The Foreign Service Journal, January 2006

tion an issue gets from our political masters — and by that measure, Iraq and Afghanistan are in a class by themselves. Another measure that could be used is the commitment of so many of our military and Foreign Service personnel to the mission and the casualties we have taken. If we accept that Iraq and Afghanistan are more important by almost any measure, then it seems entirely appropriate that service there is more valuable. Or to put it another way: assuming equal quality in the work, service in Iraq and Afghanistan should count more for promotion than service in lesser posts. Fairness to all would require equal exposure to the risks of service in Afghanistan and Iraq. AFSA should be demanding directed assignments to fill jobs in Iraq and Afghanistan, not complaining that the few who take the risks and per- form well are treated with the respect they merit by doing the most important work in the most danger- ous places. Henry S. Ensher FSO, Director of Iraq Political Affairs McLean, Va. No to Staying the Course “Stay the course” has a nice ring to it. For a country, as for an indi- vidual, it connotes resolve and a determination to triumph over what- ever obstacles may arise. It is the opposite of weakness and indecision. This positive aura hinges, needless to say, on the soundness of the course chosen. It also helps if there are signposts along the way to con- firm that the goal is being achieved. While it is tempting to do so, this is not the place to examine the mis- steps and deception involved in the administration’s decision to invade Iraq, topple a brutal and trouble- some dictator and remake the coun- try into a bastion of democracy. That examination is up to the voters and historians. What is incumbent on us, four years later, is to question the soundness of the choices made. By urging us to stay the course, the administration presumes that cur- rent policies are moving the country toward two desirable, mutually rein- forcing, goals: 1) a more stable (for- get democratic) Iraq, and 2) a more secure U.S. In reality, this is what the decision to invade and pacify Iraq has gotten us so far: • Thousands of U.S. troops and Iraqis (mostly civilians) have been killed, wounded or psychologically scarred. • Iraqi security forces — army and police — have been infiltrated. Progress toward an effective fighting force depends on which U.S. gener- al or administration spokesman you believe. • Religious freedom and women’s rights are likely to be diminished under the constitution proposed for the Shiite-dominated part of the country. • Reconstruction has been slowed by widespread corruption in Iraq and the U.S. Well-placed American and Iraqi contractors have reaped windfalls from questionable or illegal contracts. • The presence of U.S. troops occupying a Muslim country is a potent recruiting tool for al-Qaida and a lightning rod for insurgent vio- lence, and has resulted in a dramatic upsurge in anti-American sentiment throughout the Arab/Muslim world. • Longstanding allies — whose full cooperation is critical in the fight against terrorism — have well-justi- fied doubts about U.S. leadership. • With the diversion of attention and resources from Afghanistan to Iraq, the Taliban has been able to regroup. Since January 2005, U.S., NATO and civilian casualties there have reached an all-time high. • Our attention and resources have been diverted from the real threats to our security: nuclear ter- rorism, Iran and North Korea. • By choosing to finance the $1 billion-a-week war effort through borrowing rather than taxes, the administration is responsible for an unprecedented increase in the bud- get deficit. Our kids will pay for it. For all the above reasons, and by any measure, the U.S. is less secure than we were prior to the invasion. There is considerable evidence that U.S. troops — notwithstanding their unquestioned courage and lofty motives — are an obstacle to a secure and stable Iraq. Let us do everything in our power to replace them with U.N., NATO or other multilateral peacekeepers as soon as possible. If that doesn’t work, we should withdraw anyway. At this stage, we desperately need another course, one that has a chance of suc- cess. Arthur S. Lezin FSO, retired Bend, Ore. Diversity and MOH Policy Director General W. Robert Pearson’s June 2005 State magazine column, “Our Diverse Department of State,” really hit home, especially his statement that “Diversity enables us to approach and meet our chal- lenges in new, different and more effective ways.” I’ve dealt with that issue my whole life, both before and during my Foreign Service career. I am of French-Canadian descent and grew up in Quebec. My father served in the old Royal Canadian Air Force for 20 years. Everything in those days was only in English. My J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 7 L E T T E R S u