The Foreign Service Journal, January 2011

which could harbor terrorist organiza- tions. Tripoli has also made useful con- tributions to the development of African economies. Internally, Libya is introducing cau- tious economic reforms, but thus far it has not initiated a process of political or constitutional change. The country has an elaborate formal structure of di- rect democracy, but non-Libyan ob- servers view the current political system as authoritarian. The most meaningful civil society institution in Libya is the weak but ambitious private sector. Over the long term, interaction between Libyan and U.S. companies, and the reopening of American uni- versities to Libyan students, can do far more to encourage reforms than lec- tures by human rights organizations. The country’s leaders sometimes make unpredictable, even disturbing, statements. (For their part, Libyans often regardWashington’s public state- ments as arbitrary and unfair.) Tripoli’s actions, however, have followed a gen- erally prudent course in recent years, so three successive U.S. administra- tions have steadily pursued closer ties, recognizing that it was a good idea to bring Libya in from the cold. Without false optimism or illusions, we should try to maintain the relationship and ex- pand it where we can. After all, the principal rationale for U.S. diplomatic relations is not to cel- ebrate friendships with ideal democra- cies blessed with free-market econo- mies. The real diplomatic challenge, and the one that offers the most bene- fit, is moving countries from the status of adversaries to former adversaries to partners, to deal with a world of global threats and cultivate common inter- ests. Washington and Tripoli can take pride in having moved this process for- ward. The history of Libyan-American re- lations invites attention to a larger for- eign policy lesson, as well. Neither government advanced its interests greatly by the use of military power in isolation from other forms of persua- sion. Indeed, overt or covert violence was often the prelude to setbacks for both sides. This was true from the early 19th century through the 1980s. Beginning in the 1990s, both gov- ernments employed a wider range of the tools of statecraft. Latent military force for purposes of deterrence played a role, as did international sanctions. But it was essential to con- struct a diplomatic framework to make such measures effective. Diplo- macy allowed policymakers in both Washington and Tripoli to reconsider their respective interests and seek to advance them in a coolheaded way. Such an approach has applications in the resolution of other interna- tional conflicts. ■ J A N U A R Y 2 0 1 1 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 29