The Foreign Service Journal, February 2005

and all. And let’s not forget AFSA, which worked in parallel with Secretary Powell on Capitol Hill, in the media and elsewhere to support the revitalization of U.S. diplomatic readiness. John Naland FSO AFSA President, 2001-2003 v All Carrot, No Stick To me, it appears that Secretary Powell’s approach to management of the Department of State was all carrot and no stick. Powell seemed to believe that if only he could provide the State Department in general, and FSOs in particular, with all of the funds, positions, pro- motions, equipment, buildings, security, and Internet access that they requested, then they would be unleashed to do wonderful diplomatic things to promote the nation- al security and other interests of the United States. What Powell did not recognize was that the perceived shortage of people, positions, promotions and equip- ment, etc. was not the primary problem. Rather, the greatest problem was the indiscipline of well over 85 per- cent of the FSOs of the U.S. Foreign Service, as well as the majority of the rest of the American employees of the department. Powell should have fired (in a very public manner) several of the very worst offenders during his first few months in office. This would have sent a pow- erful message that when orders are given, compliance or resignation is expected. Free of any sense of restraint, many FSOs continue to pursue their own goal of domestic regime change. The result of their rogue conduct is that State is viewed more as part of the problem, and less as part of the solution. Hence, other agencies and personnel are sought to accomplish more of our diplomatic tasks. There is a massive difference between the U.S. Foreign Service (the culture of a liberal arts college) and the U.S. Army (the culture of duty, honor, country). This difference was very apparent to me, because I served in both organizations. I started government service as an officer in the U.S. Army, serving for four years. Those of my age and I, with experience in both the Armed Forces and in the Foreign Service, have a very different view than that of the elite intellectual diplomats. We do not share their disdain for the U.S.A., nor their even greater disdain for safeguarding national security information. The organizational culture of State continues to be its greatest problem. Failure to correct it will continue to limit the contribution of the department and tarnish Secretary Powell’s legacy. Peter D. Rice FS retiree Sarasota, Fla. v Going Forward, Less Military Rhetoric, Please Secretary Powell always said that he was not just the president’s Secretary of State but also the chief operat- ing officer of the State Department. He kept his word. I think Sec. Powell, undoubtedly one of the most pop- ular secretaries of State ever, will best be remembered for his integrity and his sincere concern for his employ- ees, no matter what corps nor grade. During his tenure, Sec. Powell was able to secure funding for the department to upgrade its infrastructure, especially in key areas of security and information technology; improve employee training; and, most importantly, increase Foreign Service and Civil Service recruitment. In many ways, he brought the State Department into the 21st century, and assuredly improved employee morale across the board. However, for the new, incoming State Department administration, one thing I would like to see is less mili- tary-related rhetoric and less couching of our identity in military terms. Over the last few years, we have repeat- edly heard Foreign Service employees referred to as “second lieutenants” that work on the “front lines.” We sell ourselves by emphasizing all the Foreign Service employees killed in the line of duty, and we’ve been told our diplomat and leadership training needs to be “more like the Army’s.” This comes not only from the 7th floor, but also via State management and, at times, from AFSA as well. I realize that the intent of this is positive. It is designed to help employees secure recognition and fund- ing from Congress, to ensure we get the same annual pay raise as the military, and even to help us get recognition from USAA for insurance purposes. Nevertheless, I think the constant repetition of this military rhetoric, the constant couching of diplomatic work in military terms, over time, basically tells us that diplomacy holds no value for the U.S. government. The message is: if you’re a F O C U S 56 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 5