The Foreign Service Journal, February 2004

1942-1943, in Lisbon as counselor and chargé d’affaires and next, during 1943-1944, in London as counselor to the European Advisory Commission. In each position he demonstrated notable initiative and a deepening sense that he, more so than those formally charged with the responsibility, knew the correct course for Ameri- can diplomacy. He seized with alacrity what few opportunities passed his way but more generally he felt ignored and on the periphery. Kennan’s sense of being ignored continued even after his return to Moscow in July 1944 as Ambassador Averell Harriman’s deputy chief of mission. The ambassador relied most heavily on his military staff and accorded Kennan no important place. Nonetheless, the new deputy relentlessly offered his views to his chief and through him to Washington officialdom. Through late 1944 and into 1945 he sustained a lonely campaign to convince policy-makers to abandon the chimera of postwar collaboration with the Soviets and to adopt a sphere-of-influence approach to European issues which, he hoped, would limit the outward thrust of Soviet power. The Soviet domination of Eastern and Southeastern Europe should be acknowledged, he argued, while the Western powers established a Western European federation capable of restricting Soviet influ- ence and power. These views had no impact and, much to his annoyance, Kennan observed the Yalta and Potsdam conferences from Moscow. The Long Telegram By 1946 Kennan had had enough. Disillusioned and despondent, he seriously contemplated resigning from the Foreign Service. Of course, he never submitted his resignation. The reason for this owed to developments instigated by a departmental request in early February 1946 for an explanation of recent Soviet behavior man- ifested, in particular, by the so-called election speeches of Stalin and his associates, and by the dispute over the Azerbaijan region of Iran. At long last his opinion was being sought out and he decided to make the most of it. Kennan’s response, commonly known as the Long Telegram, traced the basic features, background, and prospects of Soviet foreign policy and the implications for American policy. For him the motivation for Soviet policy lay in the Kremlin’s need to justify its rule. Marxist dogma provided a cover for tyranny. Stalin needed an enemy to justify his rule. But, Kennan explained, Soviet power was “neither schematic nor adventuristic” and was adverse to unnecessary risks. “Impervious to the logic of reason,” he noted, “it is highly sensitive to the logic of force.” He asserted that Soviet power usually withdrew upon encountering strong resistance. The implications for American poli- cy were obvious. The Long Telegram undoubtedly had an impact on the thinking of senior policy-makers in Washington. Kennan’s message helped construct the intellectual supports for the already-developing disposition of firm- ness toward the Soviet Union. Yet it in no sense put an end to the floundering in American policy formulation during 1946. Drift and indecision and, as one historian has put it, “waffling between confrontation and collab- oration” still characterized Truman’s approach. The Long Telegram, however, had one tangible effect. With the receipt of the message in Washington, Kennan’s “official loneliness” came to an end. As a con- sequence of it, he later correctly recorded, his “reputa- tion was made,” and his “voice now carried.” He was soon recalled to Washington and appointed in mid- April as deputy for foreign affairs in the recently estab- lished National War College. There he lectured on geopolitics and strategy to high-ranking military offi- cers, Foreign Service officers, and an occasional cabi- net member, particularly Navy Secretary James Forrestal. His time at the War College permitted him to hone his analysis of Soviet foreign policy, of the world situa- tion in general, and of the needed American response. Early in 1947 he outlined his analysis and recommen- dations regarding the problem of meeting the Kremlin in international affairs. Using the language that long would come to be associated with his name, he argued that the “inherent expansive tendencies [of the Soviet Union] must be firmly contained at all times by coun- terpressure which makes it constantly evident that attempts to break through this containment would be detrimental to Soviet interests.” Here he introduced the word and developed the concept of containment. But notably, his formulation — like his recommenda- tions in the Long Telegram — failed to highlight his preference for nonmilitary measures and, in fact, implied the use of military force, if need be, to imple- ment the policy. This is also true of a paper titled “The Psychological F O C U S 24 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 4