The Foreign Service Journal, February 2004

American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 , they tellingly cri- tiqued “the legalistic-moralistic approach to interna- tional problems,” which he argued ran “like a red skein through [the] foreign policy of the last 50 years.” This book made Kennan’s name familiar to a generation of students of international relations, but there remained only one audience that he really desired to influence — the makers of American foreign policy. Sadly for him, however, his direct and influential involvement in the making of foreign policy largely ended with his contri- butions to American policy in Korea. This painful reality was not yet clear to Kennan late in 1951 when he returned to the State Department and accepted Acheson’s invitation to serve as ambassador in Moscow, however. He eagerly accepted the task which was, he later remarked, one “for which my whole career had prepared me.” He arrived in Moscow in May 1952 at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations had reached their nadir, yet he still harbored some hopes that he could make a breakthrough and engage the Soviet leadership in genuine discussions. He was soon disillusioned as he experienced nothing but diplomatic isolation. The KGB controlled all his movements beyond the embassy and denied him any contact with the Soviet citizenry. He lived as if afflicted with “some sort of plague.” The pressure mounted, and Kennan’s frustration prompted an outburst in which he publicly compared the experience of living in Moscow to his experience as an internee in Nazi Germany. It was, he later commented, “an extremely foolish thing for me to have said.” It led to his being criticized by Foreign Service colleagues as “an indifferent diplomat.” The Soviet government protested his comments, declared him persona non grata and demanded his recall. Acheson was forced to comply. Despite the disastrous end to his brief and unhappy assignment in Moscow, Kennan made no plans to retire from the Foreign Service. He wanted to stay on at least until he could retire on a pension, and he indicated his willingness to serve “wherever the government wishes me to serve.” Acheson made no decision on the matter before the year’s end and consigned Kennan’s future into the hands of John Foster Dulles, who succeeded him as Secretary of State when the Eisenhower admin- istration took office in January 1953. When Kennan finally got through in March to see the new Secretary, he learned that there was no “niche” for him in the department. Dulles explained that Kennan was tainted by his association with containment. He needed to serve out the required three months and retire from the Foreign Service. For all intents and purposes Dulles fired him. Allen Dulles tried to recruit the man his brother had dismissed for the CIA, which he now directed, but Kennan turned him down. Instead, he waited out the three months and on a pleasant June day in 1953 quietly left the State Department and drove off to his farm in Pennsylvania. Continuing Service Kennan did not drive off into some sunset of anonymity, however. He participated, at President Eisenhower’s request, in a top-secret review of national security policy, which came to be known as Operation Solarium. There he defended the Truman strategy of containment against other proposals for nuclear deterrence and for liberation or rollback. But when this exercise was completed he returned again to his treasured farm. Eventually he decided to return to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, where director Robert Oppenheimer made him welcome. At the Institute he pursued a distinguished career as a diplomatic historian during the subsequent decades. The life of a pure academic failed to satisfy him fully. His various external involvements and commitments prevented him simply withdrawing completely into some mythical ivory tower. Significantly, he behaved more honorably and courageously than most of his con- temporaries as he attempted to blunt the ravages of the McCarthyite scourge upon the State Department, although his forthright efforts in support of John Paton Davies failed to produce their desired result. The Republican exploitation of McCarthy’s actions devel- oped in Kennan a partisan edge. He gave advice on foreign policy matters to Adlai Stevenson, whom he found an attractive figure. He continued to write and speak on contemporary foreign policy issues as he did in the BBC’s Reith Lectures in 1957, which sparked a celebrated dispute between him and Acheson over the issue of German reunification, a matter which they had first debated a decade earlier. When John F. Kennedy was elected, Kennan hoped for a significant appointment. This was not forthcom- ing, although the new president offered him a choice F O C U S 32 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 4