The Foreign Service Journal, January 2007

J A NU A R Y 2 0 0 7 / F OR E I GN S E R V I C E J OU R N A L 59 A F S A N E W S V.P. VOICE: STATE BY STEVE KASHKETT The Iraq Report and the Foreign Service M anymembers of the ForeignServicewelcomed the Iraq Study Group Report because it opened a long-needed debate about the need to find a new direction for U.S. policy in the Iraq crisis. Considering themultiple effects that the war has hadonour profession, onour assignments andpromo- tion systems, on our families and onmorale within the Service, it is an understandable relief to our members that this debate is underway. Buried within the report, however, are a few recommendations that are cause for alarmamong the people of the Foreign Service. Recommendation 74 asserts that “if not enough civilians vol- unteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civil- ianagenciesmust fill thosepositionswith directed assignments.” Recommen- dation76 exhorts the StateDepartment to “train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stabili- ty operation outside of the traditional embassy setting.” These two recommendationsmay sound goodonpaper, but they utterly fail to take into account the daily reality of Iraq and the most fundamental obstacle to the effectiveness of civilian employees there: deteriorating security. The fact that the coun- try remains a live-fire war zone—by most accounts a worsen- ing war zone—overshadows everything concerning the role of the Foreign Service. Ourmembers serve at hardship and high-threat posts all the time, but they are not accustomed to trying to survive and do their jobs in the middle of a war, particularly a war in which Americans are a target. As has beenrepeatedlywritten in thepages of this magazine, unarmed diplomats can only carry out their duties if theyhave the freedomtomove about a country, todevel- op expertise on the local culture and society and to cultivate pro- fessional relationships with a wide range of key interlocutors involved in the political and economic life of the country. Do the drafters of the Iraq Study Group Report really believe that diplomats are able to undertake these tasks in the streets of Baghdad? In Basrah? In Ramadi? Violence inBaghdad and in the provinces severely constrains themovements of ForeignServicemembers outside of the tight- ly-controlled International Zone andU.S.military forwardoper- ating bases, and it limits the amount of direct contact that our members can have with ordinary Iraqis. These secu- rity-drivenconditions call intoquestion the notion that our members can effectively accomplish their assigned tasks. A “complex stabili- ty operationoutside of the traditional embassy setting” is a fancy phrase, but inpractical terms, unarmeddiplomats canonly tack- le thismissiononce thewar has ended, once the countryhas been largelypaci- fied. Similarly, thedire securityproblems in Iraq have a direct effect on volun- teerism among civilian employees. Over the past four years, out of a sense of patriotismandduty, ourpeoplehave been willingly offering themselves in significant numbers to spend a year in Iraq without their families, but it is becomingmoredifficult toattract eager volunteers as thewar has spread from neighborhood toneighborhood, town to town, region to region. Inrecentmonths, Ihavewritten inthis columnabout themany negative consequences of directed assignments of civilians into a combat zone, but the bottom line is that directed assignments wouldnot benecessary if this civilian-led“complex stabilityoper- ation” was being undertaken in a more credible security envi- ronment. It makes no sense for the Iraq report authors simul- taneously topropose scaling back theU.S.military presence and beefing up the presence of unarmed U.S. diplomats in a com- bat zone. Members of theU.S. ForeignService are, by nature and tem- perament, anadventurous andhighlymotivated crowdwho love a good challenge in a tough foreign spot. Give us a well-defined mission and reasonable security conditions inwhich to operate, andmost of uswill gladly embrace “complex stability operations outside of the traditional embassy setting.” Andwewill not need directed assignments. Former SecretaryBaker andhis colleagues, inpreparing their Iraq report, spoke to a greatmanyU.S.military officers; perhaps they shouldhave spent a bitmore time talking to the career pro- fessionals of the Foreign Service who have put their lives on the line struggling to salvage Iraq. It makes no sense for the Iraq report authors simultaneously to propose scaling back the U.S. military presence and beefing up the presence of unarmed U.S. diplomats in a combat zone.