The Foreign Service Journal, February 2005

as proof that they were the reigning ideologues of the Bush administration. The president distanced himself from the more lurid declarations. Nevertheless, mil- lions of once-friendly foreigners believe that U.S. hege- mony has come unshackled from voluntary constraints such as human rights and international law. A basic compact between America and world public opinion has thus been broken. Looking Forward Secretary Rice enters a more challenging interna- tional system than the one Powell inherited from Albright. Pres. Bush framed his presidency in pre- Enlightenment terms for a domestic audience, and the international repercussions were serious. Sec. Rice has a fleeting opportunity to reframe the U.S. government in moderate terms. No, the United States is not the cartoon monster of its critics. Nor have foreign gov- ernments circled the wagons against it. But the burden of evidence required to enlist foreign support has increased, because the political legitimacy that was once the counterpart to U.S. military and economic power has eroded. She can look at Greece as a model, 20 years ahead of its time, of the global environment. Greeks lost their faith in America’s fundamental good intentions decades ago. Like Middle Easterners, they burnish their intel- lectual credentials by disbelieving any argument put forward by U.S. public diplomacy. Anti-American rhetoric is good domestic politics. Calls in parliament to resist “asphyxiating U.S. pressure” are guaranteed applause, and ministers shrink from putting their sig- nature on any document that reflects a compromise between Greek sovereignty and America’s superpower responsibilities. Even in this unpromising climate, the traditional diplomatic arts of tact, discretion, patience and com- promise eventually achieve the goals set for them. Personal relationships built on trust and openness, vital before, are even more essential now. Knowledge of foreign languages and cultures is useful, but the indis- pensable diplomatic skill is the willingness to listen carefully. America’s biggest blind spot is the absurd faith that we can navigate the minefields of a strange country’s domestic politics better than its own politi- cians. A litmus test of Sec. Rice’s commitment to effective diplomacy will be her willingness to adapt her threat perceptions. Washington agencies have found it expe- dient since Pearl Harbor to overstate foreign capabili- ties and the degree of suicidal animosity harbored against the U.S. Few foreigners were as surprised as we were to discover that Saddam Hussein, magnified to mythic madman status by Pres. Bush, had defanged himself in 1991 as a glumly rational response to dispro- portionate U.S. and U.N. power. Rational Self-Interest Rational self-interest is less scarce a commodity than Americans believe. In rogue states no less than in Washington, however, self-interest is calculable only in a domestic political context. Were we, for example, more sophisticated about the role nuclear programs play in Iran’s bitter internal political competition, our Israeli friends and we might share Europe’s lack of cer- tainty that bathing the Middle East in fire and blood is a reasonable price to pay for a non-nuclear Iran. To elucidate those politics, and as a counterweight to alarmist clandestine reporting, we desperately need a permanent diplomatic presence in Tehran and Pyongyang. On the terrorist front, the CIA and FBI have turned the planet inside out and largely debunked our myth that the Islamic world is swarming with superhuman psychotics whose goal is to exterminate us. The global battle against terrorism becomes more focused and legitimate (and affordable) once we pay the same attention to the social, political and practical aims of actual terrorist groups that we do to theoretical possi- bilities. Democratizing the Middle East — once we find some surrogate with the standing among Muslims America has entirely lost — would be a fine thing, but it is not a cure for terrorism. Some number of Americans will continue to die from terrorist attacks, as from other preventable tragedies, but America and its allies can be terrorized — induced by fear to change their behavior — only by mutual consent. Given U.S. unpopularity and the importance and vulnerability of America’s presence in the Middle East, it would have been prudent for Powell to have insisted more forcefully that his president make a sincere effort on the Israel-Palestine dispute before occupying Iraq. The death of Arafat has since provided a painless excuse for abandoning a perverse policy of punishing F O C U S 52 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 5