The Foreign Service Journal, January 2006

forces facing those of Iran on both its eastern and western borders as well as in the Persian Gulf. Promoting Mutual Interests Yet that fact, along with both coun- tries’ stake in the region’s political sta- bility, offers a variety of incentives for cooperation. We share an interest in promoting freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, particularly vis-a-vis the movement of oil to markets, where our sanctions preclude access by American oil companies to Iran and deny other commercial firms access to Iran’s potentially huge market. Both countries have an interest in curbing the movement of narcotics within the region and to the West. And we both desire political stability in Iraq and in Afghanistan, as well as throughout the region. Furthermore, Washington and Tehran, in the most basic and human sense, have shared interests that grow out of the fact that the U.S. is now the second-largest Persian- speaking country in the world. Yet, as former Representative Lee Hamilton has often put it, the absence of a relationship between Iran and the U.S. complicates our pursuit of those interests and inhibits our relationships with every other country in the region. To be sure, no one contemplates an imminent resumption of diplomatic ties between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is far off. But for the United States, now deeply engaged strategically in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to have no direct contact with the strategic entity of Iran, which lies directly between those two countries and which is by all measures destined to be the region’s pre-emi- nent power, simply makes no sense. It leaves us with no diplomatic flexibility whatsoever on the ground to deal with the many issues on our agenda. Consider the question of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For the past five years we have left that issue to the Russians and a negotiating team from Britain, France and Germany, repre- senting the European Union, confin- ing ourselves to pontificating from the sidelines — even though all con- cerned know full well that no long- term understanding will be possible without direct American involvement. The nuclear issue is but one item in any potential dialogue with the Islamic Republic, although arguably the most consequential; a nuclear-weapons- capable Iran already building long- range missiles that could reach Israel would be serious indeed. But there are a host of other issues on the nego- tiating agendas of both the U.S. and Iran that have festered there for years and that can only be dealt with by dia- logue. Claims by Iran that the U.S. is illegally holding assets frozen by President Carter at the start of the hostage period are high on the Iranian agenda; Iran’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and the West Bank is high on ours, as is concern over Iran’s long-term objectives in Iraq. Arguably what develops in our military/political efforts in Baghdad will, more than any other single factor, determine our future relationship with Tehran. Signs of Thawing? Perhaps that may be changing, with the Bush administration’s offer of some bargaining chips of its own; e.g., a readiness to relax sanctions that have precluded Iranian access to Boeing aircraft spare parts and to lift our opposition to Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization. The Iranians dismiss the former proposal as meaningless, given their ability to obtain the parts via the black market through Dubai, but the latter could be a useful bargaining chip over the lengthy period required to give it meaning. Meanwhile, however, on the substance of negotiations on the nuclear issue, the U.S. government continues strenuously to avoid owner- ship of any kind. The contrast with our position as an active and direct “Group of Six” member in the nuclear discussions with the North Koreans is striking — strategic interests being at stake in both cases. The agenda for any dialogue between two governments and two peoples so long denied would be long, and enormously difficult. Even get- ting mutual agreement on where to begin and on what basis asks a degree of mutual understanding that at the moment does not exist. And recalling the hostage issue, the fact that the Algiers Accord on our release explicit- ly denies the former hostages the right to bring suit against the government of Iran may compel an agenda item on that as well. The Iranian regime, in the person of the all-powerful Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khaman- ei, remains on record as consistently restating that no dialogue with the U.S. is possible without prior conces- sions that make American participa- tion difficult, if not impossible. Yet while there is no evidence of willingness on either side to take the risks inherent in reopening dialogue, Condoleezza Rice has made the need for “transformational diplomacy” a sig- nature feature of her approach as Secretary of State. To apply the vision implicit in such rhetoric to the task of improving relations with Iran will require major departures in the public and private postures of Tehran and Washington alike. Alternatively, we could turn to more traditional approaches, such as third-party inter- mediaries or private emissaries. But however we conduct the diplomacy, let us hope we will not have to wait another 25 years before we get serious about the effort. n Bruce Laingen was a Foreign Service officer from 1949 until 1987, serving twice in Iran (1953-1955 and 1979- 1981). He is currently the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy. 16 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 6 S P E A K I N G O U T u