THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 17 SPEAKING OUT John Fer is the planning and coordination officer for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs in Washington, D.C. He joined the State Department Foreign Service in 2009 and has served in New Delhi, Managua, Moscow, Riga, and Tbilisi. He is an Air Force veteran and a returned Peace Corps volunteer (Nepal). He and his wife, Victoria, have two sons. The views expressed are those of the author, not necessarily those of the U.S. government. Cognitive dissonance—the discomfort of holding conflicting thoughts, beliefs, or attitudes, especially during decisions or change—is a powerful force that U.S. government messaging often overlooks. This blind spot is one our adversaries are quick to exploit, as I’ve seen firsthand in my work as a public diplomacy officer. For example, in July 2021, a friend in Tbilisi noted what he saw as U.S. hypocrisy: Washington appeared tougher on Georgia over LGBTQ+ issues than on oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, which President Biden had just visited to address energy concerns. “Would you lay off if we had oil?” my friend quipped. Russia and its allies wasted no time amplifying such perceptions. Less than a year later, Russia’s Orthodox Patriarch claimed the U.S. supported Ukraine so Kyiv could hold Pride parades—a message that resonated in Georgia, a country where at the time 84 percent of the public believed homosexuality was “always wrong.” Domestically, U.S. messaging at the start of the war in Ukraine emphasized sanctions as a tool to pressure Russia into changing its behavior. Yet two years later, reports that Russia’s economy had not only weathered sanctions but was projected to outpace Group of 7 (G7) growth undermined confidence in that strategy. This may have contributed to delays in approving further military aid. Policymaking and its associated messaging often involve inherent inconsistencies, yet we seldom assess the impact of the dissonance these inconsistencies create. Left unmeasured and unchecked, this dissonance risks alienating audiences—and if it happens often enough, we may lose them entirely. This doesn’t mean abandoning our values, but it does mean systematically analyzing how much dissonance our messages create and how long specific audiences can tolerate it. By recognizing cognitive dissonance as a fundamental part of communication and assessing its effects before, during, and after messaging, we can mitigate its harm and better advance U.S. strategic objectives. This requires a deliberate acknowledgment that prolonged exposure to dissonance erodes trust—and once trust is lost, it is nearly impossible to regain. A Hardwired Phenomenon While not unique to diplomacy, cognitive dissonance in our field provides a powerful lens to examine how professionals confront and reduce this tension. Measuring and Mitigating Cognitive Dissonance in Public Diplomacy BY JOHN FER Cognitive dissonance is a hardwired phenomenon we ignore at our own risk. Leon Festinger, who pioneered the concept at Stanford in 1958, wrote: “Just as hunger leads to activity aimed at hunger reduction, cognitive dissonance leads to activity aimed at dissonance reduction.” Physiologically, we are wired to seek consonance, the opposite of dissonance. Even as infants, we instinctively seek harmony when confronted with discordant sounds. At every level, humans are drawn toward coherence. Just as immune cells, when reacting to inflammation, release cytokines to rally defenses, the brain works to restore cognitive balance by adjusting beliefs, behaviors, or justifications. If resolved, the system calms; if not, chronic stress can fuel anxiety, depression, or unhealthy coping. Our challenge as diplomats is to reflect that instinct toward coherence and to better consider our audiences in the stories we tell the world. As public diplomacy practitioners, we must think about how our messaging affects foreign audiences. Are we minimizing the dissonance our narratives create—or deepening it? And at the very least, are we measuring it? A Historical Perspective In the 1960s, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara led a wave of technocratic governance, applying quantitative methods to major institutions—most infamously, the Vietnam War. By 1995 he admitted in his memoir, “We were
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