The Foreign Service Journal, January 2009

42 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 9 field work has constituted on-the-job training for “trans- formational diplomats,” by adding a new activist dimension to their work. With a mandate to identify potential projects and groups to implement them, a diplomat’s responsibilities now ex- tend well beyond reporting on developments. Instead of simply meeting with an NGO or business association and sending a reporting cable back to the State Department, an officer can also explore ways in which the U.S. govern- ment might support these groups through MEPI. This transition from reporting on developments to ac- tively supporting them is in many ways the crux of trans- formational diplomacy. It has both supporters and detractors within the Foreign Service. The latter often argue that, by moving beyond relations between govern- ments and directly supporting individuals or groups, the United States is both flouting appropriate diplomatic be- havior and making bilateral relationships unnecessarily dif- ficult. These points deserve to be examined. The basic goal of foreign policy is to advance national interests through the management of relations with other countries. Bilateral relations consist of many and varied in- terests — some common, some competing. Maintaining diplomatic ties, however, does not necessarily mean pre- serving the status quo, for relationships adjust to changes in the mix of interests on one side or the other. Governments use a variety of tools to influence each other in favor of their own national agendas and they do not limit themselves to official interaction. These range from quiet bilateral discussions to public statements and lobbying, and from development and military assistance to business delegations and multilateral negotiations, to name but a few. In other words, there is plenty of pushing and pulling involved, not all of it done behind closed doors or using traditional diplomatic means. Seen in this light, pro- viding support to nongovernmental actors that is neither covert nor illegal is simply another way to advance one’s diplomatic agenda. Thus, a program like MEPI provides the United States with an additional tool for pursuing its stated objective of promoting democratic reform. The trick is figuring out how to pursue the new policy within the context of the overall bilateral agenda. The need for diplomats to balance the myriad foreign policy objectives and ensure that our comprehensive methods are sensibly serving our national interests was one more key reason for making MEPI the work of NEA, rather than a functional bureau or agency focused on only one area of our policy in the region. A Varied Response The response by governments in the Arab world to the initiative has varied. While almost all the governments viewed it with skepticism at the start, some have come to welcome both the concept and the concrete assistance these programs provide to local actors. Others are am- bivalent, but allow MEPI programs to take place in their countries. Finally, a small number are not only opposed, but actively make it difficult for MEPI-funded activities to take place on their territory. In other words, we are at dif- ferent stages of adjusting bilateral relations with the coun- tries of the region to match the new reality that the United States is placing a higher priority on democratic reform. Because the initiative was designed to reach beyond governments, it is also worth noting that the general pub- lic in the region is pretty much unaware of MEPI or its pro- grams. Where the approach has made considerable inroads is with the “community of reformers” in the Arab world. When I made initial visits across the region after opening theMEPI Regional Office in Tunis four years ago, most ac- tivists and reformers met me with skepticism—when they met me at all. The reasons for their reticence varied: doubts about American sincerity on reform; objections to certain policies; fear of being tarnished, or endangered, by association with the U.S. government. With sustained engagement, a consistent message and concrete program support, we have largely turned that re- action around. It’s not that the reformers now agree with all U.S. policies, but they have concluded we share a com- mon interest in promoting democratic change and believe the United States delivers on its promises of concrete sup- port, even to those who don’t always agree with us. The bottom line is that many of the groups who avoided us in the past are now coming to us with ideas for reform proj- ects and seeking support. One of the biggest challenges to U.S. democracy pro- motion has been how we talk about what we are doing. Words do matter, particularly in a region where conspiracy theories are an art form. There is a growing hunger for democratic practices across the Arab world. The way most people express this desire, however, is in the context of their daily problems and not abstract societal concepts. Terms like “freedom,” “democracy” or “rule of law” are harder to grasp for most people than “corruption,” “equal access to jobs” or “fair treatment by judges,” even if the latter are just F O C U S