The Foreign Service Journal, February 2007

emerges in two of the book’s appen- dices. On one side is the Public Diplomacy Council’s “A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy: Public Diplomacy in Crisis.” The council would create a “U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy” — clearly a recon- stituted U.S. Information Agency — and a Cabinet-level Interagency Com- mittee on Public Diplomacy; increase public diplomacy overseas staffing by 300 percent and program budgets fourfold; ramp up international broad- casting; and create a public-private “Foundation for the Global Future” to fund exchanges. Five members of the Public Diplo- macy Council dissent, arguing that returning public diplomacy to a sepa- rate agency “would weaken public diplomacy by separating it from policy formulation and implementation.” They caution that clear strategic prior- ities, and metrics for evaluating results, would have to go hand in hand with increasing staff and budget or beefing up broadcasting. And they are skeptical that public-private fund- ing would work, as the flow of private sector monies could be difficult to anticipate or sustain. Both sides of the argument have merit. But questions of structure or chain of command must not overshad- ow the more important dialogue between the United States and the world that this book so usefully ana- lyzes. Kay Webb Mayfield is a member of the FSJ Editorial Board. A Foreign Service officer in the public diplomacy cone, she is a career development offi- cer for mid-level PD officers. She has served in Nigeria, Taiwan and Guate- mala. The views expressed in this arti- cle are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. gov- ernment. How the War Was Lost Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Pantheon, 2006, hardcover, $27.95, 603 pages. R EVIEWED BY D AVID T. J ONES The title of this book pays tribute to General Patton’s World War II breakout from Normandy, Operation Cobra. Co-authors Michael Gordon (a military correspondent for the New York Times for 20 years) and Bernard Trainor (a retired Marine Corps lieu- tenant-general) are awesomely quali- fied to examine the current conflict in Iraq from every perspective. They lit- erally “wrote the book” on the first Persian Gulf War ( The Generals’ War ) and presumably will be first in line to do sequels, such as The Syria Excur- sion and On to Tehran. Cobra II is extensively document- ed, reflecting the authors’ direct access to most of the Iraq War’s politi- cal and military principals and their operational planning materials. Drawing on those resources, they usefully remind us that the invasion was one of the most successful combat campaigns in U.S. military history. Between March 19 and April 15, 2003 (cease-fire), a period of just 27 days, the U.S. and “willing” coalition mem- bers completely destroyed Iraqi mili- tary forces. Even more remarkably, they did so while losing just 138 troops out of over 173,000. To provide a sense of proportion, one may recall that in 36 days of fighting on Iwo Jima, 6,821 U.S. personnel were killed out of some 70,000 troops. Unfortunately, at 507 pages of text and 17 pages of (mostly) helpful maps, Cobra II frequently resembles a slog more than a “read.” Unless you are an aficionado of military books or a polit- ical-military affairs FSO, the extended insider commentary is excessive. At times it appears as if every interservice planning squabble is examined, before, during and after the war. To cite just one example, Gordon and Trainor make it clear that the theater commander, General Tommy Franks, is mainly a hero in his own mind, not anyone else’s — including the authors’. Gordon and Trainor contend that the coalition forces needed more troops at the outset, asserting that the various irregulars fighting them fore- shadowed the subsequent ongoing resistance. They even imply that the forces in-country during the operation were barely a third of the levels envi- sioned in the original plan. Yet even with the benefit of hindsight, the sug- gestion that the coalition should have encompassed nearly half a million sol- diers is really an argument that the war should not have been fought at all, because assembling such a force would have been all but impossible. Furthermore, the troops’ very success makes clear that such large numbers were not necessary to “win.” After all, coalition forces consistently swatted aside their opponents, both Iraqis and foreign volunteers. Where additional troops were badly needed was during the occupa- tion phase. And it is here that the authors hit their stride as they detail, albeit sketchily, the disconnects and policy reversals between the initial U.S. administration team under Jay Garner and the group replacing him, under career FSO Ambassador L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer. For instance, they believe that by officially disband- ing the Iraqi army (ghost force that it was), Bremer deprived the coalition of potential security units that would have obviated the need to recreate an F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 7 / F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L 53 B O O K S