The Foreign Service Journal, January 2011

grams accelerated the positive trends. Since then, the U.S. government has followed a gradual process of nor- malizing our relations. For some, the process has been too fast. This is true of many families of American victims of terrorist acts connected to the Libyan government, for instance. Cov- erage of Libya in the U.S. mass media is sporadic and tends to focus on the personality of its leader, Muammar al- Qadhafi. Human rights groups and some Libyan émigré personalities em- phasize Libya’s lack of internal politi- cal reforms. Others believe normalization has been too slow. Libyan government of- ficials, business people and educators all make this complaint. It is also the view of most American companies, who have been at a competitive disad- vantage in Libya due to the years of sanctions. They point to the speed with which European governments normalized relations with Tripoli start- ing as early as 1999 with the suspen- sion of U.N. sanctions. Within a short period, most of our close allies had opened full embassies in Libya, and many established direct airline links. The process of normal- ization accelerated after December 2003, with visits to Tripoli by top lead- ers of countries like Britain, France, Italy and Germany, just to name a few, often with delegations of businessmen on their coattails. There have also been return visits to West European capitals by Qadhafi, illustrating the re- ality that Libya was no longer isolated. It was Washington that was out of step with the rest of the world, and we no longer had international leverage to in- fluence Libyan behavior. In contrast to our allies and com- petitors, the highest-level U.S. official to visit Libya was Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and that did not happen until the very end of the Bush administration, in December 2008. (Her Libyan counterpart had visited Washington in January 2008.) U.S. Ambassador Gene Cretz, whose nom- ination was held up by the Senate for more than a year, did not arrive in Tripoli until 2009. As the result of pressure from impatient U.S. compa- nies and universities, full consular serv- ices returned to Libya’s capital after some months. In September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with her Libyan counterpart, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, in New York on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly session. A State Department spokesperson indicated the conversation focused on regional issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli talks and the situation in Sudan, mat- ters where the U.S. government seeks Libyan support. Cautious Re-engagement The Obama administration is in the process of broadening bilateral rela- tions with Tripoli, especially in the areas of economic and scientific coop- eration and expanded person-to-per- son contacts. Despite the recent sig- nature of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, the priorities of U.S. policy remain strategic, not commercial. In this respect, the U.S. differs from nearly every country in the capitalist world, whose governments tend to make winning business contracts the principal measure of their relations. However, growing numbers of Libyans and Americans are eager for expanded business and tourism and a resumption of the educational exchange that char- acterized U.S.-Libyan relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Recent steps by both governments to normalize visa issuance and travel are overdue and popular. The strategic benefits to the United States of Tripoli’s current posture are immense. Libya is no longer an adver- sary state located on the Mediter- ranean Basin. Instead, it can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a re- spectable member of the global com- munity. To be blunt, there are too many bad governments seeking bad weapons for the United States to bomb them all into submission. The Bush administration needed an alternative paradigm for international cooperation, and diplomatic engage- ment with Tripoli also fits well with the overall foreign policy of the Obama ad- ministration. Normalization on a basis of mutual respect, including intelli- gence exchanges on terrorist threats, serves the security needs of both states. Economically, Libyan oil and gas re- serves offer diversification of supply in a world of tight energy resources. A major incentive for the Libyans has been full international acceptance. Restoration of diplomatic relations with the U.S. made it possible for Libya to be elected to the U.N. Secu- rity Council. Its record over the course of two years was generally responsible. Despite its own bad memories of U.N. sanctions, Libya voted for enhanced measures against Iran, and hosted the recent Arab League summit meeting that supported a resumption of Pales- tinian-Israeli negotiations. Qadhafi, who recently concluded a year as chairman of the African Union, has cooperated with other African states and with the United States to ameliorate the Darfur problem and to prevent the growth of ungoverned spaces in the Sahara and Sahel regions, 28 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 1 The Obama administration is broadening bilateral relations on many fronts.