The Foreign Service Journal, January 2005

burial). There was a delay of four hours, while the PanAm aircraft kept one engine running so that it could take off for Helsinki. Its fuel supply was thus running low. Another complication was the serious condition of two wounded persons, whose prompt evacuation was neces- sary. Ultimately, the aircraft departed without the two Korean airmen. Early Sunday morning, April 23, VOA reported that the Russians had detained the pair and, in light of the two fatalities (both killed by Soviet gunfire), had established an “investigating committee” to look into the matter. As Vance was to depart that morning, I asked Shulmann urgently if the secretary would raise this ominous devel- opment with Gromyko. The answer was no. Vance was focused on arms control and did not intend to introduce an “extraneous” issue. Indeed, in his departure statement Vance expressed lavish praise for Gromyko. The joint communique spoke of progress toward an agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. Presidential spokesman Hodding Carter stated that the secretary felt he had met his objective. But what to do for the two Koreans, who might be spending years in prison if the Russian “investigation” established that espionage had been involved instead of instrument malfunction? Aware that Vance would not raise the issue at Vnukovo Airport, I took Mr. Sinitsyn of the foreign ministry aside there to “confide” that Vance would not mention it. I left Sinitsyn with the impression — correct or not — that Vance, who had a strong back- ground in civil aviation, was following the matter with great concern. His silence should not be misinterpreted. Sinitsyn claimed to know nothing of the detention of the two Koreans, and to be unaware of any assurances given that they would be released. But presumably he at least reported to his superiors that Vance’s silence did not sig- nify lack of keen interest in early release of the Koreans. On April 24, Matlock and I called again on Kapitsa in the foreign ministry to discuss the subject. He argued that a Soviet non-paper had mentioned only passengers, and recalled that he had given no assurances about the crew. Kapitsa, however, seemed to imply that the investigation might be “short.” This had a positive ring. Perhaps our protests — along with world attention to the matter — were having some effect. Later on April 24, I was granted a lengthy business facilitation meeting with a senior Soviet foreign trade offi- cial that the Russians heretofore had stubbornly resisted. It seemed possible that Vance’s visit might have opened doors for us, at least temporarily, even though he had not raised either issue. With that in mind, the embassy on April 25 cabled the department that we felt that a formal diplomatic note on the case, which State wished us to deliver, might complicate a matter about to be resolved. Triumph for Quiet Diplomacy On April 29, pilot Kim and navigator Lee were released by Soviet authorities to the consulate general in Leningrad after they had pleaded guilty to violation of Soviet air space (true) and knowingly disobeying a Soviet order to land (false because the Korean aircraft, despite strenuous efforts using all civilian frequencies, had never been able to communicate with the Soviet jet fighter). They were also obliged to apply to the presidium of the Supreme Soviet for “pardon.” Of course, no one asked the Russians to apologize for having killed two persons on board the aircraft and for having placed the lives of the other 111 in extreme jeopardy. The timing was propitious for the two Koreans, who left the USSR via Copenhagen. Soon after their repatri- ation, the FBI arrested three Soviet officials on espi- onage charges in the United States, and the Russians retaliated with the arrest of an American businessman on trumped-up charges of violation of Soviet currency laws. In a period when Soviet authorities were not loath to use strong-arm methods on dissenters — the trials of two prominent Jewish dissidents were already under preparation — and when U.S.-Soviet relations contin- ued to be tense, the two airmen were fortunate to avoid trial and prison. More sinister, although conjectural, one could assume that North Korean representatives in Moscow were making their wishes known, and would have been delighted to take delivery of the airmen at some future time. Kim and Lee, unlike their unfortunate countryman kidnapped in Prague 11 years before, were going home. It was a small triumph for quiet diplomacy. Or, perhaps, “second-line” diplomacy. Later a Korean Airlines spokesman said the airline would henceforth acquire DC-10 aircraft for use on polar routes, as they are better equipped to stay on course. Unfortunately, this tragedy did not preclude a far greater one on Sept. 1, 1983, when a Soviet aircraft destroyed a misdirected Korean airliner off Sakhalin with the loss of all 269 persons on board.  F O C U S J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 35