The Foreign Service Journal, February 2003

F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 39 could never have imagined that my first act as the designated Peace Corps Country Director for Cote d’Ivoire would involve the evacuation of 133 volunteers and the subsequent suspension of the entire Peace Corps program. However, having worked for 15 years in developing countries, much of this in Africa, I knew first-hand that just when you think you have plans for Africa, Africa reminds you that it instead has plans for you. I was appointed Peace Corps Director for Cote d’ Ivoire in June 2002 and was working at Peace Corps head- quarters in Washington, await- ing my travel to Abjidjan in late October. The country director position involved leading one of the largest Peace Corps pro- grams on the African continent, with nearly 140 volunteers working in education, small business enterprise, IT, urban environment, HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health, water and san- itation. Cote d’ Ivoire was pioneering new program initiatives for the Peace Corps Africa region, such as establishing cybercafes and working out front in the areas of urban environment and sanitation. The coun- try directorship offered me the opportunity to work with a dynamic and capable national staff and volun- teer community to build partnerships that would help maximize the impact of development efforts at the local level. Unfortunately the attempted coup and fighting that erupted on Sept. 19, 2002, in the capital and several northern cities launched a series of slowly unfolding events that would transform Cote d’ Ivoire’s econom- ic, political and development environment from one of opportunity to obstacle. The first consequence of the violence was a gener- al lack of information on what was really happening on the ground. It is normal that the people at the coun- try level are often the “last to know” — getting their initial information, like everyone else, from BBC or CNN broadcasts. The 1999 coup in Cote d’Ivoire, occurring in a country hailed for its political and eco- nomic stability and dominating regional economic and political presence, had shocked the world. Since then, there had been a con- tinuing series of violent incidents, none of which, however, had pre- sented a fundamental challenge to the state. For the first 24 hours after Sept. 19, most people assumed that this was just one more small wave to be ridden out before the country returned to “business as usual.” A Nagging Question On the second day, with the rebels still in control of several key towns in the north, the question of whether the fighting was indeed a sporadic, ad hoc outbreak or the first step in a larger destabilizing pattern having national and regional implications, began to nag every- one. At headquarters, Peace Corps staff from a num- ber of key units began feverishly talking to each other and the field, and then linked up to the State Department at both the country and Washington level. There was a clear effort by all involved to resist over- reaction and maintain a focus on ensuring the safety and security of PCVs and country office staff, both U.S. and national. Efforts focused on information gathering and dissemination and pre-positioning the F O C U S O N D A N G E R Z O N E S C OTE D ’I VOIRE E VACUATION : T HE P EACE C ORPS C OMPONENT A VETERAN OF A FRICAN DEVELOPMENT WORK RECOUNTS HER EXPERIENCE AS THE P EACE C ORPS REPRESENTATIVE ON THE S TATE D EPARTMENT T ASK F ORCE THAT MANAGED THE EVACUATION OF C OTE D ’I VOIRE . B Y K RISTI R AGAN I