The Foreign Service Journal, February 2003

volunteers during the next 12-day period in which all 133 PCVs present in Cote d’ Ivoire would be consolidated at some 13 pre-arranged points. But they also contributed to heightening anxieties as information was given to par- ents about rebels with weapons in the streets, and declin- ing water and food supplies. The evacuation was complicated by the mixed mes- sages of calm in Abidjan and solidification of rebel posi- tions in the north. With the exception of the Americans, from the end of September until nearly the middle of December, most foreign nationals living and working in Cote d’ Ivoire were not confronted with departure orders. The disparity in assessment of the instability caused some volunteers who pride themselves on a tough and rugged spirit to feel they were prematurely abandoning the coun- try and the people they were committed to serve. However, once in Ghana with access to a fuller picture on the evolving situation, most PCVs were grateful for their efficient and peaceful departure. They all had to acknowl- edge that the conditions no longer existed for them to carry out meaningful work. From Consolidation to Evacuation The State Department Operations Center was a dream-come-true compared to evacuations I had been involved with previously, with other organizations that lacked both human and equipment capacity. It was not only well-staffed and efficiently supported, but enjoyed a constant in-flow of the latest political, economic and mili- tary information. A well-crafted division of labor and sea- soned leadership meant that even during peak periods nothing was left hanging. I was never in doubt that the stated priority of ensuring the safety of American citizens in Cote d’ Ivoire was indeed the real priority. The moni- toring group and its three daily briefings with the Executive Secretariat facilitated decision-making, elimi- nated potential roadblocks, and kept everyone operating on the same page — the toughest parts of an evacuation. The weekend saw a further consolidation of the rebel- held towns in the north of the country, and on Monday, Sept. 23, 2002, the messages coming from State were to start moving from consolidation to evacuation. It would take 10 days to move 133 Peace Corps Volunteers from the remotest areas of the country to the capital for evacu- ation over the border by bus to Ghana. Some of them had only been in their villages for three weeks; others had already terminated their service and were at the beach or F O C U S F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 41 How To Participate Effectively in a State Department Task Force From her experience as a participant in the State Department Cote d’Ivoire Monitoring Group, Kristi Ragan distilled the following recom- mendations to ensure effective participation by the Peace Corps —or any other federal or independent agency, for that matter — on future State Department task forces for evacuation of American citizens: • Maintain stakeholder presence by participating as an active, full-time member of the task force, representing the Peace Corps at key, daily State Department meetings and briefings, and maintaining visibility on Peace Corps issues in the task force. • Foster a two-way communication exchange by reviewing all information coming into the task force; disseminating information to the task force that comes in from the country office and Peace Corps Volunteers, including the Emergency Action Plan, PCV locations, con- tact information and physical/emotional well-being, and feedback on the local and national situation; helping to ensure the accuracy of information contained in the regularly prepared task force situation reports; and providing regular updates and briefings to Peace Corps senior management. • Analyze information: the task force’s political/military/economic information for its potential impact on the Peace Corps and on volun- teers; and updates and information provided by Peace Corps head- quarters and field staff for consistency with task force analysis. • Propose interventions/next steps where potential obstacles occur based on a dialogue with Peace Corps headquarters on options and possible next steps. • Advocate for Peace Corps issues and implement requests or actions of Peace Corps headquarter’s senior management with respect to the task force in State Department daily update meetings, the daily written situation reports, and through maintenance of a reg- ular dialogue with the task force coordinator. It is also important to maintain a critical core of five or six Peace Corps staff, with expertise in the concerned region, for rotation through the task force during periods of peak activity. Peace Corps’ Safety and Security staff should also participate to have the opportu- nity to monitor implementation of Peace Corps Emergency Action Plans, establish contacts with State Department security staff, and build an information base for determining possible future interven- tions and support by Peace Corps regional safety and security offi- cers. Also recommended is an introductory briefing at the State Department Operations Center for Key Peace Corps participants, to include: an overview of communications systems, handling of various document classifications, transmittal of information to Peace Corps, role of the logger, coordinator, etc. and security clearances and logis- tics for task force participation. Finally, maintaining a daily log while sitting on the task force is essential to identify lessons learned after the crisis, and improve future participation.