The Foreign Service Journal, February 2004

the soon-to-be-formed United Nations into an effective crisis management organization. The ambassador warned that these Western expectations were viewed by Stalin as naïve. Once assured that Soviet overlord- ship would be imbedded in Eastern Europe, Stalin, Kennan warned, would presumably not experience dif- ficulty in going through whatever motions were required for conformity with these strange Western schemes for “collaboration in the preservation of peace.” Prescience was not rewarded, however. As the war came to closure, Kennan found himself painfully at odds with the president’s policies, which sought accom- modation with Moscow. The ambassador was later to acknowledge that his unhappiness with policy was too narrowly grounded; that he had not taken fully into account the wartime constraints and exigencies that had confronted President Roosevelt and his immediate advisers. Kennan was proved correct, however, in his portray- al of communist excesses and in predicting the unrav- eling of the communist system that these excesses would engender. Distortions in the system would arise, Kennan averred, because of the leadership’s refusal to acknowledge policy error or accept the right of opposi- tion outside party ranks. He was among the few to detect growing divergences in outlook and goals between the mass of party members and the “self-per- petuating leadership clique.” As he wrote in American Diplomacy , “Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self- delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissi- tudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom the power rests.” Kennan anticipated that Russia would endure as a united entity in the post-Cold War era because of the profound influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the “soul of the Russian peasant and his time-honored culture” and the “pull of Russian attachment to the land.” If a middle class were permitted to flourish, he predicted in A merican Stability , a spirit of dissent and reasoned discourse would also flourish. As a result, Russia would survive and continue to be a significant factor in the politics of post-Cold War Europe. Kennan urged that when changes in the configuration of inter- nal power in Russia did occur, the U.S. should not be viewed by Russians as blatantly intrusive in their inter- nal affairs or otherwise seeking to take advantage of perceived Russian weaknesses. Later in the same work, he trenchantly observed: “Of one thing we may be sure, no great and enduring change in the spirit and practice of the government of Russia will ever come about primarily through foreign inspiration and advice.” Intellect and Insight In 1950, some academicians expressed reservations concerning the ability of a seasoned foreign policy practitioner to successfully negotiate the perceived chasm separating him from the world of scholarly endeavor. While recognizing the contributions Kennan had made in the policy arena, the more skeptical noted that he possessed limited familiarity with existing acad- emic precepts and practices. Membership in the senior reaches of tenured professordom, by tradition, could be achieved only through arduous research and successful peer group review of scholarly enterprise. Over nearly half a century, Kennan confounded the skeptics, utilizing his Russian language skills, wide- ranging contacts with European area specialists and penetrating observations on the nature of Soviet lead- ers and their basic goals to widen and enliven scholarly debate. In the process, he introduced unique dimen- sions to the study field, uniting oral history with national character and cultural analysis, fields then in embryonic development. He outclasses many contemporaries in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of existing totali- tarian regimes. However, Kennan was not far removed from academ- ic reproach. It was when offering negative commentaries on U.S. security and foreign policies that he received his sharpest criticism. He was regarded as a contrarian for pointing out weaknesses in the government’s apparent failure to meet the ends-means test needed to guide American commitments abroad. He was far from ambivalent about American involvement in the Vietnam conflict; nor was he above criticizing American endeavors in sub-Saharan Africa. However, he manifestly treasured his American roots and the country’s democratic tradi- tions. Through the decades, the ambassador has always F O C U S 40 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 4