The Foreign Service Journal, February 2003

essential tasks not being accom- plished at all, or not being accom- plished as quickly and efficiently as they could be. There was also considerable personal stress asso- ciated with employees being added to the essential list, then removed, than added again, through several iterations, leaving family members confused, uncer- tain and very frustrated. There was also a perception by some non-State agencies that their responsibilities were not fully recognized in the deter- mination of essential personnel. Of special concern to USAID was the feeling that there was a very poor under- standing of just what was involved in closing down (even temporarily) the USAID mission and project activities. There appeared to be a perception that the embassy administrative staff could handle such activities them- selves, leading to inadequate numbers of USAID per- sonnel being included in the list of essential personnel. A belated recognition of these responsibilities resulted in the artificial compliance with established ceilings by sta- tioning personnel across the river in Brazzaville, for return to Kinshasa during normal working hours only. Other posts would not have the luxury of this stratagem, making early and full discussion of all agencies’ needs even more critical. A specific area for which better advanced planning was needed was that of nonpersonal services, resident- hire, and institutional contractors. While many among the first two categories argued strongly that the U.S. government had a “special” responsibility towards them as compared to other private Americans resident in the country, the real problems occurred with the third category (institutional contractors). Although such contractors are not government employees enti- tled to direct agency payment of their travel expenses via issuance of a travel authoriza- tion, they are in the country on official business and their travel will, in fact, be paid for by the U.S. government through their institutions. While USAID is clearly responsible for official Americans going out on TAs, the consular section is usually responsible for private citizens, who must sign promissory notes for costs of evacuation travel. Thus, since institutional contrac- tors are something of a hybrid in an evacuation, USAID needs to work closely with the embassy early on in a crisis situation to establish procedures for handling these employees should an evacuation be required. It would also have helped to have had better coor- dination on support provided to those in the country on temporary duty at the time of the evacuation. Some TDYers were Americans, while others were not; some traveled on diplomatic or official passports, others did not; some came from the U.S., while others came from other posts, in Africa or outside the region altogether. A central point to which all agencies report their TDYers during a crisis period, and better understand- ing of which agency or agencies would coordinate the departure of such visitors, would have made for a smoother evacuation. The greatest criticism of our planning process by far related to our failure to provide early information to employees on how to prepare for an evacuation. Basic guidance, provided in the form of a checklist, would have done much to avoid the frustration, resentment and unhappiness expressed by many people over evac- uation and post-evacuation issues. (While the printed brochure provided by the State Department at that time covered some of the issues, it was not compre- hensive and, of course, was not post-specific.) Such guidance provided should, at a minimum, touch on the following: Pet care: where to leave them, how to arrange for feeding, authority to ship later if desired, authority to otherwise dispose of if necessary. Employees need to clearly understand that leaving pets in residences for domestics to feed is not allowed. It would probably be helpful to inform employees about options for shipping F O C U S F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 3 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 45 The list of essential personnel, when faced with an actual evacuation, changed substantially from what was reported in the Emergency Evacuation Plan. Linda Gregory was executive officer for USAID Zaire from 1990-1991, and then served as USAID represen- tative there. An FSO from 1987 until her retirement in 1999, she has also served as executive officer in Sudan and Guinea and as mission director in Macedonia and Niger. She is currently serving as USAID deputy exec- utive officer in Cairo on a contract basis.