The Foreign Service Journal, January 2013

34 JANUARY 2013 | THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL Over the last four years, Secretary Clinton, under the “Diplomacy 3.0” program calling for a 25-percent increase in the Foreign Service, has made important, if uneven, progress in achieving added human resources. As of early 2012, State had gained 3,500 additional positions, and USAID, 923. These total numbers accord well with the recommenda- tions of FAB. However, the distribution of positions (and eventually people) does not. A comparison of the department’s head count in January 2008 with January 2012 shows an above-attrition increase of about 1,200 Foreign Service officers, 800 Foreign Service spe- cialists, and 1,500 Civil Service. Of these, approximately 2,300 were assigned to Washington and 1,200 to overseas posts. Some of the Washington positions represent necessary increases in long-term training. From a functional perspective, some 2,100 were serving in administrative support activities while 1,400 were conducting diplomatic missions. Clearly, additional personnel are needed to meet the core require- ments set forth in this report. For the 2013–2017 period addressed in this report, the challenge is how to achieve and maintain adequate personnel levels in a time of fiscal restraint and budget reductions. Clearly, prioritization among the items in the 150 Account is necessary. Of course, we would prefer to avoid cuts in both people and programs. But if the choice is necessary, people are more important than programs . Reduced programs can later be re-funded fairly rapidly. It takes years, if not decades, to train and develop skilled, experienced personnel. Program reductions only affect the programs involved, while personnel reductions damage foreign policy across the board as the officers who negotiate, conduct public diplo- macy, promote U.S. exports, protect American citizens, and plan and manage development projects disappear. It is par- ticularly ill-advised to reduce our civilian presence overseas at the very moment U.S. military elements are redeploying back to the United States. Fortunately, as the diagram on p. 32 illustrates, direct personnel costs for State and USAID operations represent just $4 billion of a $55 billion budget, just over 7 percent. Even a severe personnel reduction would barely move the needle downward. Likewise, the minimal personnel increases we are recommending would barely move the needle upward, to just under 8 percent of the foreign affairs budget. They would not compete with funding for foreign affairs programs, whatever decisions the next administration and Congress make. In spite of real progress since 2008, our analysis demon- strates that the foreign affairs agencies, on which the secu- rity of the American people will depend in the tumultuous decades of the 21st century, are not yet completely staffed, trained and deployed to meet the challenges. The following recommendations are designed to close the remaining gaps in personnel and training capacity, and are fully consistent with the needs we identified previously in Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future (2008) and with State’s Diplomacy 3.0 initiative. Recommendations n The Secretary of State should seek to complete the Diplomacy 3.0 staffing initiative in the Fiscal Year 2014 bud- get. This would add 722 positions, achieving the targeted 25 percent increase in the Foreign Service compared to the 2008 baseline. These positions should be distributed across core functions and public diplomacy to bring personnel levels in these areas closer to the 2008 FAB report’s recommendations. n In order to alleviate shortages of mid-career officers, the Department of State should press Congress for legislation to temporarily lift limitations on pay and numbers of hours worked for While Actually Employed retired officers and staff for a period of five years. n The Secretary of State should seek an additional (above attrition) 490 positions specifically for long-term training in the FY 2014 budget: 330 for language training to meet congres- sional requirements and 160 for training to reach mid-level needs. n The Department of State should fund a study of what would be required for the Foreign Service Institute to take on a share of senior professional education comparable to that rep- resented by the National Defense University and the service war colleges. Reduced programs can later be re-funded fairly rapidly. It takes years, if not decades, to train and develop skilled, experienced personnel.