The Foreign Service Journal, February 2005

large trust fund or the principles of someone like John Brady Kiesling, Ann Wright, John Brown or Greg Thielmann to resign or retire rather than defend an indefensible policy. Those who did not depart can excuse themselves by saying they stayed to advocate moderation — just as their leader did. But Powell moderated very little and stayed as long as he did out of self-interest, not national interest. The Horatio Alger- like story of the boy from the Bronx who succeeded by working hard ignores the fact that Powell got ahead by being the consummate loyalist. Like Alexander Haig, Powell earned at least three of his four stars as a gen- eral on the bureaucratic battlefields of Washington. And again like Haig, Powell’s ability to play the bureau- cratic game and cultivate mentors and allies resulted in his being named Secretary of State. In short, Powell owes his stature, status and wealth to the Republican elite who rewarded him for faithfully serving them. That is why Powell allowed himself to be used to help elect George W. Bush and to get him re-elected. Now that Bush no longer needs him, however, he has been let go. But what legacy has he left and how will historians judge it? To hear Powell and Bush tell it, the last four years have brought nothing but success. But is there any American interest or alliance that is better off now than four years ago? For instance, in his letter acknowledg- ing Powell’s resignation, President Bush praised him for bringing democracy to Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai is little more than the mayor of Kabul, however, and presides over a narco-state that makes Colombia look like Switzerland. Bush also described Powell as the “key architect of the Broader Middle East Initiative, which is helping spread democracy and freedom in that region.” Just which countries in the Middle East are now more democratic and free than they were in 2000? In his resignation letter to Bush, Powell noted that he had brought the attention of the world to the problem of proliferation and undertook major initiatives to deal with poverty and disease in the developing world. On the nonprolifera- tion front, both North Korea and Iran have made sig- nificant progress in acquiring nuclear weapons as the administration has dithered. Powell has said North Korea can be encouraged to end its nuclear weapons program through diplomacy and that Bush is willing to put his intention not to attack that country in writing. But Vice President Cheney, in one key meeting on North Korea, said, “I have been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” As for improving the plight of the developing world, the administration did launch the Millennium Challenge Account to promote economic growth and a plan to combat AIDS. This was done mainly because the administration needed a kinder, gentler face as it marched inexorably to war. Both programs have been grossly underfunded and are more designed to provide pork and patronage to the Republican faithful than relief to the world’s poor. Ineffective or Disingenuous? Former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer once commented that, “History is the sum total of things that could have been avoided.” It is for that reason that Powell will be most remembered for his role in invad- ing Iraq and, in particular, for his February 2003 speech at the United Nations where he made the case for war. Despite the record, Powell has nurtured the notion that he valiantly fought the good fight only to lose to the neoconservatives. But in the Oct. 18, 2004, issue of The New Yorker , Nicholas Lemann wrote: “By August [2002], Powell had come around to the view that the war couldn’t be headed off. He decided that his best F O C U S F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 23 Those who work at State will be reluctant to speak ill of Powell because he was a good boss. Dennis Jett, an FSO from 1972 to 2000, was ambas- sador to Mozambique and Peru and DCM in Malawi and Liberia. He also served in Argentina, Israel, and Washington, D.C., both in the department and at the NSC. Following retirement, he assumed his current position as dean of the International Center at the University of Florida in Gainesville. He is the author of Why Peacekeeping Fails (Palgrave, 2001) and has published over 50 opinion pieces in major newspapers.