The Foreign Service Journal, January 2004

who promise change. Brazilians, for example, veered to the left in 2002 when they elected Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, head of the Workers Party, as president. “Lula,” as he is universally known, has turned out to be more pragmatist than doctrinaire leftist, and is widely admired inmuch of the hemi- sphere. President Bush greeted him warmly when he visited the White House in June. Venezuelans broke with 40 years of centrist politics in 1998 by electing populist Hugo Chavez as president, reflecting widespread disgust with the country’s traditional parties. But Chavez appears to have made a bad sit- uation worse. He has presided over a dramatic decline in the country’s eco- nomic fortunes. He befriended Fidel Castro and Middle East radicals, lead- ing many to worry that he plans to shut down Venezuela’s democratic process- es in favor of a more authoritarian approach. A referendum on his rule may be held in early 2004. Meanwhile, U.S. officials are becoming increasing- ly concerned about what they see as a joint effort by Chavez and Castro to nurture anti-American sentiment in a number of Latin American countries with money, political tutoring and training. In Bolivia, a pro-American presi- dent, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, was deposed in a political uprising in October. U.S. officials are convinced that Chavez financed the Bolivian opposition and say that may have con- tributed to Sanchez de Lozada’s down- fall. At present, the most popular political figure in Bolivia appears to be Evo Morales, known for his hostility to capitalism and his support for Bolivian farmers who grow coca, the raw mate- rial for cocaine. Bolivia not long ago qualified as a U.S. favorite in the Andes, with its pro-growth policies and its determination to destroy the narco- trafficking industry. Now its course is highly uncertain. Another cause for anxiety in Washington is Chavez’s willingness to allow leftist rebels in Colombia to make use of territory in western Venezuela as a springboard for attacks inside Colombia. Colombian Presi- dent Alvaro Uribe has emerged as per- haps Washington’s favorite president in the hemisphere. He wants his country out of the drug export business and has accelerated efforts to eradicate coca. He also has been stepping up the war with the leftist FARC and ELN rebels while attempting to negotiate the demobilization of the AUC, a rightist paramilitary group. Redefining Security Threats In October, Mexican President Vicente Fox convened a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers to rede- fine hemispheric security. He pointed out that inter-American concepts on this issue have not been revised since the Rio Treaty, a mutual defense pact, was signed in the Cold War year of 1947. Citing his belief that the real threats to hemispheric security are poverty, disease and environmental degradation, Fox had already with- drawn Mexico from the treaty in 2002. His stand may also reflect Mexican weariness with constant American pressures to combat narcotraffickers and to ensure that the border area is not a gateway for terrorists wishing to enter the United States. Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez gave voice to this frus- tration in a September speech in which, without mentioning the United States by name, he said, “No state can impose on another its own security agenda nor the order of its priorities.” The Bush administration argues that the Rio Treaty is still applicable, pointing out that other dangers have emerged to replace international com- munism, such as terrorism and drug trafficking — threats that it believes are best dealt with collectively. Signaling Washington’s view that Fox’s initiative trivializes grave dangers, Powell showed his disregard for the Mexico City conference by not bother- ing to show up. In the end, the con- ference approved a statement that embraced the views of both Mexico and the United States. It acknowl- edged the legitimacy of Washington’s concerns about transnational threats but also accepted Mexico’s position that poverty and other social issues deserve attention as well under the hemispheric security umbrella. Mexico’s decision to go to the mat with the United States on the security issue reflects the complexity of cross- border relations. On the whole, 2003 was not a good year for U.S.-Mexican relations. Much to Fox’s chagrin, it marked yet another year in which there was little measurable progress in Mexico’s hopes for a fairer shake for the four to five million Mexicans who live and work illegally in the United States. Mexico wants legal status for these people, but in the post-9/11 environ- ment, there has been little enthusiasm in Congress for rewarding Mexicans who entered the United States illegal- ly. There is more interest in expanding a program that allows Mexicans to enter the country as guest workers for a set period. Rather than taking the lead itself, the administration seems content to let Congress carry the ball on immigration reform. It’s hard to overestimate the importance of Mexican immigrants to the Mexican economy: $14.2 billion in remittances during 2003, according to a new study. And as Bush himself has noted, they help the U.S. economy as well. Mexico is not alone among hemi- spheric countries in its eagerness to score political points at American expense. Latin American and Carib- bean nations banded together at the Organization of American States meet- ing in Chile last June to defeat the U.S. candidate nominated to serve on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an arm of the OAS. J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 4 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 55