The Foreign Service Journal, February 2006

than embracing this argument, congressional appropria- tions staff members for State and Foreign Operations privately dismissed it as irrelevant because the $1 billion did not come from “their” budget. Another problem is that the foreign policy staff exper- tise in Congress is now largely confined to the majority and minority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. The fact that appropriations staff for State and Foreign Operations also work on the budgets for Commerce, Justice and other agencies limits the time they have to grapple with the complexities of certain for- eign affairs issues. A National Security Support Budget The funding problem for S/CRS points to the need for a national security support budget. These funds could potentially be controlled by the Office of Management & Budget, and various State and Defense Department pro- grams, as well as programs from other agencies, could be funded out of it. Aside from the S/CRS core functions budget and the Conflict Response Fund for surge response capacity, programs like the Global Peace Operations Initiative, International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Financing might also fall under its aegis. While it is impossible to know what such a budget might look like without knowing the com- plete spectrum of programs included, it is safe to say that stabilization and reconstruction activities are cheaper than war, but still not cheap. A national security support budget would require at least $1 billion, and probably more than $5 billion, a year. At present, Congress funds the aforementioned pro- grams — and many others relevant to U.S. national secu- rity interests — out of the tiny and often-cut 150 Account. The military is funded out of the huge 050 Account. Even the military recognizes the problems with this, and is trying to get around it by offering its own funds to the State Department. A far better solution would be for the Bush administration to propose a national security support budget, and press hard for the necessary dialogue with Congress to start the ball rolling. Yet if this is to happen, the way the administration pro- motes its foreign policy goals must change. Even though various offices and individuals within the Bush adminis- tration are supportive of a new office for reconstruction and stabilization, the Bush team has been largely unsuc- cessful in advocating with Congress for its avowed foreign policy goals in this area, whether it be funding for S/CRS or lifting the cap on U.S. funding for United Nations peacekeeping. The State Department’s Legislative Affairs Bureau is supposed to promote the administra- tion’s foreign policy with Congress, but based on the results to date it has not done a particularly good job. A More Public Dialogue Needed? Many observers suggest that if the Bush administra- tion really wanted the money for S/CRS, it could have gotten it. This implies that obtaining the funding was not a high enough priority. Yet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is reportedly a strong supporter of S/CRS, and in fact helped push creation of the office when she served as national security adviser. She report- edly made phone calls to secure S/CRS funding, indicat- ing a willingness to accept cuts to other department pro- grams (the usual response of Congress when funding a new program in the 150 Account). In other words, she has made S/CRS a priority. Ambassador Pascual has been a tireless promoter of S/CRS, with excellent, articu- late and frank portrayals of both why the office is needed and what he and his staff have been doing. Clearly an assessment of why the arguments have not worked is in order. Perhaps new approaches will be needed to secure funding. This may require fostering a more public dialogue about why S/CRS is needed. Americans do not understand the full extent of what peacebuilding entails. Partly, this is because it is a new endeavor, and no one really knows exactly how it should work, but partly it is because no one has ever explained why the U.S. needs to do it. The problem goes beyond the American public, however. Many members of Congress and even people in the foreign policy community remain unclear about what S/CRS is, what it is doing, and what it could do. One thing that is certainly necessary is a detailed report to Congress on what S/CRS has already done and what it will do in the upcoming fiscal year. The administra- tion cannot rely on a “trust me and give me the money” message. Congress needs to better understand what the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization would do with a Conflict Response Fund, and how national security interests are harmed if an effective U.S. peacebuilding response cannot be ensured. n F O C U S 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 6