The Foreign Service Journal, January 2011

J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23 through the north-south axis of the district) in order to build a solid, long-term relationship linking the community with the government and coalition forces. The PRT and other coalition actors had been seen as highly unreliable partners in Tagab in the recent past. This began to change with the develop- ment of the PFN and its focus on northern Tagab. We started with an emphasis on agricultural development. The pro- vince is blessed with high-quality pomegranates, but its farmers have historically had a hard time getting a good price for their produce. This was because the only buyers were Pakistani traders who purchased from individual farmers in a manner that drove down prices. Beginning in September 2009, the PRT worked with local leaders to es- tablish a farmers’ cooperative and linked the farmers to a USAID-funded juicing company in Kabul and buyers in Dubai and India. Forced to contend with compe- tition for the first time, the Pakistani traders tripled the prices they paid for Tagab pomegranates in the 2009 harvest. From a COIN perspective, even more important than the eco- nomic benefit of the pomegranate cooperative were the relationships it fostered between the coalition and local leaders and communities. As these relationships grew, the coalition became able to re- spond more nimbly to events on the ground and strengthen the ties. One example comes from a tragedy. On Nov. 16, 2009, the French commanding general held a large meeting in the Tagab District Center with tribal and government leaders to discuss the new focus on cooperation with the C OVER S TORY The quick rotation of our forces means a local leader or community cannot be sure that PRT counterparts will stick around long enough to make a difference.