The Foreign Service Journal, February 2005

an enemy seizure of their own country with a ferocity not previous- ly demonstrated on the battlefield in Kuwait. Even if Hussein were captured and his regime toppled, U.S. forces would still have been confronted with the specter of a military occupation of indefinite duration to pacify the country and sustain a new government in power.” Would the warnings of the first President Bush and Baker about the consequences of regime change in 1991 be applicable to 2003 as well? It’s hard to see why not. But one obvious difference is that in 2003, the imperative of doing away with Saddam was far greater than in 1991, because of concern about possible trans- fers of unconventional weapons from Saddam to al- Qaida. To the second President Bush, that considera- tion transcended all others. If those concerns had been present in 1991, they could have tipped the balance in support of regime change despite the dangers. Victories and Defeats Powell took office in January 2001 with widespread support from the public and on Capitol Hill. It helped that Powell had served for more than 30 years in the military, as national security adviser for President Reagan and as a top staff aide to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. When he spoke to State Department employees upon taking office, he said it seemed that he had been preparing all his life to become America’s chief diplomat. But to many, it seemed he was never allowed to fully fill his role as the president’s top foreign policy adviser. On key deci- sions, Bush often heeded the advice of others. Powell never became the commanding figure that Henry F O C U S F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 35 Scores of foreign governments wish there had been more in the administration who thought as Powell did.