The Foreign Service Journal, February 2005

ceived communist threats was not confined to Asia and Africa. In 1954, alarmed by the leftist tenden- cies of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala, the U.S. assisted in the overthrow of his gov- ernment. In 1973, U.S. involvement was suspected in the overthrow and death of President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, another left-lean- ing Latin American leader. The Reagan administration saw a com- munist threat to the U.S. in the growing leftist movements in Central America, and undertook to support anti-communist elements in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Hon- duras. To many in the poorer coun- tries of the Latin American region, such activities were further evidence of “gringo” manifest destiny. Unintended Consequences Undoubtedly the most damaging of the unintended consequences of the Cold War came through the sup- port for the mujahedeen, Muslim fighters resisting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan after the invasion of 1978. The Soviet invasion set off alarms in the Carter administration that the Soviets were about to realize their dream of gaining access to the Persian Gulf. The United States saw the opportunity to make the Soviets pay a price for the invasion through providing arms and assistance, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to the resistance. Muslim fighters from Arab countries and other Islamic regions were accepted and trained for jihad against the infi- del invader. Islamic militantism was mobilized to fight the Soviets, but, once the Soviets left in 1989, the militants looked for new targets. Out of that effort to train and encourage militant Muslim forces to fight the Soviets — with extensive CIA help — grew the influence of Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaida movement, arguably one of the most serious of the unintended conse- quences of the Cold War period. The Cold War fears of communist advances were replaced in the 1990s by concern over the threat of Saddam Hussein to dominate the oil-rich region of the Gulf. But a consequence of the first Persian Gulf War was the strengthening of al-Qaida, fed by resentment over the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Opposition in the Middle East region to the U.S. invasion of Iraq is undoubtedly a reflection of beliefs fostered during the Cold War that America was anti-Muslim and sought to dominate the oil-rich region for its own purposes. In the actions taken that led to the unintended consequences of the Cold War, policy-makers were, in the main, responding to fears and attitudes in the public, the media and Congress that overwhelmed contrary views. To be sure, some prescient observers did express con- cerns, but they were brushed aside. Specifically, throughout the peri- od a constant tension existed between a view of the world held by many top policy-makers and mem- bers of Congress and the views of many with experience in the regions involved, whether diplomats, schol- ars, journalists or foreign observers. Officers in the embassy in Baghdad in 1955 raised questions about the wisdom of pressing the Iraqi government into an anti-com- munist pact. Those serving in Teh- ran in later years expressed their doubts about the stability of Iran under the shah. But these views were unwelcome to decision-makers in Washington unwilling to hear challenges to established policy. The debate over Vietnam policy is well documented. In his recent biography of Ellsworth Bunker ( Ellsworth Bunker: Global Trouble- shooter, Vietnam Hawk , University of North Carolina Press, 2003), who served as U.S. ambassador to Viet- nam from 1967 to 1973, Howard Schaffer writes: “As he settled into a steady, mutually confident relation- ship with [President] Thieu in the Nixon-Kissinger years, his messages presented a picture of sustained if uneven advance toward stability, security and a measure of prosperity for South Vietnam. “Some on the embassy staff dif- fered sharply with his assessments, especially officers in the political section but others, mostly younger officers, as well. These negative views about Vietnam’s prospects were shared by many American cor- respondents, with whom they regu- larly compared notes. This pattern, senior officials taking an optimistic view of developments, more junior ones and media representatives more skeptical, was not uncommon throughout the war.” Foreign observers were equally skeptical. Indonesians were part of an international commission in Vietnam and traveled throughout the country. In January 1975 (four F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 5 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 63 In the 1950s, the containment philosophy of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Truman Doctrine evolved into a strategy of encirclement.