PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 HONORING EXCELLENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT LTG: “THE PEOPLE’S AMBASSADOR” ABOVE AND BEYOND PARTISANSHIP FINDING YOUR NEXT CAREER
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 3 January-February 2026 Volume 103, No. 1 HONORING EXCELLENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT FOCUS ON AFSA AWARDS 28 2025 Awards for Constructive Dissent 32 2025 Posthumous Awards for Dissent 35 2025 Awards for Exemplary Performance 45 2025 Award for Foreign Service Champions 20 28 20 The People’s Ambassador—A Conversation with Linda Thomas-Greenfield 2025 Award for Lifetime Contributions to American Diplomacy 32 45 35
4 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 61 2025 AFSA Awards Celebrate Diplomatic Excellence 61 AFSA Conducts Global Survey on the State of the U.S. Foreign Service 62 State VP Voice—Breaking State? 63 U SAID VP Voice—The Road to 2026 64 R etiree VP Voice—A Growing Alumni Network 64 A FSA Essay Contest Goes Live 65 AFSA Dues Increase for 2026 65 AFSA Governing Board Meeting— October 15, 2025 65 AFSA Treasurer’s Report 66 AFSA Federal and State Tax Guides Now Online 69 Government Shutdown Harms Diplomacy 70 S ervice and Sacrifice: Memorial Project Expands Online 70 AFSA Welcomes Newest FS Orientation Class 73 A FSA Honors 2025 Sinclaire Language Award Recipients 73 A FSA Launches Lunchtime Listening Sessions 73 A FSA Hosts MSPB-Focused Webinars 74 A Fond Farewell to an AFSA Unsung Hero: James Yorke AFSA NEWS THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF AFSA ON THE COVER: Design by Caryn Suko Smith/Driven by Design. Photos courtesy of the award winners. PERSPECTIVES 5 President’s Views Above and Beyond Partisanship By John “Dink” Dinkelman 7 Letter from the Editor Looking to the Year Ahead By Shawn Dorman 14 Speaking Out State’s Opportunity Ahead for Global Health By Troy Fitrell and Jamie Bay Nishi 17 Speaking Out Measuring and Mitigating Cognitive Dissonance in Public Diplomacy By John Fer 93 Reflections Logrolling in Rural Thailand By Dick Virden 94 Local Lens Datong, China By Julia Wohlers FEATURES 47 Service Disrupted: The Costs of the Government Shutdown 49 Like Lightning from a Clear Sky: Watching Guerrillas Recruit in Peru By Stephen G. McFarland FS KNOW-HOW 54 Turning Your Favorite FS Skills into Your Next Career By Eileen Smith OFF-ROAD WITH THE FOREIGN SERVICE 57 A First-Tour Foray into Eastern Türkiye By Noah E. Rose SUMMER CAMPS SUPPLEMENT 75 International Summer Camps Take an American Tradition Overseas By Melissa Mathews DEPARTMENTS 8 Letters 9 Talking Points 79 In Memory 86 Books MARKETPLACE 89 Real Estate 91 Classifieds 92 Index to Advertisers 94 75
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 5 Above and Beyond Partisanship BY JOHN “DINK” DINKELMAN John “Dink” Dinkelman is the president of the American Foreign Service Association. PRESIDENT’S VIEWS Meeting a deadline more than six weeks before publication is no easy task, and writing this column in late November reminds me why I never liked playing the stock market—I’m terrible at predicting the future. Given the “dynamic” nature of the past six weeks, I’m hesitant to even try to picture conditions in the new year. While I wish that by January the “Ship of State” would begin to steady itself, I hold out little hope that things will improve for the Foreign Service anytime soon. I reluctantly must conclude that we have no choice but to hunker down for the foreseeable future—both individually and collectively. The sad truth is that in 2025 Washington, any criticism is seen as opposition and any opponent is treated as an enemy. Dissent is not welcome and can lead to retribution. Such an environment does not bode well for Foreign Service professionals, whose greatest “value added” has historically been to point out unwelcome truths not easily seen from inside the Beltway; to play “devil’s advocate” and question conventional wisdom; and even to advocate for (and, when necessary, dissent from) contemplated courses of action. The year 2025 has turned into a “bear market” for diplomacy, and the administration is simply not buying our products. Nevertheless, I’m playing the long game on the investment in our profession and encourage you not to issue a “sell order” on diplomacy, at least not just yet. In preparation for a continued disruptive period for our nation and profession over the coming year, I want to reaffirm AFSA’s intention to maintain active and vociferous engagement on the broad spectrum of issues affecting the Foreign Service, while remaining nonpartisan. (See https://bit.ly/AFSA-statement.) I will do my best to ensure that such engagement is constructive and open, and hope that it will be received that way. For decades, AFSA worked directly with agency leadership to advocate for the Foreign Service. As those channels are now largely closed, we are adapting to this new reality and will be taking more aggressive public positions when necessary to register concerns and draw attention to problems confronting the Service. AFSA will be calling out executive overreach, judicial failures, and legislative inaction when they threaten the safety of FS families, undermine working conditions, or compromise our ability to serve the national interest. This isn’t about politics. It’s about protecting the people who carry out U.S. foreign policy and ensuring they can do their jobs effectively. We will also address the increasingly divisive tone of discourse within the Foreign Service, which now mirrors the tone that has infected much of our nation’s public exchanges. How can we reasonably expect foreign interlocutors to see us as credible diplomats representing our nation when the tone of public interaction between and among our own ranks is anything but diplomatic? AFSA looks forward to partnering with like-minded elements within the foreign affairs community to (re)build dialogue among our ranks. This is more than just advocating for professional courtesies; it is a matter of whether we can continue to constructively apply the very skills for which we were hired. We must demonstrate these skills for the next generation entering the Foreign Service, who view the present situation as the norm. They need to see a workplace where our differences—be they points of view, educational or socioeconomic backgrounds, geographic origins, race, gender, or even political opinions—create a stronger whole, enabling the effective implementation of our nation’s foreign policy. We must provide space for all. Overseas, our children play together and attend the same schools, our spouses socialize together, and we live cheek to jowl in government housing, often in adverse conditions. We must not allow external forces of partisanship to damage our community or diminish the professionalism that underpins our work for the American people. Watch for more of this discussion— from me and others—on these pages in the coming year. Please add your voice by submitting a letter or article to the Journal (journal@afsa.org). I wish you all nothing but the best in 2026. May the year see a return to civility—and diplomacy. n
6 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL www.sfiprogram.org SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE SFI-01268 Certified Sourcing Editor in Chief, Director of Publications Shawn Dorman: dorman@afsa.org Deputy Editor Donna Gorman: gorman@afsa.org Senior Editor Susan Brady Maitra: maitra@afsa.org Managing Editor Kathryn Owens: owens@afsa.org Associate Editor Mark Parkhomenko: parkhomenko@afsa.org Business Development Manager— Advertising and Circulation Molly Long: long@afsa.org Art Director Caryn Suko Smith Editorial Board Lynette Behnke, Co-Chair Hon. Jennifer Z. Galt, Co-Chair hannah draper, Gov. Bd. Liaison Kelly Adams-Smith Ben East Mathew Hagengruber Steven Hendrix Katherine Ntiamoah Peter Reams Dan Spokojny Lisa Nuch Venbrux THE MAGAZINE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROFESSIONALS The Foreign Service Journal (ISSN 0146-3543), 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037-2990 is published bimonthly by the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), a private, nonprofit organization. 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Michael Kirby: kirby@afsa.org Julie Nutter: nutter@afsa.org STAFF Executive Director Ásgeir Sigfússon: sigfusson@afsa.org Executive Assistant to the President Jahari Fraser: fraser@afsa.org Office Coordinator Therese Thomas: therese@afsa.org PROFESSIONAL POLICY ISSUES AND ADVOCACY Director of Professional Policy Issues Lisa Heller: heller@afsa.org Director of Advocacy Kim Sullivan: sullivan@afsa.org Advocacy and Policy Manager Sean O’Gorman: ogorman@afsa.org FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION Director, HR and Operations Cory Nishi: cnishi@afsa.org Controller Kalpna Srimal: srimal@afsa.org Member Accounts Specialist Ana Lopez: lopez@afsa.org IT and Infrastructure Coordinator Aleksandar “Pav” Pavlovich: pavlovich@afsa.org COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH Director of Communications and Outreach Nikki Gamer: gamer@afsa.org Deputy Director of Communications and Outreach Nadja Ruzica: ruzica@afsa.org Online Communications Manager Jeff Lau: lau@afsa.org Communications and Marketing Manager Hannah Harari: harari@afsa.org MEMBERSHIP Director, Programs and Member Engagement Christine Miele: miele@afsa.org Membership Operations Coordinator Mouna Koubaa: koubaa@afsa.org Counselor for Retirees and Alumni Brian Himmelsteib: himmelsteib@afsa.org Manager, Membership and Events Glenn Stanton: stanton@afsa.org Program Coordinator Indigo Stegner: stegner@afsa.org OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL General Counsel Sharon Papp: papp@afsa.org Deputy General Counsel Raeka Safai: safai@afsa.org Senior Staff Attorneys Zlatana Badrich: badrich@afsa.org Neera Parikh: parikh@afsa.org Labor Management Counselor Colleen Fallon-Lenaghan: colleen@afsa.org Labor Management Coordinator Patrick Bradley: bradley@afsa.org Senior Grievance Counselor Heather Townsend: townsend@afsa.org Grievance Counselor Ed White: white@afsa.org Attorney Adviser Erin Kate Brady: brady@afsa.org FOREIGN SERVICE CONTACTS www.afsa.org
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 7 Shawn Dorman is the editor of The Foreign Service Journal. Looking to the Year Ahead BY SHAWN DORMAN LETTER FROM THE EDITOR Welcome to the new year. Despite all the challenges facing AFSA and its members, the entire FS community, and the country, we look ahead to 2026 with hope and resolve. The value of the Foreign Service is in its people, on the front lines of diplomacy around the world 24/7. Members of the Foreign Service swear an oath to the Constitution and are duty-bound to speak honestly and dissent (within the system) when necessary. But today, the freedom to provide honest input and constructive dissent is threatened. If we lose the space for principled dissent and erode the protections that allow FS members to speak truth to power, we will lose not only good policy—we will lose the very character of the Service. AFSA’s unique awards program has been honoring dissent from within the system for more than 50 years. In this edition, we are delighted to celebrate the Foreign Service members and champions who received the 2025 AFSA awards, not only for constructive dissent, but also for outstanding performance and lifetime contributions to American diplomacy. May these stories, beginning with the interview with Lifetime Contributions recipient Ambassador Linda ThomasGreenfield, serve as an antidote to the barrage of disturbing news that will likely continue into 2026. While the FSJ is in leaner times, publishing six bimonthly editions this year with a reduction in staff time, we will home in on what matters most to the foreign affairs community at this time. We will continue to publish strong voices on big topics, because that’s what the Journal does. One primary issue of concern is the politicization of the Foreign Service. When the administration prioritizes “loyalty” and “fidelity” above all else, publicly goes after members of one political party, and denigrates public service and the federal workforce, this is not business as usual. See the AFSA president’s column, “Above and Beyond Partisanship,” for the latest on how AFSA is engaging on this. AFSA’s “State of the Foreign Service” survey and resulting report, “At the Breaking Point,” illuminate a Service in crisis. See State VP Ro Nepal’s column and Director of Professional Policy Issues Lisa Heller’s article in AFSA News for more. As we go to press in mid-December, the survey report—released December 3 —is still getting attention and inspiring reporting and responses in The New York Times, Axios, NPR, CNN, and elsewhere. May this attention raise awareness of the realities facing federal employees in 2026 and spur action to protect the professional, nonpartisan Foreign Service. This edition includes two Speaking Out articles. Troy Fitrell and Jamie Bay Nishi outline “State’s Opportunity Ahead for Global Health,” and John Fer writes on “Measuring and Mitigating Cognitive Dissonance in Public Diplomacy.” In this month’s Service Disrupted collection, find FS voices on “The Costs of the Government Shutdown,” for the record. And Ambassador Stephen McFarland illustrates the value of understanding your enemy in his feature story, “Like Lightning from a Clear Sky: Watching Guerrillas Recruit in Peru.” In FS Know-How, Eileen Smith offers tips and resources on “Turning Your Favorite FS Skills into Your Next Career.” FSO Noah Rose takes us “Off-Road with the Foreign Service: A First-Tour Foray into Eastern Türkiye.” For those of you thinking ahead to summer, Melissa Mathews offers the inside scoop on summer camps abroad in “International Summer Camps Take an American Tradition Overseas.” In Reflections, Dick Virden tells his story of “Logrolling in Rural Thailand.” And in the Local Lens, FSO Julia Wohlers shares a Lunar New Year dance from Datong, China. We want to hear from you. Please consider writing for the Journal in 2026. Send a letter to the editor (journal@ afsa.org). Review the Focus topics for inspiration (see box) or send a pitch or article on another relevant topic. Stay in touch and be well. n March-April Nuclear Diplomacy May-June AI, Tech, and Diplomacy July-August Celebrating 250: The U.S. in the World September-October USAID: One Year Later November-December FS Writing and Publishing 2026 Focus Topics
8 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL LETTERS A Love Letter to the FSJ AFSA is the voice—the independent voice—of the Foreign Service. With the cutback in The Foreign Service Journal— AFSA’s flagship publication—to six issues a year, it is worth remembering what the Journal is and does, and why we need it. The Journal keeps alive the intellectual and emotional connection that Foreign Service members, past and present, have to the Service and to each other. Now, when the State Department and the president are engaged in a campaign to destroy the apolitical Service, the Journal is a trail guide and user manual for maligned and abused Foreign Service members seeking redress or rescue. The Journal is especially adapted to long-form articles, essays, and opinion pieces. It is a unique source for the preservation of a historical record that is at risk of being lost, distorted, or falsified. The Service as it existed for 100 years is gone and will not return. What will rise in its place? We can look to the Journal as the forum and platform for ideas from the people who know the Service best. The Journal is our present, our past, and our future. I can’t wait to see the next issue. Harry Kopp FSO, retired Baltimore, Maryland Peacebuilding Architecture The November-December FSJ is masterful. It comes across as the professional journal it has always been, never whiny or complaining, just the facts ma’am. It’s a great reminder for all of us of what our legacy is and what we stand to lose if we continue down the current path. I loved Dink’s opening remarks in President’s Views, and I can’t put the rest of the magazine down. Keep it up. I found John Mongan’s article on the closing of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), “Don’t Let Stabilization Expertise Go,” particularly timely and helpful (although I would leave out the offer to help with the occupation of Panama and Greenland, some bad raisins need to simply fall off the vine). Mongan raises two (relatively) minor issues and one (very) major issue. The loss of expertise and learning when bureaus, agencies, and institutes are eliminated is tragically short-sighted. Forty years of peacebuilding experience was lost when the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) was taken down by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and 60 years of experience lost with the elimination of USAID. CSO may be able to save some of its research, lessons learned, and analysis as some functions gravitate elsewhere, but the loss is truly medieval. A second issue is functional versus regional bureaus. This administration is partial to regional bureaus, but anyone who has worked in both a regional and functional bureau recognizes why both are needed. Regional bureaus are trains; functional bureaus are stations. The train just wants to get from point A to point B, heaving coal into the boiler as fast as muscle and shovel permit. At the station, meanwhile, the more technical and specialized work can be done, such that when the train pulls into the station it can get repaired, adjust course, receive guidance on track conditions. Over the decades this relationship has worked reasonably well. CSO has been caught up in this scrum, as with so much of government reorg today, driven by individuals who have had no real touch with what they are “reforming” and are rewarded not by what they build but by what they tear down. But the major issue is the U.S. architecture for peacebuilding and stabilization. Four key organizations were working this: CSO, USAID, the International Organizations Bureau coordinating UN operations, and USIP. The number of places in the world where threats of force and high-level diplomacy are being used to bring about peace is noteworthy, and President Trump deserves high marks for much of it. But in the cases I am most familiar with, the real issue now is not whether the U.S. can drive a lasting bargain between contending sides (as in Gaza), intimidate an oppressive government to allow a democratic transition (as in Venezuela), or push back gangs and restore order with a multinational force (as in Haiti). Rather, success will require the much harder and long-term work of ensuring that initial agreement leads directly to a governing arrangement that allows the country to cohere and deliver on the key issues of inclusive governance, security, justice, and public services. Only this will ultimately secure the peace. This is the work CSO, USAID, and USIP quietly did behind the scenes, anchoring the long-term peace that so often breaks down at the end of forced settlements. There is no one else really staged to pick it up. Keith Mines Senior FSO, retired Washington, D.C. n
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 9 TALKING POINTS Former Senior Diplomats Speak Out for Foreign Students A coalition of more than 80 former senior State Department officials and ambassadors has issued a public letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau expressing “dismay” over recent U.S. government actions targeting foreign students and faculty for their speech, academic work, and lawful protest activity. The letter, dated November 17, 2025, includes signatories who served in both Democratic and Republican administrations, among them Ambassadors Wendy Sherman, Thomas Shannon, Eric Rubin, Aurelia Brazeal, and Barbara Bodine. The group argues that visa revocations, arrests, and deportations based on protected expression represent a sharp break with long-standing U.S. commitments to free speech and undermine America’s global reputation as a center for open discourse and higher education. Citing economic, academic, and diplomatic consequences, the signatories urged State to “halt the targeting of foreign students and faculty” and restore U.S. leadership on democratic values. The full letter, including all signatories, is available at https://bit.ly/ diplomat-letter. Administration Adds Roadblocks to Entry Secretary of State Marco Rubio has instructed U.S. diplomats to consider obesity and a wide range of chronic health conditions as grounds for denying U.S. visas, expanding the administration’s interpretation of the “public charge” rule to an unprecedented degree. The November 6, 2025, cable, first reported by KFF Health News and later verified by The Washington Post and Politico, directs consular officers to weigh conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, cancer, metabolic disorders, and mental health conditions when determining whether an applicant might impose future financial burdens on U.S. taxpayers. The guidance, drafted by political leadership and issued without the normal review process, marks a significant expansion in consular discretion. White House and State Department spokespeople framed the directive as part of a broader effort to “put Americans first” and more aggressively enforce longstanding statutory authority to deny visas to those who may require publicly funded care. Immigration attorneys, however, described the shift as sweeping, noting that many of the listed conditions have never been treated as disqualifying in their own right. Diplomats who received the cable said the new framework gives officers “more reasons not to issue a visa,” coming at a time when the administration is tightening both legal and illegal immigration pathways and pushing for historically high deportation targets. The change comes amid a series of other restrictive measures. The administration has begun implementing its September 2025 proclamation imposing a $100,000 fee on many H-1B petitions, an action now the subject of multiple federal lawsuits. Employers must pay the fee before filing appeals, and exceptions are available only under what the Department of Homeland Security has called “extraordinarily rare” circumstances. Immigration advocates warn that the cost will effectively cut off access to the H-1B program for many U.S. employers, particularly in medicine, research, and education, while discouraging recruitment of high-skilled workers who traditionally bolster the U.S. economy. Similarly, the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), a nongovernmental organization (NGO), warned in an October 20, 2025, analysis that the administration’s emerging posture toward refugees and asylum seekers marks a fundamental break from decades of bipartisan policy. At a UN General Assembly side event, senior State Department officials including Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau outlined principles that sharply narrow asylum eligibility, emphasize national sovereignty, and reframe refugee status as explicitly temporary, all while asserting widespread “abuse” of the system without supporting evidence. USCRI cautioned that the approach departs from long-standing U.S. commitments under the Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the Refugee Act of 1980, and risks weakening global norms at a time of unprecedented displacement. More than 260 NGOs have joined USCRI in urging UN member states to reaffirm refugee protections. Significantly, on November 28, 2025, following the shooting of two National Guard members by an Afghan asylee, the Trump administration announced a pause on all asylum decisions and a freeze on the Special Immigrant Visa program for Afghans who assisted the U.S. during the war in Afghanistan. These developments paint a picture of a U.S. immigration landscape in which the federal government is steadily and deliberately closing its doors. Talking Points offers a snapshot of recent developments affecting the Foreign Service. The following items were finalized for publication on December 12, 2025.
10 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL In a letter accompanying the strategy, Secretary of State Marco Rubio wrote that the administration must “keep what is good about our health foreign assistance programs while rapidly fixing what is broken.” He argued that decades of U.S. investment have saved millions of lives yet also created “inefficiency, waste, and dependency.” The document calls for shifting major programs into bilateral government-togovernment agreements, with the goal of transitioning many countries toward greater self-reliance and national ownerRelease of “America First Global Health Strategy” After nine months of cuts to global health programs, the Trump administration has released its first comprehensive blueprint for the future of U.S. foreign assistance in the sector. “America First Global Health Strategy,” a 35-page document issued by the State Department in September 2025, lays out a dramatic shift in how the United States intends to deliver global health support, negotiate with partner governments, and position U.S. engagement abroad. I took an oath to this country. This is a lifetime oath to do the right thing and to obey the Constitution and to enforce the Constitution. And no threats and intimidation by the president are ever going to stop me from carrying out that oath. —Representative (D-Colo.) and former Army Ranger Jason Crow on NPR on November 21, 2025, responding to President Trump’s threat to have him and five other members of Congress executed for their role in creating a video reminding military members that they are required to refuse unlawful orders. Contemporary Quote ship. It also proposes consolidating U.S. global health efforts by moving away from disease-specific initiatives and integrating data systems, supply chains, and service delivery. The strategy states that funding for frontline health workers and essential medical commodities will be maintained, while technical assistance and overhead costs will be significantly reduced. It also positions global health engagement as a means of strengthening bilateral relationships and expanding international markets for U.S. medical and pharmaceutical products. The department aims to complete most bilateral agreements by the end of 2025 and begin implementation in April 2026. Global health experts have raised concerns about the strategy, including Stanford researchers Ana Maria Craw- ford and Michele Barry, who argue that the plan focuses only on how much is spent and not on health outcomes. They note that despite high expenditures, Site of the Month: The Steady State The appearance of a particular site or podcast is for information only and does not constitute an endorsement. This month, we highlight The Steady State, an organization of more than 340 former U.S. national security professionals spanning intelligence, defense, diplomacy, and homeland security who have united around a simple mandate: defend the U.S. Constitution over partisan politics. Founded in 2016 amid growing concern about authoritarian drift in U.S. governance, the group continues to publish sober, expert-driven analysis on national security, rule of law, and democratic resilience. Their membership includes former senior officials from across the national security community, and their work ranges from legal filings and congressional letters to public statements, open letters, and policy commentary. The Steady State recently released “Accelerating Authoritarian Dynamics: Assessment of Democratic Decline,” a sweeping, intelligence-style analysis authored by former U.S. intelligence officers. Drawing on open-source indicators and structured analytic tradecraft, the report concludes that the United States is on a trajectory toward “competitive authoritarianism,” where democratic institutions persist in form but are increasingly manipulated to entrench executive power. The document examines trends including executive overreach, judicial erosion, politicization of the Civil Service and intelligence community, weakening congressional oversight, and sustained assaults on public trust and civil society. With its steady stream of resources, the organization has become a wellspring for readers seeking principled, factbased assessments during a period of accelerating institutional strain. Visit https://thesteadystate.org/ for more.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 11 A Life of Challenge and Adventure 50 Years Ago Generalizing from the 220 answers received and from the statistical analysis reported above, it seems that Foreign Service wives as a group are hardy and self-sufficient with a positive orientation toward the Foreign Service way of life. Many enjoy the life just because it is adventurous and challenging. As some of them expressed it, “There is no substitute for being there, smelling the smells, hearing the sounds …” —Katharine Gratwick Baker in “Mobility and Foreign Service Wives” in the February 1976 edition of The Foreign Service Journal. the U.S. health system underperforms on life expectancy and maternal mortality, which proves that financial outlays alone do not produce strong outcomes. Critics warn that the strategy’s shift to bilateral agreements comes amid deep disruptions caused by earlier aid cuts and the dismantling of USAID. Many NGOs have already reduced or closed programs, raising doubts about whether health ministries alone can maintain services. As one senior aid worker told CNN, activities now labeled “overhead” are often “the things that make the essential functions work.” Analysts also note the strategy’s narrow focus on a limited set of diseases and its more transactional posture. Concerns include long-term data-sharing requirements that may advantage U.S. industry and the risk that poorer countries will struggle to meet compact terms. One official told CNN the approach “feels like we’re leaning into” the kind of highly transactional aid model the United States has historically criticized abroad. U.S. Designates European Leftist Groups as Terrorist Organizations The Trump administration has designated four far-left European groups as “specially designated global terrorists,” with plans to formally add them to the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list later this month. U.S. officials accuse members of the groups—Antifa Ost (Germany), the Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (Italy), Armed Proletarian Justice (Greece), and Revolutionary Class Self-Defense (Greece)—of fomenting violent attacks across Europe. The move is part of what the State Department described as a global campaign to target “antifa [anti-fascist] groups across the globe.” Jason Blazakis, the former head of the State Department office that oversees FTO designations, noted that the four groups “wouldn’t really typically merit an FTO designation because they hadn’t been responsible for fatalities,” adding that they lack the capability associated with organizations such as ISIS or al-Qaida. The designations carry sanctions risk for U.S. individuals or entities that engage with the groups. But analysts say the move appears aimed less at European militancy than at domestic politics. “The administration has really been interested lately in identifying domestic terrorists in connection with antifa,” NPR’s Odette Yousef reported, even though antifa in the United States is a decentralized movement without formal leadership. As journalist Patrick Strickland observed, ties between U.S. and European anti-fascist groups amount mostly to “putting out a statement in solidarity,” far from the “material support” required for terrorism prosecutions. Rubio Agrees to Return MS-13 Informants to El Salvador An October 2025 Washington Post investigation reveals that Secretary of State Marco Rubio agreed to return nine MS-13 leaders in U.S. custody, including several protected informants, to El Salvador as part of a deal to secure access to the country’s CECOT (Centro de Confinamineto del Terrorismo, or Terrorism Confinement Center) megaprison for U.S. deportation operations. In an interview with NPR, Washington Post reporter John Hudson noted that “a core part of an informant relationship is that the United States says … we’re not going to turn around and send you to the very government that you are giving us information about.” Reneging on that protection, he added, risks undermining years of U.S. law-enforcement work and damaging the government’s ability to recruit future informants. El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele sought custody of the nine men in part because several had provided information about alleged secret dealings between his administration and MS-13. For the Trump administration, the agreement helped facilitate the transfer of hundreds of Venezuelan migrants through El Salvador as part of its broader deportation strategy. As of December 1, 2025, only one of the nine men had been returned to El Salvador, with legal challenges preventing additional transfers. A federal judge has questioned the government’s lack of transparency around the agreement and raised concerns about potential torture or disappearance if the remaining detainees are deported.
12 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Analysts caution that while the White House sought to emphasize economic and security cooperation, several key Saudi priorities, such as a nuclear cooperation agreement, remain unresolved, and congressional skepticism toward MBS persists across party lines. COP30 Concludes with Divisions Over Fossil Fuels The 2025 United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP30), held in Belém, Brazil, on November 10–21, 2025, ended with one of the most divisive conclusions in the conference’s three-decade history. Framed as a summit of implementation, the meeting focused on translating existing climate commitments into concrete action. But the final agreement, made up of 29 formal decisions known as the Belém Package, exposed stark fractures over the future of global climate governance. The Trump administration did not participate in the summit. California Governor Gavin Newsom emerged as the highest-ranking U.S. official at COP30, using the platform to sharply criticize President Donald Trump’s absence and his administration’s rollback of climate policies. Newsom condemned newly reported plans to open California’s coastline to oil and gas drilling, saying such efforts would be “dead on arrival.” Leading an alternate U.S. delegation of more than 100 state and local officials, Newsom argued that Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and support for expanded fossil fuel production undermine both U.S. credibility and economic competitiveness, handing a strategic advantage to China in clean-energy manufacturing. He also urged subnational leaders to “assert ourselves” in the vacuum left by the federal government, viewing local action as essential to maintaining U.S. climate leadership. Brazil’s presidency secured a deal that triples adaptation finance by 2035, adopts 59 global indicators to measure progress under the Global Goal on Adaptation, launches a Global Implementation Accelerator for NDC (nationally determined contributions) delivery, and establishes a new Just Transition Mechanism to support countries facing social and economic risks from decarbonization. COP30 also unveiled major forest and maritime initiatives. Yet divisions over fossil fuels dominated the summit. More than 80 delegates, including those from Colombia, Panama, Uruguay, and the European Trump Welcomes Saudi Crown Prince President Donald Trump hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) at the White House on November 18, 2025, offering an elaborate welcome that included a military flyover, red-carpet ceremony, and an evening black-tie dinner attended by U.S. business leaders. It was MBS’ first visit to Washington since the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. President Trump announced that the United States would proceed with the potential sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia and confirmed Riyadh’s new designation as a major non-NATO ally. U.S. officials also highlighted new cooperation on AI infrastructure, civil nuclear energy, and the release of advanced Nvidia chips to Saudi firms. MBS, for his part, pledged to increase planned Saudi investments in the United States from $600 billion toward $1 trillion—though some critics pointed to the fact that the country’s entire GDP is just $1.24 trillion. According to Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Program, many of the deals touted during the trip are preliminary or symbolic, with significant details still to be negotiated. Analysts note that the most tangible outcome for MBS may be reputational: a highly visible return to the White House after years of strained ties, complete with presidential praise and a public reaffirmation of the U.S.-Saudi partnership. Human rights concerns remained a point of tension, with reporters pressing both leaders on Khashoggi’s killing and broader rights issues documented in the State Department’s 2024 country report. Trump defended the crown prince and criticized media questioning, while MBS called the journalist’s death “painful” and “a huge mistake.” As we go to press, the Trump administration released its new National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 4, 2025, sharply redefining U.S. foreign policy and elevating the Western Hemisphere as Washington’s top priority in what it terms a “Trump Corollary” to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. Early analysis from experts at the nonpartisan Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings suggests that the NSS abandons the previous framework of “great-power competition” with China and Russia, instead casting economics as the “ultimate stakes” and treating China primarily as an economic competitor. Initial criticism indicates the strategy is more ideological manifesto than road map and lacks the focus on a rules-based international order contained in past NSS documents. The full strategy document is available at https://bit.ly/25NSS. NSS: A Radical Reordering of U.S. Strategy
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 13 sector saw notable advances: new green shipping corridors, accelerated methanolfueled fleet deployment, commitments to reduce black carbon, and the launch of an Oceans Task Force integrating marine solutions into national climate plans. Looking ahead, parties agreed that COP31 will be hosted by Türkiye in Antalya, with Australia assuming the presidency. COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago said Belém must be remembered not as an endpoint but as “the beginning of a decade of turning the game,” even as many participants left uncertain about the path forward. n This issue of Talking Points was compiled by Mark Parkhomenko. Sierra Leone criticized newly approved adaptation indicators as “unclear” and “unmeasurable,” and the EU, cornered after agreeing to extend the finance tripling target to 2035, admitted it had achieved little on mitigation ambition. Observers pointed to the widening geopolitical divides and growing doubts about the COP model itself. Amid tense all-night negotiations, questions resurfaced about whether a consensus-based process can still deliver meaningful progress in a rapidly warming world. Trade also emerged for the first time as a major negotiating theme, prompting COP30 to launch a new dialogue on aligning climate and trade policies ahead of future talks. Despite the tensions, the maritime Union (EU), pressed for a binding global road map to transition away from coal, oil, and gas. Major oil-producing states, supported tacitly by China and more directly by Russia and Saudi Arabia, blocked any such language. With talks teetering on collapse, Brazil introduced voluntary side texts on fossil fuel transition and deforestation, issued by the presidency rather than adopted by all parties, leaving them politically symbolic but legally uncertain. The outcome left many negotiators frustrated. Colombia warned that a deal without fossil-fuel language “could not be supported,” while UN Secretary-General António Guterres cautioned that “the gap between where we are and what science demands remains dangerously wide.”
14 JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL SPEAKING OUT Troy Fitrell retired in September 2025 after 30 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. He led the Bureau of African Affairs through the changes reflected in this article and earlier served as ambassador to the Republic of Guinea, in addition to assignments in Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Jamie Bay Nishi is the chief executive officer of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, the largest international scientific organization of experts dedicated to reducing the worldwide burden of tropical infectious diseases and improving global health. As a Foreign Service dependent, she grew up in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, and Germany between postings back to Washington, D.C. A “tumultuous” year doesn’t begin to describe the impact on lives, livelihoods, and global health initiatives of the dismantling of USAID, the pulling back from multilateral partnerships, and budget cuts across public health and research. The global health community’s cry that these disruptions have cost lives and set back health initiatives for years is not an understatement: We cannot easily replace USAID’s expertise or that of the global health implementer community. It is not enough to simply shift the burden onto fragile countries themselves or pass the responsibility solely to international and regional organizations. If we cannot do things as we did, we must plan to conduct health diplomacy in a new way. Even with decreased U.S. funding, the State Department must protect and advance the gains already achieved in global health while implementing the administration’s policies. State’s Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy recently released its strategy for the new era of U.S. contributions to global health programming, which is intended to empower partner country governments, improve health outcomes, and promote durability and self-reliance in local health systems while ensuring U.S. health security. We appreciate our colleagues’ efforts, noting—as they did on the release of the strategy—that there is much left to do to implement the broad strategic approach. We hope our suggestions in this piece will complement the strategy and keep us all directed toward better global health outcomes. An Opportunity for Health Diplomacy Going forward, chiefs of mission and their country teams will need greater understanding of the complexities of health challenges in the countries where they serve as they inherit the responsibility to engage continually on health, a task previously owned by USAID counterparts. They must advance bilateral conversations with significantly diminished resident expertise. Further, the State Department will need to quickly acquire the know-how for contract and grant authority to fill gaps that are deemed priorities in terms of U.S. strategic interests. There is appropriate concern within the global health community about State Department generalists’ ability to absorb global health programmatic activities, but there is a difference between implementing health programming and integrating global health into the overall conduct of diplomacy. The State Department will not be able to advance its work without engaging technical health expertise, but at the same time the department has a fresh opportunity to collaborate with partner countries to consider health activities within a broader socioeconomic context. Within the health arena, State can now reshape activities formerly undertaken by USAID’s Global Health Bureau and consider health impact outside siloed efforts run largely through diseasespecific vertical programs. Integrated Approaches vs. Silos For years, and across political administrations, global health stakeholders have noted the need for integrated approaches to delivering health outcomes but often felt constrained by longestablished programs aligned to specific appropriated funding lines. Traditionally, there were eight health-area silos: HIV/AIDS, largely facilitated through PEPFAR; the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), jointly State’s Opportunity Ahead for Global Health BY TROY FITRELL AND JAMIE BAY NISHI
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2026 15 facilitated through USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Tuberculosis; Maternal and Child Health (MCH); Family Planning/Reproductive Health; Nutrition; Neglected Tropical Diseases; and Global Health Security. But today, if a country indicates that they are seeing better HIV outcomes thanks to decades of PEPFAR support, and their top concerns have shifted to maternal health and malaria, there is an opportunity to turn to other areas of U.S. expertise in which a ministry could most use support. A reframed approach will also open new doors to more patient-centered approaches to health and programmatic efficiencies. If a pregnant woman presents at a clinic feeling ill, instead of offering a diagnostic for one disease, testing could be offered for a suite of diseases or health concerns, to reach a proper diagnosis more efficiently. Though this example appears simplistic, everyone involved in health diplomacy knows such situations are commonplace. Chiefs of mission and their teams talk to many officials across government, and this interaction will benefit from engaging outside the often-siloed development assistance health dialogues. Shifting from health area verticals to bilateral cross-cutting health programming is a big challenge, but it offers an opportunity to reorient to a nimbler approach that is responsive to constantly evolving health priorities and can, perhaps, ultimately drive better health outcomes. Building on Solid Foundations Though some level of reorientation is needed, the State Department should build on the highly effective multisector models for global health already advanced by USAID—for example, the Neglected Tropical Disease (NTD) program. Two decades of U.S. leadership combating 21 NTDs that disproportionately affect the world’s poorest communities through a mass drug administration campaign has achieved remarkable results. More than 54 countries have eliminated at least one NTD, with 600 million people no longer requiring preventive treatment. These efforts have also served as a powerful example of effective public– private collaboration: Only $115 million annually in government funding has leveraged more than $1.1 billion in donated drugs from pharmaceutical companies. Similarly, USAID’s Center for Innovation and Impact spent years developing models of sustainable finance for health and models of data-driven health policy. Let’s not allow that work to get lost but leverage it to ensure that unique American expertise in the fields of health innovation and life sciences, philanthropy, academia, and civil society is engaged. This includes working with the non-health private sector that employs Americans to work in nearly every country in the world and wants to ensure the well-being of their workforces. We have more than 5 million Americans working and living abroad, and improved global health means better access to health care for them as well. Using Comparative Advantage In the consolidation at State, U.S. national interests such as epidemiology and the overall detection, management, and control of various emerging infectious disease threats should remain a priority. Far from being external niche programs, these should become more central and intrinsic to the State Department’s global strategic planning. Part of the United States’ comparative advantage is the ability to rely on the critical interagency expertise that remains following this year’s significant reductions in force. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plays a vital role in strengthening global health systems through disease surveillance, outbreak response, laboratory capacity building, workforce training, and pandemic preparedness. A notable example of successful interagency collaboration was the response to the Ebola outbreaks in West Africa in 2014, when tens of thousands perished, threatening the globe. The response led to significant investment in national and regional epidemiology, field service capacity strengthening, and creation of the Africa CDC, modeled after the gold-standard U.S. CDC. In 2021, when Ebola reared its ugly head again in a manner similar in scope and distribution to 2014, only a few dozen perished thanks to the new structures the United States created. Looking to Increased Local Capacity Significantly, this increased domestic capacity is applicable to the range of emerging infectious diseases—e.g., mPox, Marburg, Lassa fever, Ebola— protecting not only local communities but the entire globe. We are currently watching a new Ebola outbreak unfold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with little to no U.S. engagement around the response, which is testing bilateral country ties in new ways. While the United States should maintain some level of bilateral engagement during an emerging infectious disease, increased local capacity aligns with an America First agenda and accesses American comparative advantages.
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