The Foreign Service Journal, January 2009

6 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 9 Talking with Iran For the first time in decades, there is the possibility, indeed the probabil- ity, of official dialogue between the United States and the Islamic Repub- lic of Iran. President-elect Barack Obama is on record favoring talks with Tehran, when they are in the American interest and at a time and place of our choosing. That language leaves room for the essential prepara- tory diplomatic maneuvering, includ- ing the need for prior consultation with friends at the United Nations Se- curity Council and the European Union — a channel where this past summer, for the first time, there was participation by the U.S. under secre- tary of State for political affairs. Still, the process will not be easy. This channel has dealt only with the nuclear issue, where Iran has contin- ued to reject the precondition that it must first suspend its enrichment of uranium. Tehran has already ignored four Security Council resolutions on the subject, reiterating there and else- where that its enrichment process is dedicated only to building the basis for production of nuclear energy — a less than plausible claim, given Iran’s lack of full transparency in its obligations as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Meanwhile, the American and Iranian ambassadors in Baghdad have had occasional contact, but those exchanges have been desul- tory at best, specifically limited to a focus on stability in Iraq. Nonetheless, we may soon be on a new path in our tortured relations with Iran, which have set a record among diplomatic ruptures. In that regard, some historical background may be useful. There has been no formal diplo- matic contact between the U.S. and Iran since President Jimmy Carter broke relations in April 1980 over the hostage crisis that had begun on Nov. 4, 1979. After five months of secret probes and public frustration, Pres. Carter finally ordered the closure of Iran’s embassy in Washington and its consular presence elsewhere and the departure of all resident personnel within 36 hours. But in Tehran, all American per- sonnel had been taken hostage when the embassy was forcibly overrun, in- cluding myself as chargé d’affaires, my deputy chief of mission and a security officer. We were held by Iranian Army guards within the foreign min- istry, while my Iranian counterpart in Washington, also a chargé d’affaires, remained free and in place inside his embassy on Massachusetts Avenue until the formal break in relations in April 1980. It was a most unusual state of half-diplomatic relations be- tween two sovereign nations. Though I was a hostage, I was de- termined, until my later solitary con- finement, to maintain a facade of diplo- matic decency in my capacity as the American chargé d’affaires. Somehow I found enough paper to write a stream of formal protests to Iran’s officialdom about my treatment and that of my colleagues — the two in the ministry with me and the 50 others held hostage in the embassy compound on the other side of the city. Surreptitiously handed to guards and contacts within the for- eign ministry, the notes may never have reached their addressees. But the mere act of sending them boosted my morale. Today, nearly 30 years later, I re- main the last senior American diplo- mat to have been accredited and resident in Tehran, in direct contact with the Islamic Republic. During my time, however, there was no opening for the kind of sustained dialogue es- sential for any diplomatic relationship. Indeed, the one opportunity that did arise proved seriously adverse. That was the meeting in Algiers on Nov. 1, 1979, between Iran’s secular Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and U.S. National Security Adviser Zbig- niew Brzezinski — each heading his country’s delegation to the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Algerian Revolution. I had pressed Bazargan hard to go to Algiers because dialogue at that level seemed essential for the still-un- certain relationship between the Khomeini regime and the U.S. Three days after that meeting, radical Iran- ian students, concerned that Bazargan was taking Iran back into a relation- ship with the Great Satan, overran our embassy. The rest is history. There have since been quiet probes and occasional policy initiatives, but all were unsustained and lacked adequate L ETTERS