Creation” moment, then we will need budgets for our foreign affairs agencies that can support such an awesome undertaking. Even if you do not hold that view, we will still need to appropriately fund U.S. diplomatic activities so that we can confront rivals, particularly China, and protect our interests. For perspective, this edition also includes selections from the FSJ Digital Archive as well as firsthand accounts from diplomats who have worked on presidential transitions during the past half a century. Journal editors plumbed the archive to document the Foreign Service approach to presidential elections throughout its first 100 years. And Daniel Evensen, a Foreign Service officer currently with the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), tapped into ADST’s vast oral history collection to capture diplomatic voices from times of presidential transition. Both collections show that the Foreign Service has always dealt with political transitions by offering nonpartisan, professional advice and support. Evensen notes that a transition can also be an opportunity to provide new initiatives that make the Service more efficient and, I would add, reinforce the link between what we do and the security and prosperity of our country. I remain hopeful because I have seen in my five years on the AFSA Governing Board a bipartisan core of support for the FS in Congress. Senators and representatives from both parties have told me their positive views about what we do and how we do it, especially when they see us in action during their visits to U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. With that in mind, I continue to hope that our career ambassadors get nominated, vetted, and confirmed in a timely fashion. It is now the norm to wait nearly a year from recommendation to nomination to confirmation to attestation. That is a strong disincentive for our best and brightest to throw their hats in the ring for an ambassadorship or to put their lives on hold while the process plays out. Even more importantly, when our government does not provide sufficient diplomatic resources to compete with China overseas and when ambassadorial positions remain vacant for so long, it has a direct impact on our national security. This is also true for the promotion lists that suffer in this long and fraught process. In March, we will once again share your “Notes to the New Administration,” a place for members of the Foreign Service to offer their best advice on key issues that will confront the new president and his national security team. As always, please let me know your thoughts at yazdgerdi@afsa.org or member@afsa.org. Wishing you and yours a happy and healthy new year! n
8 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL www.sfiprogram.org SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE SFI-01268 Certified Sourcing Editor in Chief, Director of Publications Shawn Dorman: dorman@afsa.org Deputy Editor Donna Gorman: gorman@afsa.org Senior Editor Susan Brady Maitra: maitra@afsa.org Managing Editor Kathryn Owens: owens@afsa.org Associate Editor Mark Parkhomenko: parkhomenko@afsa.org Publications Coordinator and Content Strategist Hannah Harari: harari@afsa.org Business Development Manager— Advertising and Circulation Molly Long: long@afsa.org Art Director Caryn Suko Smith Editorial Board Vivian Walker, Chair Lynette Behnke, Gov. Bd. Liaison Suzanne August David Bargueño Hon. Robert M. Beecroft Gaïna Dávila Hon. Jennifer Z. 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Email: journal@afsa.org Phone: (202) 338-4045 Fax: (202) 338-8244 Web: www.afsa.org/fsj Address Changes: member@afsa.org © American Foreign Service Association, 2025 PRINTED IN THE USA Postmaster: Send address changes to AFSA, Attn: Address Change 2101 E Street NW Washington DC 20037-2990 AFSA Headquarters: (202) 338-4045; Fax (202) 338-6820 State Department AFSA Office: (202) 647-8160; Fax (202) 647-0265 USAID AFSA Office: (202) 712-1941; Fax (202) 216-3710 FCS AFSA Office: (202) 482-9088; Fax (202) 482-9087 GOVERNING BOARD President Tom Yazdgerdi: yazdgerdi@afsa.org Secretary Sue Saarnio: saarnio@afsa.org Treasurer Hon. John O’Keefe: okeefe@afsa.org State Vice President Hui Jun Tina Wong: wong@afsa.org USAID Vice President Randy Chester: chester@afsa.org FCS Vice President Joshua Burke: burke@afsa.org FAS Vice President Evan Mangino: mangino@afsa.org Retiree Vice President John K. 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THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 9 LETTERS Appreciation for the Appreciation Ambassador Tom Boyatt’s article in the September 2024 Journal, “A Soft-Spoken Institution Builder,” expressing his appreciation of Lars Hydle does them both credit. Much of the character of the present-day Foreign Service dates from the far-sighted interaction they engaged in as colleagues with somewhat differing views. I hope it is widely read by current— and maybe even future—generations in the Foreign Service so they will know there were giants in those days. Edward Marks Ambassador, retired Washington, D.C. The Case for Red Teaming Prior to joining the State Department as a Foreign Service officer, I worked for four years at the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) helping set up its Lessons Learned Program. I was glad to see my former colleague David Young’s piece, “Foreign Assistance Lessons from Afghanistan: How to Balance Accountability and Learning,” in the October 2024 FSJ and wholeheartedly agree with the suggestions he put forward. However, State needs to go a step further and not just rely on external oversight organizations to critically assess our strategies, plans, evidence, and data analysis. The department’s March 2022 After Action Review on Afghanistan recommended that State establish a “red team” capability, i.e., the ability to organize teams that can critically assess strategies and plans to identify weaknesses, assumptions, and alternatives to help strengthen these plans and prepare for unexpected contingencies. The review, however, focused on creating this capability only within the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) rather than more generally encouraging red teaming as a concept to be adopted across the department, for strategies big and small. Red teams can add value to State efforts. I know this because I worked with others to establish red teams at Embassy Jakarta in 2021 and in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau in 2023. Unfortunately, even though the concept of red teaming has been around for decades, and its effectiveness validated many times over, the practice is still not widely adopted at State. I have seen colleagues selflessly volunteer to rush off to deal with the myriad crises State faces at any given moment, but I have not seen the same gusto for long-term strategic planning aimed at preventing those crises in the first place (regrettably, incentive systems at State seem to reinforce this dynamic). I encourage all my colleagues at State to embrace the lessons from our long and costly involvement in Afghanistan and find ways to apply principles of red teaming into your work, no matter how small or large. Greg Bauer FSO, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Arlington, Virginia Foreign Assistance Needs to Be Streamlined The importance of foreign economic and financial assistance in U.S. foreign policy is well highlighted by Steven Hendrix in the October 2024 Foreign Service Journal (“USAID: A Critical National Security Tool”). In fact, it is the major diplomatic tool we wield in numerous countries of the world. Hendrix stresses the central role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), our preeminent and lead implementing organization, with field missions around the world and an annual budget of about $40 billion. However, there are several other organizations also implementing segments of our foreign assistance program. These include the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC); the Development Finance Corporation (DFC); the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), which I once briefly headed; the Peace Corps; the African Development Foundation; and aid units within various departments of our government, including State, Treasury, Agriculture, and others. Having so many foreign assistance spigots creates confusion, overlap, inefficiencies, and high administrative costs. To my mind, it would be more effective to combine them into fewer entities. In fact, our friends on the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have urged this from time to time. But we all know how difficult it is to eliminate an agency of government once established. Raymond Malley Senior FSO, retired Hanover, New Hampshire Reconsidering the Political Appointee Ambassador Like many Foreign Service members, I have long argued that we need to align with most other countries and reserve our ambassador positions for career diplomats.
10 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL I have often told the anecdote about a career ambassador who was chatting one day with the U.S. commander of the Fifth Fleet. The commander stated that when he retires from the Navy, he’d really enjoy a gig as a U.S. ambassador. The quick-witted ambassador responded: “That’s funny. When I retire, I’d like to get a job as head of the Fifth Fleet!” Needless to say, the admiral was horrified at the idea that someone thought he could walk into that naval job with no experience. Thus, it was with some trepidation that I bid on a job as special assistant to an incoming political appointee ambassador to India. I secretly hoped his pending nomination would linger so I could continue to work for the sharp chargé d’affaires in New Delhi, Career Ambassador Beth Jones. It turned out, however, that the political appointee ambassador, former Mayor of Los Angeles Eric Garcetti, was one of the finest leaders with whom I have had the pleasure of working. He was eminently qualified on the issues, having studied India in college, and possessed the contacts to reach back to the highest levels of the U.S. government, as well as leaders on both sides of the aisle in Congress and the private sector. Working tirelessly on the entire realm of U.S.-India relations, he recognized what he didn’t know about the Foreign Service and depended on the highly respected Career Minister–ranked deputy chief of mission, Patricia Lacina, for counsel. Together they made a dynamic team, along with a sterling country team. Amb. Garcetti’s charisma and vision inspired mission staff to want to raise their ambitions. Perhaps most important, he was committed to “leading with kindness” and cared deeply about the well-being of career members of the Foreign Service and embassy staff. He pushed for solutions to address local staff complaints that had simmered for years. Even after his most draining 12-hour days of high-level visits, when any of us would have been burned out, he would somehow find the time, of his own volition, to stop and chat with a gardener, check up on an FS child, or deposit a handwritten note of appreciation to an embassy officer’s desk. I honestly do not believe there was anyone more qualified in the Foreign Service to be that ambassador at that time. So, do we need to reform the dreadful role of money in our elections that can lead to donors buying ambassadorships? Absolutely. But I, for one, will keep a more open mind about political appointees. Stuart Denyer FSO U.S. Embassy Cairo n Share your thoughts about this month’s issue. Submit letters to the editor: journal@afsa.org
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 11 TALKING POINTS Modernization Agenda Wrap-Up In an address at the Foreign Service Institute on Oct. 30, 2024, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reflected on his tenure and outlined the achievements of his modernization agenda, emphasizing its influence on equipping U.S. diplomacy with the tools to navigate a rapidly shifting global landscape. The Secretary highlighted key reforms during the Biden administration, including the establishment of new bureaus focused on cybersecurity, global health security, and emerging technologies. These efforts aim to address pressing issues such as artificial intelligence, climate change, and economic security while strengthening U.S. leadership in setting global norms. He also pointed to the department’s expanded global presence, with five new U.S. embassies in the Indo-Pacific region. Blinken emphasized investment in the department’s workforce, citing record hiring levels, introduction of paid internships, and reforms to improve diversity and retention. The Secretary also praised the department’s embrace of innovation, citing the adoption of AI tools and online passport renewal services as examples of how technology is transforming diplomacy. At the same time, he pointed to the importance of fostering open discourse, referencing the revitalized Dissent Channel as a means to strengthen policy through constructive debate. Blinken called for bipartisan support from Congress to sustain and build on these modernization efforts: “When our diplomats have the resources they need, when they have the support they deserve, ... there’s nothing—nothing— they can’t do.” Transition at State As the U.S. transitions from President Joe Biden’s administration to President-elect Donald Trump’s, two individuals will manage this critical period at the State Department. Secretary Blinken announced that Ambassador (ret.) Stephen D. Mull, vice provost for global affairs at the University of Virginia, will coordinate the State Department’s transition on behalf of the Biden administration. For the Trump administration, Brian Hook, a former State director of policy planning and special envoy for Iran, has been selected to lead the transition team. Mull, a seasoned diplomat and former ambassador to Lithuania and Poland, began his assignment on Oct. 28, focusing on ensuring a smooth transition while safeguarding vital U.S. interests. Blinken emphasized his commitment to using the remaining weeks of the Biden administration to address pressing foreign policy issues, including U.S.-China competition, support for Ukraine, and efforts to end the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza. On the Trump side, Hook’s appointment highlights the early formation of the president-elect’s national security team. Known for his tenure in Trump’s first administration, Hook will play a central role in shaping the incoming administration’s foreign policy priorities. While Mull focuses on continuity and stability during the handover, Hook is expected to prioritize aligning the department’s leadership with Trump’s vision. These developments echo past challenges in diplomatic transitions. The 1980 State Department transition report, written by Robert G. Neumann for President Ronald Reagan’s incoming administration, stressed the necessity for the Secretary of State to assert control over the department’s bureaucracy and ensure alignment with the president’s foreign policy objectives. Both appointments are part of broader transition efforts across national security and foreign policy sectors, with figures like Robert Wilkie (Pentagon) and Joel Rayburn (National Security Council) also taking prominent roles. COP29 Ends in Contentious Agreement The 29th UN Climate Change Conference (COP29), held in Baku, Azerbaijan, concluded on Nov. 22, 2024, with a polarizing agreement to triple annual climate finance for developing nations to $300 billion by 2035. The deal, which fell far short of the $1.3 trillion annually that experts say is Take away America’s diplomats working all around the globe, deployed in the world’s second-largest network of embassies and consulates, and you get a very different reality, one less bright, less peaceful, less prosperous. [But] make no mistake about it, all that deploying takes a toll. It often involves real sacrifice on the part of members of the Foreign Service and their families. Tonight, we celebrate their commitment, their sacrifice, their tireless efforts, and their profound impact on shaping our world. —World Affairs Councils of America (WACA) board member Ambassador Barbara Stephenson, presenting the WACA International Service Award to “the Foreign Service” at the WACA annual conference opening dinner in Washington, D.C., on Nov. 20, 2024. Contemporary Quote
12 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL An Intern’s Perspective 100 Years Ago “In reviewing specific impressions, I would like to begin on the positive side. The most remarkable attribute of the US embassy at which I worked was the high calibre of persons filling a number of prominent positions. By the internship’s end, I felt special admiration for the thoughtfulness, political aplomb, and integrity of the American ambassador. Although I often heard FSOs discuss other US chiefs-of-mission as counter-examples, I can only conclude that an organization which permits such a man to rise through its ranks to the top must be doing something right! Several other officers with whom I came in contact, all proceeding up their career ladders quickly, were also extraordinarily capable and personally attractive. Each, I know, has made strongly favorable impressions on citizens of the host country. A notable characteristic of some of these US officials (the observation applies especially to the deputy chief of mission) was an effervescent interest in other people. All in all, the efforts of this group of exemplary officers are a credit to their profession and country. As an outside observer and a possible Foreign Service candidate, I was impressed.” —Andrew Spindler, excerpted from his article, “A Summer’s Intern,” in the January 1975 FSJ. needed, has exposed deep fractures in global climate diplomacy and highlighted the challenges of addressing the climate crisis amid shifting geopolitical priorities. The agreement, described by COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev as the “Baku Breakthrough,” was finalized after tense negotiations and accusations of mismanagement. While the agreement avoided an impasse, it was immediately criticized by delegates from developing nations as insufficient. India’s climate envoy, Chandni Raina, called the deal “a paltry sum,” and representatives from countries including the Marshall Islands and Panama accused wealthier nations of prioritizing political convenience over global needs. The negotiations were overshadowed by geopolitical turmoil, including the election of Donald J. Trump, who is expected to once again withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement and scale back U.S. climate commitments. Trump’s rhetoric and anticipated policy positions loomed over the conference, weakening the U.S. delegation’s leadership role and adding uncertainty about future global climate cooperation. U.S. officials sought to reassure partners that market forces and existing policies would sustain renewable energy progress domestically, but doubts remain. Adding to the tension, the war in Ukraine and rising conflict in the Middle East have strained global finances, limiting the willingness of wealthy nations to increase climate funding. Critics pointed to this financial retrenchment as evidence of the declining prioritization of climate change amid growing isolationist politics and economic challenges. The conference also highlighted the intersection of climate change and forced displacement, as detailed in a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Refugee Agency, released during COP29. The report, “No Escape: On the Frontlines of Climate Change, Conflict and Forced Displacement,” revealed that three-quarters of the world’s 120 million forcibly displaced people live in countries heavily impacted by climate change. Already vulnerable due to conflict and insecurity, these communities face escalating risks from climate hazards such as flooding, cyclones, and extreme heat. Despite their dire need, fragile states hosting displaced populations receive only $2 per person annually in adaptation funding—compared to $161 per person in non-fragile states. UNHCR has called for increased climate financing to reach displaced populations and host communities, urging their inclusion in global climate policies and funding mechanisms. Despite the contentious atmosphere, COP29 made progress on important technical issues, including finalizing mechanisms for carbon markets under the Paris Agreement. These mechanisms aim to support least-developed countries while incorporating safeguards for environmental and human rights protections. Debates over the transition away from fossil fuels remained divisive, however, with Saudi Arabia resisting language affirming the need to phase out fossil fuels. Negotiating blocs representing leastdeveloped nations and small island states walked out of COP talks at one point, delaying the deal’s conclusion by hours. Many delegations left the summit frustrated, with Sierra Leone’s Environment Minister Jiwoh Abdulai criticizing the influence of a few wealthy nations over the process. Fractures exposed at COP29, coupled with growing skepticism about multilateral climate action, foreshadow the difficult road ahead. As climate envoy Tina Stege of the Marshall Islands warned, “Playing games with the lives of the world’s most vulnerable people must end.”
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 13 Diplomatic Arrests in Yemen and Russia Recent developments in Yemen and Russia highlight escalating threats to Foreign Service personnel and affiliated staff, emphasizing the need for vigilance and resilience in the face of authoritarian crackdowns. In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthi militia has detained dozens of individuals linked to the U.S. embassy and the United Nations, including former Yemeni local staff member Shaif alHamdani. After years of detention, following his arrest in 2021, al-Hamdani resurfaced in June 2024 and was forced to appear in a Houthi propaganda video confessing to espionage, a claim dismissed as coerced by U.S. officials. Al-Hamdani’s arrest is part of a broader campaign of repression, with arrests targeting humanitarian workers to exert control over international aid operations. The State Department and humanitarian organizations have condemned these actions, warning of the dire implications for aid delivery in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, in Russia, Robert Shonov, a former Russian local staff member at the U.S. consulate in Vladivostok, was arrested in May 2023 and recently sentenced to nearly five years in prison for “secret collaboration with a foreign state.” Shonov worked at the consulate for more than 25 years. After Moscow placed restrictions on hiring local staff in 2021, Shonov became a contractor, compiling publicly available media reports. The Russian government accused him of passing secret information about the war in Ukraine to the United States, allegations the State Department has strongly denied as baseless. Following his arrest, Russia expelled two U.S. diplomats in September 2023, accusing them of acting as liaisons to Shonov. In recent years, Russia has detained several U.S. nationals under politically motivated charges, often using them as leverage in potential prisoner exchanges. Despite the high-profile prisoner swap involving journalist Evan Gershkovich in August 2024, many U.S. and dual nationals remain imprisoned in Russia under precarious circumstances, including American schoolteacher Marc Fogel. These cases exemplify the challenges faced by Foreign Service personnel and locally employed staff operating in environments where authoritarian regimes use intimidation and false allegations to suppress dissent and control narratives. U.S. Diplomat Wins C3E Award The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has recognized Gina Cady, a USAID Foreign Service officer, as a 2024 C3E International Award winner for her outstanding contributions to clean energy deployment and sustainability. The C3E Awards, now in their 13th year, celebrate women leaders driving innovation and equity in clean energy. Cady leads Power Africa’s Health Electrification and Telecommunications Alliance (HETA), a $150 million public-private partnership to electrify and connect 10,000 health facilities across sub-Saharan Africa. Her work integrates the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 3 (health) and 7 (energy) to strengthen healthcare infrastructure and reduce energy poverty. In her acceptance speech, Cady highlighted the critical link between energy and health: “Health is a climate issue. Without reliable power, primarily women and children are unable to get the basic care and services they deserve. Doctors are using cell phone lights, and patients are bringing candles for nighttime care. We can do better.” GEC Faces Uncertain Future The State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), a critical hub for countering foreign disinformation campaigns, risks losing its congressional authorization as this edition goes to press. Established in 2016, the GEC has exposed major disinformation efforts by Russia and China, including a recent Kremlin-backed campaign in Africa targeting U.S.-funded health programs. Senators Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and John Cornyn (R-Texas) have led bipartisan efforts to extend its mandate through 2031, but the center faces opposition from some Republican lawmakers. Critics accuse the GEC of overreaching and funding entities perceived as politically biased, such as the Global Disinformation Index, which has labeled certain conservative media outlets as high risk. Special Envoy James Rubin, the GEC’s leader, has emphasized the center’s successes, including detailed reports on Russian and Chinese propaganda and agreements with 21 countries to counter disinformation. Rubin acknowledged concerns over past funding decisions and assured lawmakers of stricter nonpartisan guidelines under the proposed reauthorization. The GEC’s closure could weaken U.S. efforts to combat global disinformation. Foreign allies have praised its work, highlighting its influence on security issues in regions like Africa and Eastern Europe. As debates continue, the State Department remains committed to countering foreign disinformation regardless of the center’s fate.
14 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL T his edition, we spotlight the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a nonpartisan organization that provides in-depth analysis of military affairs and national security through its opensource research, conflict maps, and on-the-ground assessments, helping policymakers and the public understand complex global conflicts. ISW offers timely and independent analysis on key security issues such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the evolving threat of ISIS, and Iran’s nuclear policy. The center works to identify strategic risks and opportunities for the United States and its allies. ISW publishes a range of reports, including its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments and Iran Updates, which track battlefield developments and geopolitical shifts. Recent reports include analyses of Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and Iranian responses to international censure. ISW provides all research free to the public. Visit www.understandingwar.org to explore ISW’s comprehensive reports and learn more about its mission. Site of the Month: Institute for the Study of War (ISW) The appearance of a particular site or podcast is for information only and does not constitute an endorsement. Russia and China in Central Asia: Compete, Cooperate, or De-conflict? The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) hosted a panel discussion on Nov. 12 exploring the complex relationship between Russia and China in Central Asia, “Russia and China in Central Asia: Compete, Cooperate, or De-conflict?” Moderated by New Statesman Senior Editor Katie Stallard, the event marked the launch of a CNAS report on the subject. Panelists included Ambassador Donald Lu, assistant secretary of State for South and Central Asia; Andrea KendallTaylor, director of the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS; and Lisa Curtis, director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. The panelists painted a nuanced picture of the region, noting limited cooperation between Russia and China despite overlapping interests. They emphasized the U.S. role in providing economic alternatives and fostering regional stability. Programs like the U.S.-led C5+1 initiative and greater educational exchange were identified as opportunities for deeper American engagement. The discussion concluded with a call for sustained U.S. attention to Central Asia as a geopolitical crossroads, warning that neglecting the region could leave it further exposed to the competing influences of Moscow and Beijing. Listen to the full discussion at http://bit. ly/RC-CNAS. Afghan Lessons Learned in SIGAR Report The head of SIGAR, John Sopko, called for the organization to close its doors by Sept. 30, 2025. Shortly after, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released its 13th, and what could be its last, lessons learned report, “Staffing the Mission: Lessons from the U.S. Reconstruction of Afghanistan,” shedding light on critical personnel shortcomings that plagued U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan over two decades. The report highlights chronic issues in recruiting, training, retaining, and coordinating personnel from the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense (DOD), ultimately undermining the $145 billion U.S. investment in rebuilding Afghanistan’s institutions, security forces, and economy. Frequent staff turnover drained institutional knowledge, while insufficient handovers perpetuated mistakes across civilian and military agencies. The report emphasizes that politically driven timelines hindered long-term planning, preventing the establishment of robust state-building institutions to address Afghanistan’s complex needs effectively. SIGAR also identifies failures in training personnel for the specific challenges of Afghanistan, including inadequate preparation for advising Afghan security forces and understanding local dynamics. SIGAR’s recommendations point to the necessity of systemic reforms to prepare U.S. agencies for future reconstruction efforts. Proposed measures include establishing a Diplomatic Reserve Corps, improving pre-deployment training, enhancing interagency coordination, and instituting mandatory exit memos for personnel. The report also stresses the importance of retaining capabilities like the Security Force Assistance Brigades to ensure readiness for future contingency operations. n This edition of Talking Points was compiled by Mark Parkhomenko.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 15 SPEAKING OUT Robert S. Wang, a retired Foreign Service officer, is a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and was an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service from 2018 to 2023. During a 32-year career with the Department of State, Mr. Wang served overseas in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Singapore, Taiwan, and Beijing, where he was deputy chief of mission from 2011 to 2013. He served as the U.S. senior official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (2013-2015) and retired in 2016. D uring his term in office over the past four years, President Joe Biden highlighted the global struggle between democracies and autocracies and underscored the need for the United States to help defend and strengthen the post–World War II rulesbased liberal international order. For this effort, the administration inaugurated and co-hosted an annual Summit for Democracy with the participation of leaders from up to 100 countries who have made a range of specific commitments to advance human rights and democracy, counter authoritarianism, and fight corruption. At the same time, the United States provided crucial military assistance to Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s invasion and built and strengthened security alliances in Europe and Asia, while increasing worldwide development assistance and taking measures to respond to China’s increasingly aggressive and coercive political, military, and trade policies. In its February 2022 “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” document, the Biden administration specifically called attention to the mounting challenges in the region, particularly citing Beijing’s actions “from the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas. … In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.” Nonetheless, while calling for collective efforts to address these challenges, the strategy states: “Our objective is not to change the PRC [emphasis added] but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.” This phrasing deliberately avoids stating clearly the ultimate goal of getting China, itself, to accept and abide by the values and principles of the rules-based liberal international order, which the United States has worked to promote globally since the end of WWII and to advance with respect to China since establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979. In so doing, the administration appears to be acknowledging the difficulty of achieving this goal (without being accused of seeking “regime change”) while continuing “to manage our competition with the PRC responsibly.” Beijing’s Narrative: Interests vs. Values Meanwhile, Beijing has continued to promote its narrative that the U.S.-China rivalry is primarily a competition of national interests as opposed to values. That is, the United States as a status quo power is seeking to contain and suppress China as a rising power (popularized in the concept of the “Thucydides Trap”). In April 2013, shortly after Xi Jinping assumed power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued an internal communiqué (“Document Nine”) warning that “Western anti-China forces” were seeking to spread Western ideas and values (such Defending Values: The Case for Strategic Clarity BY ROBERT S. WANG Beijing has continued to promote its narrative that the U.S.-China rivalry is primarily a competition of national interests as opposed to values.
16 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL as constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, and freedom of the press) and cultivating so-called “anti- government forces” within China to subvert CCP rule and prevent China’s rise. This was followed by a crackdown against human rights lawyers, media outlets, academics, and other such independent thinkers within China; against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang; and, later, the people of Hong Kong. This Beijing narrative has served to mobilize populist and nationalist anti-U.S. sentiment within China to justify the CCP’s increasingly tight political controls. Abroad, Beijing has also sought to promote the same narrative while utilizing trade and investment ties, e.g., through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as acts of economic coercion intended to expand China’s economic and political influence. To the extent that this narrative prevails, it lends support to those who argue against having to choose between the United States and China, focusing instead on protecting and advancing their countries’ own interests in the context of this geopolitical rivalry. In a series of essays published by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in 2023, for example, scholars from the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries were asked to address the issue of how each of their countries has viewed and responded to U.S.-China geopolitical competition in the region. A summary of these essays concluded that “they all emphasized developmental security and strategic diversification as priorities” to protect and advance their own national interests without reference to issues of human rights and international law. Notably, “none of the papers featured especially prominently the importance of the United States as an economic partner. In contrast, China’s economic initiatives and expanded economic relations with individual states loomed large.” Highlighting the views of these countries, Indonesia’s then President-elect Prabowo Subianto said in an interview with Al Jazeera in May 2024 that his administration would maintain an open foreign policy approach and not be drawn into choosing sides between the United States and China as they compete for global influence. “Our guiding philosophy is to be friends with all countries,” Subianto said. “We invite the U.S., the Japanese, the Koreans, the Europeans. The fact that we are friends with you doesn’t mean we can’t be friends with China, India, Russia.” Defending Values and Interests While cognizant of the difficulty of “changing China” and the need to engage diplomatically with Beijing, I would argue here that it is critical that the United States openly and directly challenge the Beijing narrative by making clear, first to the Chinese people, that our strategic goal has never been to suppress China’s rise but rather to encourage and convince the government in Beijing that it needs to change many of its current policies, which undermine the fundamental values and principles of the rules-based liberal international order from which China has greatly benefited. We need to underscore that the United States and the West have helped China achieve its remarkable rise over the past 50 years with the hope and expectation that it will eventually assume the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in this international order. I certainly believed this to be our goal while I served several tours in China during the past 30 years, working with my colleagues to expand trade and investment relations through China’s eventual accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), facilitating the travel of millions of Chinese students to the United States, and building broad government and people-to-people ties between our two countries. At the same time, we should make explicit to those countries that have chosen not to take sides that they have, in fact, chosen to accept Beijing’s narrative, thus ignoring or even denigrating the values of the liberal international order, implicitly condoning China’s practices and fueling its threat to this order. Although the United States cannot make other countries choose sides, we should at least warn them that unless Beijing changes and abides by the rules and principles of this order, it may eventually pose a threat to their own interests, if those conflict with China’s interests as Beijing further extends its sphere of influence. We have already witnessed this during the past decade in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in the East and South China Seas. As Beijing has significantly expanded its aggressive military and gray-zone activities, both Japan and the Philippines have now become increasingly aware of the dangers of neutrality and are beginning to work with the United States to respond to Beijing’s threats. Similarly, Beijing’s continued support for the DPRK and its nuclear arms program should be a clear warning not only to Korea and others in the region but even beyond the region with the DPRK now sending its own troops to assist Russian forces in Ukraine. While we should continue to counter Beijing’s coercive policies by reshaping
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2025 17 critical supply chains and offering alternative development incentives, i.e., shaping the strategic environment, I believe that we must also get more countries to recognize the serious risks of Beijing’s continued challenge to the values of the rules-based international order and its eventual effect on peace and stability in the region. Finally, we need to point out more broadly that if Beijing does not fundamentally change its policies, it poses an existential threat to the long-term interest of the entire global community as Beijing continues to assist other powerful and aggressive authoritarian states that transgress and violate the rights of other countries and erode the rules-based liberal international order. This threat is becoming increasingly clear today, with China first declaring its “no limits” partnership with Russia at a Xi-Putin summit meeting in Beijing just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and subsequently refusing to impose sanctions on Russia while continuing to provide critical assistance that has allowed Russia to expand its war against Ukraine. In a continued show of defiance, Xi and Putin held three summits in 2024, each time reaffirming their partnership against the United States and the West. In October, Xi traveled to Kazan in western Russia, where Putin hosted a meeting of BRICS, the intergovernmental organization of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates that has now expanded its membership to include Iran. Separately, Xi traveled to France, Serbia, and Hungary last May in an apparent effort to sow division within Europe and weaken U.S.-European ties. As China, Russia, and other autocracies join together to expand their influence, we are facing the very real risk of a return to an even more dangerous “Cold War” that could potentially have devastating consequences for the entire world. The Bottom Line The bottom line of my argument is that the United States itself must adhere to and continue to promote the rulesbased liberal international order. And we must underscore that if Beijing continues to violate the values and principles of this order, China’s continued rise will eventually, directly and indirectly, pose an existential threat to the peace and prosperity of the global community. Understanding this, the United States must be forthright in stating our strategic objective, which is to induce China to change, and we must try to get our likeminded partners and others to understand the seriousness of this challenge. “Not taking sides” is taking sides. This will not be an easy task as Beijing continues to promote its narrative and wield its considerable economic power and influence, especially among those who do not share these values or those who continue to focus solely on their immediate economic interests. Nonetheless, I believe that greater strategic clarity regarding our goal with respect to China is especially critical at this time, because Beijing’s increasingly assertive and expansive policies have begun to raise concerns in the region and around the world. Within China, we must continue to speak up for universal values and contest and dispel the notion that the United States wants to suppress China’s rise or seeks regional hegemony, understanding that it will ultimately be up to the Chinese people themselves to choose their own path forward. n
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