The Foreign Service Journal, February 2006

new office or a new agency, but instead requires a more in- depth consideration of the broader issue of the way the U.S. government funds and organizes development activi- ties and programs. The experience of S/CRS to date suggests that more ambitious reform may be necessary. Despite the leader- ship of the able Ambassador Carlos Pascual, who stepped down at the end of 2005, the office may lack the necessary clout. The evidence for this is anecdotal. S/CRS interacts with nearly every part of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, from State’s regional bureaus and Bureau of International Organi- zations to USAID’s Office for Conflict Mitigation and Management. While most people in these offices recog- nize the need to move away from an ad-hoc response to conflict and peacebuilding, numerous reports of turf wars and budgeting concerns do not suggest a productive response to and relationship with S/CRS. This, in turn, has hurt the case for the new office on Capitol Hill. Still, support in Congress as a whole is widespread and bipartisan, if neither strong nor deep. Before S/CRS was created, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee devel- oped legislation arguing for the enhancement of U.S. gov- ernment civilian capacities for post-conflict situations, and remains seized with the issue today. In the House, Sam Farr, D-Calif., and David Dreier, R-Calif., chair of the powerful Rules Committee, are supportive of S/CRS. In both the Senate and House, legislation has been intro- duced to support the office’s functioning. Despite this backing, Congress failed to appropriate any funds for S/CRS. In part it reflects narrow interests and responsibilities within the budget process. For exam- ple, supporters of the new office have argued that proper civilian planning before an intervention, coupled with effective management of the civilian response after it, could enable the U.S. military to bring troops home faster, resulting in huge savings. An investment of $24 million for S/CRS operations and $100 million for S/CRS surge capa- bilities in a crisis situation could save $1 billion if one Army division were able to return one month earlier. Yet rather F O C U S F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 6 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 37