The Foreign Service Journal, February 2003

44 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 3 n September 1991, troops in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) began looting residences and commercial establishments in the capital, Kinshasa, to protest low pay. They were soon followed by many in the general population. After the second day of widespread looting, the decision was made to evacuate all Americans from the country, with other similar deci- sions being made by other foreign governments. French and Belgian paratroopers were flown in to pro- vide protection for the evacuation effort. By the end of the week, most of the Americans in Zaire, both official ones and those in the private sector, had departed on several charter flights, leaving behind a small number of official Americans to deal with the aftermath. This scenario has been repeated over and over since then, in many locations around the world, though of course circumstances differ from one country to another, in terms of how much advance warning is given, how much time there is for safe processing of evacuees, and how long the evacuation will last. We were very lucky in Zaire, in many ways. First, we were never the target of the hostility being expressed in the looting. In fact, popular feeling was generally protec- tive of Americans, and a sentinel telling looters that the house was occupied by Americans was usually enough to send them off to find another house to loot. Second, there were alternative escape routes available when the airport became inaccessible, since Brazzaville (the capital of the Republic of the Congo) was just across the river. Third, staff remaining behind were able to quickly and effectively initiate action to safeguard both personal and official property. Over the extended period of the evacuation, the post was able to pack everyone’s personal effects and ship them to safety in Antwerp. Following the evacuation, and during the long (six- month) evacuation period, Americans remaining at post had a lot of time to look back at the evacuation and reflect on what had gone well, not so well, and had not been done at all. Several country team meetings were dedicated to discussing the lessons learned by the post, in an attempt to be better prepared in the future. The following article is based on my 1992 summary of those findings, as articulated by many of the remaining Americans. It is important to note that this account deals primarily with at- post issues, since the feedback from the evacuees themselves was limited, and that this assessment is not intended in any way as criticism of any individuals or organizations. Early Planning In Zaire, we found that the list of essential person- nel, when faced with an actual evacuation, changed sub- stantially from what was reported in the Emergency Evacuation Plan. Some of this was driven by the ceiling placed on the post, but it is also clear that this list should be reviewed in some detail by all parts of the U.S. mis- sion very early on in a crisis situation. There should be full discussion with all elements and all agencies at post, and personal contact made with each person proposed for inclusion in the list. There is, inevitably, consider- able ego invested in this list, with many employees reluctant to characterize themselves as non-essential. There was a general perception that some “chiefs” were retained when it was the “Indians” who were really needed. Some perceive that this resulted in some F O C U S O N D A N G E R Z O N E S L ESSONS L EARNED IN THE 1991 Z AIRE E VACUATION O VER A DECADE LATER , USAID’ S 1991 Z AIRE EVACUATION STILL HOLDS LESSONS FOR OTHER POSTS . B Y L INDA R AE G REGORY I