The Foreign Service Journal, January 2006

ments and investigate any improper behavior on the part of embassy per- sonnel. An inherent part of the job was to develop relationships with the security services of the host country in order to collect intelligence on any potential threats to the embassy or its personnel. During the time that I was in Argentina (1978-1980), in the course of carrying out these functions, I stumbled onto the fact that the Argentine security services were car- rying out some operations in neigh- boring countries. But I do not recall ever hearing the term “Operation Condor” used, either there or in Santiago, by any of my contacts or embassy colleagues. I also did not know the extent of Argentine or Chil- ean military networking, either with each other or with the security ser- vices of other Latin American coun- tries. Nor was I aware of any U.S. role in relationship to that coopera- tion. With the exception of the claims concerning my role in Chile, Prof. McSherry’s claims are all based on two memoranda of conversation I drafted while in Buenos Aires that were subsequently released to the public under FOIA. From these she has concocted the theory that I was a central figure in a multinational enterprise called Operation Condor. I turn now to responding to each of her particulars: • During my tour in Santiago, which preceded that of Buenos Aires, I had limited contact with Chilean intelligence officials. In fact, I met with DINA just twice: once, to see what information the agency had in its files on followers of the Allende government who had requested to be paroled into the United States on political grounds; and the second time, to coordinate security arrange- ments for the Organization of American States conference held in Santiago in 1976. I never met Juan J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 71